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Dedication
Carbon Stock Engineering (CSE) – www.carbonstockeng.com
Carbon Stock Engineering (CSE) was formed as a consulting firm specializing in carbon capture,
transport, and storage (CCS) research and investment related services. The home office is
currently established in Paris, France but the company is focused on expanding into the US and
Chinese CCS project finance markets as the opportunities become apparent. An eventual
expansion into other countries enthusiastic about deploying CCS is possible once CSE builds a
respectable portfolio of projects in the US and China.
The founders of the firm are professional engineers and entrepreneurs with extensive
experience within the oil and gas industry. As a result they have significant contacts and
expertise dealing with the main companies that are currently interested in moving into carbon
services, especially in France and in the US. The hope is to utilize these connections to position
CSE as a bridge between the currently fragmented CCS services market and financing
mechanisms for CCS projects. The founders, Jean‐Pierre Foehn, Jean‐Michel Fonck, and Thiery
Gadou, provided an initial investment towards the start‐up expenses associated with hiring
Cameron McQuale, the lead market analyst. These costs were namely for start‐up related
administrative tasks, expert contact development, in‐depth market research of the US, France,
and China, and the creation of this report.
The Report
This paper was made possible by my position with Carbon Stock Engineering (CSE) and the
financial support of its founders. The goal for CSE in sponsoring this report was to identify
shortfalls in current service offerings and other pathways into the CCS service market. In pursuit
of this information I was hired as an analyst to conduct the necessary research required to
establish a base understanding of CCS technology, its global status, and the active projects and
players in the countries concerned. The report itself was submitted to Ecole des Mines de Paris
(Mines ParisTech) in France and Tsinghua University in Beijing, China in addition to the
Univeristy of Pennsylvania as part of a cooperative international masters program in
environmental management between those three institutions.
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ABSTRACT
THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OF A CCS‐BASED SERVICE AND TECHNOLOGY MARKET WITH A
FOCUS ON THE US, FRANCE, AND CHINA
Cameron Rolfe McQuale
Robert Giegengack
Andrew Huemmler
The international discussion regarding those tasks that will be required for mitigating climate
change has placed several new technologies on the table as possible means for upgrading the
global energy and industrial infrastructure. That process will significantly reduce the current
level of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, primarily carbon dioxide (CO2 ). Carbon capture and
storage (CCS), would add the capacity to capture and store all or most of the CO2 emissions
from both existing and planned new facilities. Carbon capture and geological storage (CCGS)
describes a more specific technology within CCS, whereby captured CO2 would be stored in
geologic formations deep underground.
Effective storage sites would be located within porous formations, deep below the Earth’s
surface, where the CO2 would be trapped within pore spaces and prevented from escaping by
an overlying impermeable geologic seal, in most cases the same seal whereby petroleum and
natural gas were naturally trapped millions of years ago. Carbon dioxide has been injected
routinely into hydrocarbon bearing reservoirs for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) projects during
the past few decades. Thus, CCGS, a relatively new strategy, is based on fundamental concepts
that are already in use.
The implementation of CCGS on a broad scale may lead to increased extraction of fossil fuels, as
energy will be required to capture and sequester the CO2 produced in combustion. Therefore,
concern for the impact of mining on the local environment and the probability of oil spills will
not be resolved. However, if the global energy industry will be restructured to measurably
reduce CO2 emissions on the time scale allotted to address climate change, CCGS will represent
a significant component of that response.
To mitigate a significant fraction of the emissions expected between 2005 and 2055, Socolow
and Pacala (2004) offered a strategy that has come to be known as the wedge concept: since no
single mitigation strategy offers the potential to reduce CO2 emissions to an acceptable level,
Socolow and Pacala suggest that many mitigation strategies be implemented in parallel in a
portfolio. Using the wedge model, the International Energy Agency considers CCGS technology a
means of preventing approximately one fifth of the global GHG emissions expected under a
business‐as‐usual scenario from now until 2050. The IEA estimate implies the construction of
3,400 projects that would couple both industrial and energy based infrastructure with the
technology during that time period (IEA CCS Roadmap, 2009).
Several factors will have a significant effect on the time and capital investment needed for
deploying CCGS at a scale that could impact global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Although
CCGS is safely deployed today; only five integrated, commercial‐scale CCGS projects exist. Until
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more commercial‐scale demonstration projects are in operation, it will be difficult to estimate
the real costs of this technology. The goals of this report are to explain the technology, give
some examples of existing projects, and discuss current assessments of the CCS market with a
focus on storage, as well as provide three country‐based case studies: the US, France, and China.
Given the level of oil production across the US, interest in receiving CCS credit for injecting CO2
as a means of EOR is growing, inspiring an increase in development of recovery‐based CCGS
opportunities. It should not come as a surprise that the two of the five existing commercial‐scale
projects where the US is active both involve EOR. Furthermore, the US has committed significant
funding to projects that will demonstrate CCGS across the country. This mix of incentives has
established the US as the most active country internationally in deploying CCGS technology on
its own soil. However, because no commitment to a global emissions‐capping treaty has been
adopted, many major American players have thus been slow to get into the international
storage market. For this reason the major storage actor present in the largest of the DOE
projects is French.
Although France has a low carbon profile, major French players have significant investment in
carbon‐intensive operations outside the state’s borders, where they hope to employ CCGS as an
emissions‐mitigation tool. In addition, several major French oil and gas‐based companies are
active players in the developing global CCGS market. The French government is active in
supporting this development, and as a result has deployed, along with additional funding set
aside for CCS, several mechanisms, such as a carbon tax that will go into effect in 2010. With the
breadth of French expertise in CCGS‐related service and technology, France is now able to
deploy the technology directly. The involvement of France in CCGS demonstration projects in
China and the USA demonstrates the global reach that France has already achieved within the
CCGS market.
The Chinese appear hesitant to commit publicly to reduction targets or to pursue a direct
application of CCGS technology on their own and are soliciting international assistance.
However, this picture is deceiving because China sees the value of developing its own expertise
in CCS and Chinese companies are pursing projects without foreign involvement so as to remain
competitive within this emerging market. Additionally, the IEA now estimates that China's coal
reserves will last ~50 years, at the current rate of extraction. The high energy penalty exacted by
capturing, compressing, transporting, and injecting large amounts of CO2 dictates that energy
efficiency must be paramount in any CCGS industry. Thus, deployment of CCGS technology
would achieve many things for the energy and environmental security of China.
The positions of France, China, and the USA in a global CCGS industry, can only be surmised at
this early stage of development of the industry. Inasmuch as the CO2 emissions of China, the US,
and Europe combined represent ~50 percent of the emissions that the IEA identifies as
capturable by 2050, the case studies developed in this report intend to assess the rate of
development of this technology. One of the economic concerns that remains is that most
discussions of CCS or CCGS mention only briefly the economic impact of the development of this
new technology on consumption of such commodities as coal, iron, steel, wire, and cement. Past
experience with the Three Gorges Dam in China and the nuclear power roll‐out in the US during
the 1960s and 1970s, should predict that prices and availabilities of these materials will be
significantly affected by the global roll‐out of CCGS. The extent to which this technology will to
mature now lies in the hands of investors in CCGS technology and the regulators of CCGS
deployment.
v
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Introduction
The higher load of global human activities is rapidly changing today’s world. The increasing
global population and especially the urban populations in developing countries are increasing
their demands for resources and the associated services are increasing linearly or in some cases
exponentially. One of the most essential of these resources is energy. Another is water, which is
required to sustain human life and is inseparably linked to the production of energy as steam for
turbines, a driver for hydropower, an oil production booster, a coolant, and perhaps one day a
storage vector for energy in a hydrogen‐based economy. Additionally, food production and
transportation are two of the main uses of energy on the planet.
Securing the energy to provide access to food is vital and fresh water provision is also becoming
increasingly dependent on energy. As a result, humanity arguably has rights to energy as means
of survival. However, given the current natural resource availability, consumption trends, and
observable and estimated ecological impacts of the current global energy system, the means by
which this energy is supplied needs to change. In his book Hot, Flat, and Crowded, Thomas
Friedman refers to the current period in history as it is briefly described above, as the Energy‐
Climate Era because it is a period where these two critical elements of human existence have
become intrinsically linked (Friedman, 2008). However, it is important to understand the
principles that provide the connection between these two systems: human energy production
and consumption and the global climate.
Climate
The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) identifies in Climate Change 2007, three
fundamental ways that the radiation balance of the Earth can be changed to affect the climate.
This is an oversimplification of the reality, but gives some basic understanding as to how the
Earth’s climate system works (Giegengack, Correspondence, 2009). One key factor is
represented by the balance between the reflectivity of the planet and the absorbency of its
atmosphere with respect to solar radiation. The Earth’s climate responds, directly or indirectly,
to changes of these factors by means of a variety of feedback mechanisms so as to return to
equilibrium (Le Treut, 2007).
Due to the limitations in current modeling technology, this model cannot adequately take into
account the role of intrinsic solar variability and other global factors, which can have major
influences on Earth's climate over the time periods in which climate scientists are interested. For
example, the thermohaline circulation of the oceans, which turns over every 1500 years and
stores roughly 100 times more energy as the atmosphere, is difficult to consider in this model.
The IPCC presents a simplified model of radiation balance because that is as far as the current
modeling industry can go at the present level of technological development (Giegengack,
Correspondence, 2009).
Carbon
One factor that regulates this absorbency dynamic is something known as the greenhouse effect
and is caused by certain gases, most of which naturally present in the atmosphere. This effect is
related to the bond length of these particular “greenhouse gas” (GHG) molecules, which allows
them to absorb and store the infrared solar energy as it is reflected by the earth’s surface back
to space. GHGs include water vapor, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide, ozone, chlorofluorocarbons
1

(CFCs), and carbon dioxide (CO2 ) ‐ the gas that has become the most popular member of the
group with respect to climate change.
CO2 is one of the two most important GHGs, along with water (vapor), in terms of its effect on
the climate due the fact that these two GHGs are found in significantly higher proportions in the
atmosphere than the other GHGs. With an actual horticultural greenhouse, which allows
sunlight to enter and heat a typically translucent building were plants are grown, it is the closed
structure that significantly slows the natural convection of that heat into the atmosphere.
Conversely, the atmospheric greenhouse phenomenon, which is not based on convection,
involves energy being trapped in the atmosphere because the wavelength of infrared radiation
is caught as a vibration in the bonds of the GHG molecules, which lengthens its residence time
and currently has the effect of keeping the global temperature at an average of 14 degrees
Celsius. This is a positive effect with regard to maintaining the existing balance between the
earth’s climate and eco‐systems.
The concerns over the human factors driving climate change are the basis for the current
climate negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol, and the resulting international treaty that aims at
limiting the production of GHGs. Given the current international political trends, a truly global
treaty that sets national production caps for of GHGs could be imminent. Global leaders met in
December of 2009 in Copenhagen, Denmark to discuss the next steps and a global climate
agreement to succeed the Kyoto Treaty, which would otherwise expire in 2012. Preparing for
the possibility of such a treaty is therefore in the best interest of companies that produce these
gases. If a global GHG emissions are regulated or “capped”, any progress in terms of developing
alternatives to or solutions for activities that are GHG intensive will be prudent and even
compulsory financially speaking. However, as the attendees of Copenhagen were unable to
agree on a solution, the debate for an international political solution continues to be hotly
debated.
Energy
The increase of fossil fuel‐based energy production/consumption since the industrial revolution
has resulted in a significantly elevated levels of GHGs, most notably CO2 as a waste by‐product.
The resulting buildup of these human activity‐related waste GHGs in the atmosphere has been
documented by climate scientists. It should be noted that the increase of GHGs is at the very
least an indication of a decrease in terms of the availability of carbon‐based energy resources.
According to Jefferies, an investment firm in New York, the power generation sector makes up
over 60 percent of the industrial CO2 .
For the moment, despite extreme irregularity in fossil fuel supplies and prices, the major
concern today arises from the effect that the increase of these gases is having on the global
climate system and potential for these effects to increase if the concentration of GHGs
continues to augment. Scientists appear to agree that the earth has been on an incremental
global warming trend for thousands of years, i.e., since the end of the last Ice‐Age. However,
what is currently being documented is that there is an overall accelerated rate of temperature
increase. In addition to the increased production/consumption of fossil fuels, global
deforestation of rainforests is considered among the most significant of anthropogenic
contributions to GHGs and the net global temperature increase, which is projected to increase
by two degrees Celsius or more if the trends for emission and deforestation remain unchecked
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from business as usual (BAU). Again it is worth noting that deforestation has many negative
aspects regardless of its contribution to the atmospheric GHG concentration.
Next, it is essential that a solution is found for what to do with all of the remaining emissions,
which will prevent them from entering the atmosphere. At the current growth and expansion
rates seen in the international industrial sectors that produce CO2 , it is expected that a
minimum of 175 billion tons or Gigatons (Gt) of CO2 will need to be eliminated by 2055
(Hotinski, 2007).
Sustainability
Simply giving the technological limitations facing those studying the climate issue is not an
excuse for continued inaction. The fact is that the current system is simply not sustainable and
the measures needed to move in a sustainable direction are time consuming, technologically
complex, and often politically unpopular. Humanity therefore has two choices. People can use
doubt and fear of change to justify continuing in an unsustainable fashion, until mankind is
forced to change by the limits of the natural system. The second choice is to change by working
with the tools available so to maintain, to the extent that is possible, a good quality of life for
people across the planet by moving society, as quickly as possible, toward a more sustainable
system.
The ideas being considered as a means for reducing GHG production are endless. However, the
actual feasibility of these ideas, in terms of the physical, economic, and political resources
needed to put the pieces in place, limits the scope of the possible solutions that are available if
the aim of implementing GHG reduction goals is to be met. Although the expansion of
renewable energy production is intended to at least reduce CO2 emissions, an overall
appreciable reduction will be extremely difficult within the short‐ to medium‐term using these
emerging GHG‐free technologies. What this highlights most is a need for a dramatic increase in
efficiency throughout the entire global system, so that the existing infrastructure is producing
the least amount of GHGs physically possible.
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The Argument for Carbon Storage
Paul Breeze, of Modern Power Systems magazine, presents a more serious situation than is
presented by the 175 Gt by 2055 prediction. Breeze in 2006 stated that, “If the growth in
demand for electricity continues unabated, and if the concentration of carbon dioxide within the
atmosphere is to be stabilized, it may be necessary to capture, transport and [eliminate via
storage] up to 350 Gt of carbon dioxide over the next 50 years (Breeze, 2006).”
Capturing the carbon and storing it with a
Storage Type
Global Capacity
portfolio of solutions commonly referred to as
Deep Saline
1,000‐10,000 Gt
carbon capture and storage ‐ or sequestration ‐
Oil & Gas Reservoirs
675‐900 Gt
(CCS) technologies, presents some options for
Unminable Coal Seams
5‐200 Gt
Total
1,680‐11,100 Gt
industries that are currently tied to a carbon
Multiple of current GHG 56x‐350x current
intensive production method. In order to build
emissions
including
non‐ emissions
the requisite new CCS infrastructure or even
stationary sources
outfit the current GHG producing industries with
Table 1 - Global CO2 Storage Capacity
Source IPCC
CO2 capture and compression facilities will be an
immense task. Construction alone will require a significant outlay of capital from governments
and private investors, without even considering the transportation and storage capital and
energy costs that are estimated as comparatively less than capture/compression but still
important at the global scale and can become more significant if efforts are not coordinated.
According to the IPCC estimations, the
amount of CO2 to be stored is enormous
but not unmanageable in terms of the
global geological capacity for storage. What
is important to understand when
considering their initial estimations, seen in
Table 1, is the pyramid of storage capacity
versus volume certainly. Based on basic
assumptions, such as the characteristics
diagram for CO2 provided in Figure 1 and
the general pore volume observations for
porous geological structures as seen in
Figure 3, an estimate can be made such as
the one by the IPCC. However, as John
Kaldi, the chief scientist at the CO2 CRC
points out, as knowledge and precise data
is obtained about the actual space where
CO2 will be stored, e.g. the amount of
resident water, the injectivity, and other
unpredictable factors are determined
about the reservoir, the total amount of
capacity decreases as is seen in Figure 2
(Kaldi, September 9, 2009). Nevertheless,
some initial countrywide assessments have
in fact increased estimates from the initial
IPCC estimate, but these developments will

Figure 1 - CO2 at Different Storage Depths
Source: CO2 GeoNet
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be discussed
section.

in

a

later

The IEA estimates that 3,400
projects are required to
achieve the goal of reducing
emissions 50 percent from
their level in 2005 (Kerr T. a.,
2009). They place CCS
investment as only 6 percent
of the total amount required
to achieve this 50 percent by Figure 3 - Basic CO2 Storage Capacity Assumptions with Increasing Depth
Source: Jefferies (converted to meters)
2050 goal. The outfitting of
more than 3,000 projects
with CCS technology alone,
not to mention the other
technology rollouts that will
be required in tandem to the
CCS scale‐up, will require
significant amounts of human
capital and place significant
strain on many global
resources such as iron, steel,
coal, and concrete and
essential industrial items
such as wire, valves, turbines,
etc. As a result it is incredibly
difficult to predict the real
Figure 2 - Storage Capacity Pyramid
costs of deploying CCS. The
Source: CO2 CRC
next section discusses the
overall picture in terms of what technologies will also be needed and will give some rough
estimates as to the costs that should be expected.

Carbon Capture and Geological Storage (CCGS)
Before engaging in an explanation regarding the details of the market potential for CCS and
examining the technology’s status in the US, France, and China, it is important to understand
exactly what CCS is and also what it is not. To clear up confusion over terms of use, the focus of
the discussion here needs to be précised to that of the capture of carbon dioxide from industrial
point sources and its geological storage in porous media. This specific technology group should
not be confused with other similar technology groupings, such as deep ocean storage and coal
bed enhanced methane recovery (ECBMR). These technologies are perhaps similar to CCGS in
many aspects and as a result are often categorized as forms of CCS. Nevertheless, they will not
be discussed at length in this paper beyond a brief description of the merits and detractions of
each relative to CCGS. The reason for excluding ECBMR is that this paper focuses on the
geological storage aspect of captured CO2 in porous media. As coal is not highly porous and the
amount of GHG mitigation that can be achieved using this technology is comparatively small
relative to standard sedimentary storage formations, ECBMR should not be considered seriously
as a storage solution but more as a gas recovery method. Whereas ocean storage does address
5

the storage aspect, the fact that it is not geological results that the solution conflicts with
several international regulations regarding waste disposal at sea. Ultimately, neither of these
alternatives to CCGS is very attractive as a real option for addressing climate change due to their
immaturity in the technological pipeline and the fact that they entail either higher risks or other
significant regulation related hurdles.
The Basics
The CCGS concept is relatively simple and the individual processes involved in executing the full
technology chain are already in use today throughout the industrial sector. In fact, with regards
specifically to injecting CO2 underground, some oilfield operators have already been engaged in
this field since 1972, using CO2 from natural and anthropogenic sources for enhanced oil
recovery (EOR) by pumping the CO2 into depleting oil formations so as to force out normally
unrecoverable oil. However, only around the year 2000 did these companies begin to
intentionally store the CO2 used for their EOR operations permanently because as CO2 is
expensive it proved more economic to recover as much of the gas as possible (IEA GHG). It is
important to clarify that extracting natural CO2 and then injecting it to recover more oil is not
CCGS and serves no purpose in terms of mitigating climate change as in fact the process
increases the overall GHG production. CCGS technology in its simplest form involves three steps:
1) the CO2 produced by a point source (e.g. an oil refinery, natural gas production facility, fossil‐
fueled power plant, steel mill, chemical or cement plant, or a waste treatment facility) is
captured by using any one of a variety of technologies and methods, 2) the CO2 is compressed
and transported either via pipeline, or in the case of long distances via ocean tanker (in some
early cases CO2 has been transported by trucks or rail due to regulatory issues with the
permitting and building of the necessary pipeline infrastructure but this is not cost effective at
scale), 3) the CO2 is injected underground using a specially designed well, similar to that used
for re‐injecting water into an oil field, and is stored in a deep geological formation, which can be
located either onshore or offshore – far beneath the ocean floor. At this point, as well as after
the storage reservoir has been filled and sealed, the reservoir that contains the trapped CO2 is
monitored for leaks and seismic issues. Continuous monitoring takes place for roughly 20 to 50
years after the storage site is closed and at that point, if the site is shown to be stable, the long
term responsibility of the storage should in most cases ideally pass from the storage site
operating company to the national government in a process called reclamation. At that point,
monitoring would become minimal. It is important to note here that the regulatory frameworks
for this process are not finalized for most countries and a large amount of work is required to
put proper laws and policies in place.
Prior to transport, it is important that the CO2 is purified to a quality level that prevents
corrosion in a pipeline and the storage of non‐GHG gases, but minimizes unnecessary cost. Paul
Breeze outlines that, “Transportation will normally take place either under pressure in pipelines
or by liquefying the gas and transporting it by sea…Underground storage could be carried out in
three different types of geological structure, empty oil and gas fields, unmineable coal beds and
within deep saltwater aquifers (Breeze, 2006).” In terms of actually geologically sequestering
CO2 , the idea is to safely and permanently store as much of the gas as is possible for the lowest
economic cost. The basic theoretical assumptions, based on existing research studies,
demonstrate that 20‐80 percent of the space in these reservoirs can be taken up by CO2 and
that the deeper the gas is stored, the denser the gas becomes until a depth of around two km,
as can be seen in Figure 1 (Metz, 2005). Below 800‐1000 meters of depth, the CO2 remains
supercritical due to the pressure and takes on some liquid‐like flow characteristics but remains
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buoyant like a gas. Most experiments aim at injecting the CO2 to a sufficient depth so as to
maintain this supercritical characteristic but some, like the US Midwest Geological Sequestration
Consortium (MGSC) project in Hopkins County, Kentucky, where 8,000 tons of CO2 are being
stored at a depth of 580 meters, will explore the possibility of storing CO2 as a gas (OGJ, 2009).
The first CCS project, called Sleipner, has been operated by Statoil in the North Sea since 1996
and stores 1 Megaton (Mt) or 0.001 Gt of CO2 per year. There were some enhanced oil recovery
(EOR) projects in the US prior to Sleipner but none were designed to permanently store
significant amounts of the CO2 . In fact it was a benefit to recover most of the injected gas
because it was expensive. EOR projects did not aim to store the injected CO2 until much later,
around the year 2000 as will be seen in the US case study (Lagneau, Second Advisory Meeting ‐
Report Review, 2009). The project to construct a CO2 treatment module at the Sleipner‐T
platform to treat the extracted natural gas produced by the operation, cost 350 million Euros.
Sleipner does give an idea of the investment needed to take this technology to the commercial
phase in that the investment will be significant to deploy CCS globally. However, Sleipner is
perhaps not a great benchmark for price estimation since it was the first pilot of its scale and
does not involve the same sort of processes that are most concerned by climate regulators, such
as power plants, steel foundries, and cement production. The costs for CCS are expected to drop
significantly as more pilots come online and experience is gained with deploying the technology,
but this implies a significant number of these demonstration facilities coming online in the
coming years (IEA GHG).
The Technologies
The source of the CO2 is best for CCS if it is concentrated, because this reduces costs and allows
for more capture methods. Jefferies has estimated the amount of CO2 from common
anthropogenic point
sources and compared
it to the concentration
of the CO2 in the flue
gases of those sources
in the Figure 4 to
illustrate
which
sources are the best
options for CCGS
application. However,
according to Sarah
Forbes of WRI, it is
Figure 4 - CO2 Point Sources: Amount vs. Concentration
Source: Jefferies
not prudent at this
point in the CCGS technology’s development to eliminate any source as too small or too dilute
(Forbes, Correspondence, 2009). Each CO2 point source should be engaged in research,
development and deployment of carbon abatement technologies including CCGS. Nevertheless,
with small sources such as ammonia and ethanol plant it may be better to utilize the high purity
CO2 for commercial purposes.
The reality beyond the Jefferies assessment in Figure 4 is that most ready sources for capture do
not yet exist. Coal gasification plants (coal to SNG and IGCC) and the advanced pulverized coal
(PC) boilers (i.e. supercritical and oxy‐fuel PC) are not yet being built at commercial scale due to
the extensive costs of these projects and the risk that they imply due to the uncertainties
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associated with state level and international climate change politics. The risks are becoming high
for building a carbon intensive plant without CCGS because this could put the project at risk of
negative financial effects from a sudden passage of any significant climate legislation.
Conversely, the costs of building the plant today fully‐fitted with CCGS technology are too high
without a climate treaty to place a price on carbon to ensure the competitively of the plant
compared to the equivalent non‐CCGS plants. The only cases that are at low risk are some
special cases where EOR or some other economic benefit apply or in the case of Norway or
Algeria where there are carbon emission taxes for the gas extraction operations. The strategy
behind the Jefferies diagram is that sources with largest CO2 emissions should aim to develop
technologies that allow
Gas Power,
them to be capable of
7.52%
Oil Power,
achieving
high
2.82%
concentrations
of
CO2,
Not
Addressable
Other Power,
Coal Power,
Addressable
which would place them in a
with CCS,
0.47%
24.44%
with CCS,
47%
position, due to their scale,
53%
Cement,
as the most appropriate
4.23%
targets
for
strategic
Refineries,
Iron & Steel,
3.76%
commercial scale CCGS
3.76%
projects designed to reduce
Figure 5 - CO2 Emission Sources Ready for CCS
the overall global GHG
Source: EEA, IEA, McKinsey
emissions.
According to McKinsey, as seen in Figure 5, coal power plants make up 24 percent of the global
CO2 emissions resulting from fixed, man‐made point sources. Of the capturable emissions, coal
power represents 52 percent and this number is growing. Based on this assessment, the primary
targets for CCGS will be regions or countries where significant amounts of their electricity needs
are met by coal. An analysis of the coal consumption and electricity ratios globally in 2006
available from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the US Energy Information Agency (US
EIA) reveals the most probable locations for most commercial CCS projects in the event of a
global emissions treaty. Figure 6 contrasts the overall use of coal with the dependence on that
resource as an electricity source by country. As CCGS is a new technology option, in terms of it
being applied at a commercial scale on plants that are for normal electricity production, the
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Figure 6 - Countries Compared by Coal Consumption vs. Electricity Ratios
Sources: Energy Information Administration (US EIA), IEA, and Personal Analysis
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results of this diagram indicate that the most significant coal‐based CCGS market growth will
most likely be seen in these countries. In fact, all of the countries that fall in the category of
having high coal consumption and/or a high percentage of power from coal can be seen as
pursuing CCS research projects, with the exception in the immediate term of India and
Kazakhstan probably due to a lack of funding for CCGS projects there. This highlights the
importance of adding CCGS projects to the list of “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM) and
Joint Implementation (JI) projects approved for accreditation under the Kyoto Protocol as an
alternative means of developed countries achieving GHG reductions. The issue of CCGS currently
being excluded from these programs will be important to resolve in terms of the policy design
process for a similar cooperative mechanism under a future treaty if one is created at
Copenhagen or thereafter. Despite many European countries being insignificant compared to
other major coal countries, the European Union (EU‐27) does consume a significant of coal as a
whole (although this makes up a lower percentage of its electricity consumption). As a result the
EU is also pursuing CCGS as a region and will award funding to 10‐20 projects being pursued
within member countries.
To give an overview of the existing capture technologies, there are currently three main
categories for CO2 capture methods: post‐combustion, pre‐combustion, and oxyfuel‐
combustion. This section briefly outlines each technology as it is used with current technology.
Post‐combustion capture is performed in a way similar to that of several modern pollution
mitigation schemes, e.g. for sulfur dioxide (SOx) and particulates, in that it involves the
separation of CO2 from normal flue‐gas. This capture method typically relies on a chemical that
bonds with CO2 when introduced to the end of a flue gas stream after other pollutants and
particulates have been removed. The CO2 is first captured by a special chemical and then
released in a second process. The chemical, which most commonly is monoethanolamine (MEA),
is typically recycled but many cost issues are related to contaminating agents in the process such
as nitrogen degrading the capture chemical. The associated family of chemicals, known
commonly as amines, is the subject of a large number of research, development, and
deployment (RD&D) projects globally aimed at reducing the cost and increasing the efficiency of
amine‐based capture processes (Breeze, 2006). This type of capture will be applied most
effectively to carbon point sources that already have high concentrations of CO2 in the exhaust
stream (see Figure 4 for examples). If the process is applied to retrofitted coal and natural gas
fired power plants, it will potentially only prove cost effective (at this stage) on newer plants,
because in many cases it would cost less to build a new, more efficient boiler along with a
capture facility than to retrofit an older inefficient plant.
Post‐combustion technology ideally removes 80 to 95 percent of the CO2 from flue gases.
However, there is a significant energy penalty lost as a result of the carbon capture process,
which are estimated at 24%‐40% for high efficiency pulverized coal plants and 11% to 22% for a
natural gas combined cycle plant due to its lower carbon intensity (Breeze, 2006). The EU aims
at reducing the current costs of post‐combustion capture by 50 percent using amine‐based
chemicals. WRI in its “Capturing King Coal” report examined an MIT‐developed efficiency
comparison chart seen in Table 3, which gives an idea as to this loss of energy that should be
expected due to the capture processes being added to a coal plant’s energy requirements. As is
visible with the lower‐efficiency plants, which burn coal at lower temperatures, fitting these
plants with capture facilities would require an increase in construction costs by 61 to 74 percent
(compared to the cost for building an equivalent plant new). The WRI report notes that the
actual prices for new power projects are much higher per kW than the number’s presented by
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MIT because of a recent increase in prices. Nevertheless, using the percentages for the expected
increase in costs if fitting the plant with capture facilities is still useful in terms of roughly
estimating what a plant needs to be prepared for when deciding whether or not to engage in a
CCGS project.

Basis: 500 MW plant net output, 85% capacity factor; for IGCC, GE radiant cooled gasifier for no‐capture case and GE full‐quench
gasifier for capture case.
(1)
Efficiency = (3414 Btu/kWe‐h) / (heat rate)
(2)
90% removal used for all capture cases
(3)
Based on design studies done in a period of price stability between 2000 and 2004.
Updated to 2005 dollars using CPI inflation rate. Current costs would be higher because of recent increases.
Table 2 - MIT CCGS Efficiency Loss
Source MIT (as found in WRI “Capturing King Coal”)

Paul Breeze outlined the market situation in 2006 regarding these technologies:
“There are currently three commercial processes available based on post‐combustion
chemical absorption. The Kerr‐McGee/ABB Lummus Crest Process marketed by ABB
employs a roughly 20% MEA solution has been used on small coke and coal‐fired boilers.
The Fluor Daniel Econamine Process, acquired by Fluor from Dow Chemicals in 1989,
uses around 30% MEA solution as the chemical absorbent. The Kansai Electric Power Co,
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Process, meanwhile, uses specially developed amines that
are tailored for particular industrial applications (Breeze, 2006).”
There are several other post‐combustion processes under research now that are aimed at
solving this and other efficiency and cost related issues. A medium to long‐term solution to this
cost issue are separation technologies such as membranes, which can be employed at higher
concentrations of CO2 but this would require technology that releases much purer streams of
CO2 than traditional boilers. The next two capture methods address the creation of purer CO2
streams.
Pre‐combustion capture implies removing most of the carbon prior to combustion and
therefore a change in the actual energy production process meaning the construction of a new
plant. This technology is the entry step to a hydrogen based energy scheme: once the carbon is
removed from any hydrocarbon you are left with hydrogen. If pure hydrogen is not the aim, a
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more hydrogen rich fuel is an economic alternative, creating a gas similar to CH4 from nearly
pure carbon fuels like coal, or carbon intensive fuels like petroleum, and biomass. Biomass could
prove a very interesting candidate for CCGS because if the bio‐mass is harvested sustainably,
this could lead to negative emissions in terms of carbon accreditation.
Using oxygen or high temperature steam with some sort of catalyst, fossil fuels can be caused to
react and produce carbon monoxide and hydrogen in a mix called synthesis gas or syngas. If
syngas is passed through a second steam reaction, hydrogen and CO2 are produced with an
efficiency rate of 76 percent for natural gas conversion and 64 percent for coal. If the CO2 is
made ready for transport and storage, an additional 3 percent of the efficiency is lost. Integrated
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) plants are plants that today take heavy oil residues, coal,
petroleum coke, etc. and gasify them, creating syngas. IGCC technology has a great potential for
coupling with CO2 pre‐combustion capture. The efficiency comparison of an IGCC plant with the
more traditional pulverized coal boilers can be seen in MITs analysis in Table 3. Another
technology to watch in this sector is Greatpoint Energy’s coal and biomass gasification plant that
makes “bluegas”, which is very similar to natural gas and can be sold commercially, and a very
pure form of CO2 that would be readily available for storage. The project is similar to a steam
methane reformer but utilizes their patented catalyst to significantly reduce their energy costs
for their demo plants they are building in Massachusetts and soon in Southern China
(Greatpoint Energy, 2008‐2009).
Oxy‐fuel combustion is the remaining technology for capture and it is designed to address the
problems that arise with burning a fossil fuel feedstock with normal air are that the combustion
flue gases contain a significant number of other elements found in air, mostly (up to 75 percent)
nitrogen. An oxy‐fueled capture process uses air separators to remove the nitrogen from the
intake air needed for combustion. Air typically contains roughly 80 percent nitrogen, 19 percent
oxygen, and 1 percent argon with some other compounds found in very small quantities and this
process removes the nitrogen (Lagneau, Second Advisory Meeting ‐ Report Review, 2009).
However this process creates two issues for CCS projects employing oxy‐fuel. First, burning a
fossil fuel with pure oxygen generates temperatures upwards of 3,500 degrees Celsius and so to
resolve this issue, some of the CO2 needs to be cycled back into the intake air stream to dilute
the oxygen with a non‐reactive additive. Second, with the removal of nitrogen the percentage of
argon and other trace gases increases (argon to roughly 4.5 percent) and as it is a large gas this
can prove problematic when it comes to storage. Air Liquide and some other gas separation
specialists are working to address this purity issue. This technology requires further
development at this stage but can prove promising for industrial retrofitting projects such as
coal and gas power and also steel and cement plants.
The transportation of CO2 takes place at a commercial scale already via onshore pipelines,
especially in the US where it is already used since the 1970s for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and
the infrastructure that exists now takes CO2 from both natural reserves and anthropogenic
sources close to oil producing regions, especially in Texas (McKinsey, 2008). However, the
viability of using CO2 for this purpose was not widely published until much later, but this will be
discussed in a later section. A pressure of 1450‐2175 pounds per square inch (psi) or 10‐15
megapascals (MPa) is needed to pipe the CO2 in a supercritical liquid state, and the pipelines
can be made of steel as long as the moisture is minimal to prevent extensive corrosion (Breeze,
2006).
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The costs predicted for a large‐scale deployment of CO2 infrastructure depend on the method
and distance as seen in Figure 7 and in Table 2, with offshore transport increasing costs by
roughly 50 percent versus onshore, and with shipping becoming the economic choice after any
distance over 1,500 km (Breeze, 2006) and (Alexander, 2009). However, these costs are hard to
generalize because they represent the cost of transporting CO2 and do not account for litigation
and permitting and also do not take into account “trunk lines” where additional CCGS
operations tie into an existing grid and contribute to the associated construction, operation, and
maintenance costs of that line.
Jefferies lists the players in this existing merchant market as: Linde, Airgas, Praxair, Air Liquide,
and EPCO (Alexander, 2009). In terms of existing pipelines, the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ) has
compiled a list of the existing pipelines, most of which exist in correlation to the existing CO2
based EOR projects in the Southern United States. The current locations for the current global
commercial onshore CO2 pipeline infrastructure exist almost entirely in the US and Table 6 lists
the most well know projects by location and operator expanded from OGJ. Norway has the
longest offshore pipeline with 145 km of pipeline between its Snøhvit CO2 storage
demonstration and its Melkøya liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing plant (Acworth, 2006).
Canada also has several smaller pipelines and is developing a more extensive network for its
EOR operations there.
The current CO2 high pressure pipeline in the US is made up of roughly 5,000 km with a capacity
of 0.042 Gt per year of CO2 . To accommodate transporting carbon to storage sites in the US
alone, Jefferies predicts a 10 to 50 fold increase or the construction of 95,000 to 245,000 km of

Cost (USD/Ton)

50

Onshore Pipeline

Offshore Pipeline

Ship

40
30
20
10
0
500

1,000

1,500

2,000

3,000

Distance (km)
Figure 7 - CO2 Transport Costs in USD per ton
Source: Paul Breeze, Business Insights
Transportation Method

Cost (USD per ton)

Onshore Pipe (250 km)
1‐8
Offshore pipe (250 km)
2‐12
Up front capital cost
1.6‐3.2 million USD per km
(USD per km of pipe)
(labor 26%, materials 25%, rights of way 14%)
Shipping
2‐25
Table 3 - CO2 Transport Cost Breakdown in USD
Source: Jefferies

pipe to hold a capacity of 0.42 to 2.1 Gt CO2 (Alexander, 2009). Jefferies gives an estimate that,
“to build a pipeline 50 [times] the current network in the U.S. would cost 180‐360 billion USD in
capital outlays, assuming no impact on the price of steel, molybdenum, valves, pipes, and other
materials. Similarly, property rights and related litigation would surely increase this outlay.” To
deal with some of the potential litigation issues CO2 furthermore needs to be classified as a
pollutant or a commodity for extensive interstate/province or international pipeline networks
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and this entails the consensus extensive national and international governmental bodies and
agencies.
One major issue that is highlighted by Jefferies is that “there could be significant complications
when investors attempt to scale up [CCS transport] projects.” This is because there is significant
risk associated with dramatically expanding existing capacity, or building of any extensive new
CO2 infrastructure, because if the network of CO2 pipelines becomes on par with the existing
natural gas pipelines, this could entail an equal number of accidents, which they roughly
estimate as 550 per year for natural gas in the US (Alexander, 2009). Understanding what this,
other transport risks, and legal issues mean, in terms of what precautionary steps would be
required to get such projects approved, is vital to any rollout of CCS at a commercial scale. A
solution that could resolve many of these issues is if the storage sites can be found close to
significant “clusters” of carbon intensive industries and power plants. If these clusters could
combine their captured CO2 emissions and inject them into a local formation, the need to
transport CO2 through populated areas and across major political borders could be avoided, as
well as a need to create such an extensive network of high pressure CO2 pipelines.
Onshore
Pipeline

Location

Operator

Cortez

USA

Kinder Morgan

USA

Capacity
(Mt
CO2/yr)

Length
(km)

Year

CO2 Sources

19.3

808

1984

McElmo Dome

BP Amoco

9.5

660

1984

Sheep Mountain

USA

BP Amoco

7.3

350

1984

Bravo Dome

USA

Kinder Morgan

5.2

225

1972

Gasification Plants

Val Verde

USA

Petrosource

2.5

130

1998

Bati Raman

Turkey
USA &
Canada

Turkish Petroleum
North Dakota
Gasification Co.

1.1

90

1983

Val Verde Gas
Plants
Dodan Field

5

328

2000

Gasification Plant

Rangely

USA

Chevron/Exxon

3

283

1984

In Salah

Algeria

Sonatrach/BP

1.2

60‐100

2004

Lacq

France

Total

0.2

27

2000

Offshore
Pipeline
Snøhvit

Norway

Statoil

0.7

145

2008

Sheep
Mountain
Bravo
Canyon Reef
Carriers

Weyburn

LaBarge Gas
Processing Plant
Gas Processing
Plant
Oxy‐fueled Gas
Power Plant

Melkøya LNG Plant

Table 4 - Existing CO2 Pipelines
Sources: SPE, Oil and Gas Journal, CO2CRC, BP, Chevron

As mentioned, the main focus of this report is on the storage aspect of CCGS and therefore
storage will be outlined here only briefly in general terms, with more to follow in the next
section. The concept of geological storage is that the CO2 would, as outlined in the two previous
sections , be compressed and piped (or even shipped) to various storage locations, either on‐ or
offshore, and injected into the appropriate geological formations. This can be for an economic
benefit, with locations such as depleted oil fields that can benefit from the EOR, or simply
storage, in places such as saline reservoirs. All of the storage locations should be sufficiently
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deep as to maintain the ideal pressure for keeping the CO2 dense, to save space, and sufficiently
sealed in by “cap‐rock” formations, so that it does not infiltrate drinking water sources or
migrate to the surface.
Currently there are several existing demonstration/pilot projects conducting CCGS for a variety
of reasons in several different types of geologic formations and these will be illustrated in detail
in the next section. The one type of geological formation that will not be discussed here, as
mentioned earlier, is deep un‐mineable coal seams where the idea is to boost methane (CH4)
recovery by replacing the CH4 with the CO2 molecules. There is also an emerging storage
method that involves mineralization of the CO2 either above ground in an industrial plant (ex‐
situ) or underground, where the CO2 bonds naturally with basaltic formations, as is being
looked at in the Hellisheidi project in Iceland and at several other locations worldwide. These
are discussed further in the alternatives to CCGS section because they are viewed in this report
as an unappealing GHG mitigation option at a global scale, based on current research on the
existing technologies.

CCGS Compatible Geology: Where Can Large Amounts of CO2 be Stored?
Any sufficiently porous media that is overlain by an impermeable cap‐rock formation, which
would prevent the escape of any gas (or pressurized liquid) residing there and is not overly
saturated with water, should in theory work for CCGS. The majority of the current international
focus ‐ in terms of research studies, pilots, or projects moving towards the commercial scale ‐
has been on three types of underground formations: depleted oil fields, depleted gas fields, and
deep saline reservoirs. These vary in size and shape but physically all of these formations are of
the same sedimentary rock types, the difference being that a hydrocarbon bearing formation
has trapped oil or gas from a source rock below it and therefore is predisposed to preventing
things stored there from escaping to the surface as it did with the hydrocarbon for millions of
years. If any oil is still present, the type of oil may be or may not be conducive to CO2 based
enhanced recovery (EOR). Sarah Forbes, the CCS research specialist at the World Resource
Institute (WRI), has confirmed saline reservoirs as ideal for storage sites, which is important
because they are the most widely available globally and offer the best solution in terms of local
storage options (Forbes, Phone Interview, 2009). The dissolved salts and metals of saline
reservoirs make them of little value in terms of drinking water, given the high costs of current
desalination technology. For this reason these have become of interest for the storage of not
just CO2 but also other substances such as natural gas. However, without an assigned price to
carbon it is unclear if the storage of CO2 will take place at a commercial scale without some
economic benefit such as EOR.
To give a broad picture of what CCGS is, Figure 8 gives an idea of the different possible project
scenarios, with on‐ and offshore setups, all three geological formations, and EOR/EGR taking
place on the hydrocarbon formations. Many sources at this point state that for efficient
injectivity, it is compulsory to attain a sufficient depth so as to maintain an adequate pressure
range, ideally one equal to that of the transportation network of 1450‐2175 psi (10‐15 MPa)
(Lagneau, First Advisory Meeting, 2009). However, other sources like WRI disagree stating that
all cases need to be evaluated. In terms of storage principles, Geostock of France suggests a
minimum depth of 500‐2000 meters as a general reference for the storage of any gas, including
natural gas, compressed air, and CO2 . However, as is suggested by the Jefferies diagram in
Figure 3, this may not be ideal for maximizing storage capacity (Geostock). However, the
Jefferies range conflicts with the transportation pressures and therefore a cost‐benefit analysis
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is needed to determine the true optimum depth range and this may not be possible except on a
site‐by‐site basis according to Forbes.

Figure 8 - CCGS Geology Scenarios

It is held as important by many in the CCS field, such as John Kaldi of the CO2 CRC, that a depth
be achieved to obtain pressures/temperatures to maintain the CO2 at a supercritical state.
However, Forbes points to a DOE partner, the Midwest Carbon Sequestration Partnership
(MCSP), project in Hopkins County, Kentucky in the US, which is attempting the storage of CO2
at a shallower depth of 580 meters, meaning this would be in a gaseous state (OGJ, 2009). The
diagrams in Figure 9 allow for a comparison of a CO2 phase chart with the suggested depths
given by various sources relative to an average hydrostatic pore pressure gradient [assumed at
1.4 psi/m (0.43 psi/ft)] and given a general geothermal temperature gradient range. The yellow
section highlights the conditions needed for maintaining CO2 at a supercritical state but given
that a reservoir can be overpressure or underpressure, meaning that due to other factors the
observed pressure in the reservoir may be higher or lower than the standard pore pressure for
that depth, some margin of safety should be established so that all ranges of pore pressure
experienced within the reservoir will be manageable.
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Sarah Forbes warns that until more projects come online for analysis and real regulations are
formed, what remains paramount are the main criteria for using a geological formation for

Figure 9 - Phase Chart of CO2 and CO2 Storage Depths and Pressures
Sources: Jefferies, Ecole des Mines, Geostock, Schlumberger, Personal Analysis

storing any gas and determining the storage formation rests directly beneath at least one, but
ideally several, impermeable cap‐rock layers that will prevent upward migration of the gas and
protect overlying freshwater aquifers from CO2 as is illustrated in Figure 8. It is also beneficial
for the reservoir to have anticline characteristics so as to prevent extensive horizontal migration
of the CO2 to areas beyond the projects ability to monitor the site’s integrity. Monitoring must
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take place throughout operation and continue for some time after the storage site is closed to
additional CO2 , until the CO2 is determined to have stabilized, so as to ensure long‐term storage
security.
According to WRI, “Careful characterization of potential storage sites is perhaps the single most
important step to ensure that CCS projects can sequester CO2 for geologic periods of time
(Venezia, 2008).” Several projects have been completed estimate CO2 capacity globally.
GeoCapacity is a European consortium project that took existing GESTCO country data and then
conducted investigations on many of the remaining countries of Europe, releasing a final report
released in 2008. The Carbon Sequestration Atlas of the United States and Canada is a project by
the National Energy Technology Lab (NETL) and the US DOE called the NatCarb Project and was
completed in 2008. The results of the work indicate that the US, Canada, and Europe alone have
the sufficient geological formations to store what the IPCC initially estimated as the global CO2
capacity. Further work is underway to determine the possible storage capacities globally,
including work in Australia by the CO2 CRC collaborative effort and efforts by the GeoCapacity
consortium and others to map East Asia. A recent report from the NRDC has released some
estimates for China’s estimated capacity (Qian, 2009). Nevertheless, it is important to
remember what was discussed earlier in the report regarding the storage capacity pyramid. This
stage of national level estimations, although they are helpful in terms of giving a better picture
of the existing formations that could be capable of CO2 storage compared to the rough estimate
given by the IPPC, it is still only the bottom of the pyramid meaning it is an exaggeration of the
actual capacity. Further efforts need to now take place on the basin‐ and project‐ scale.

The Key Demonstration Projects
This section gives some examples of existing CCS projects that are in operation around the
world. The characteristics of the early projects that follow must be taken as references only as
first of all, many of the situations are naturally ideal, and secondly, these projects were not all
developed explicitly to develop the CCGS technology portfolio – many having been due to other
economic and political drivers. Because the reservoir types concerned by CCGS are broken down
into three categories: deep saline reservoirs, depleted oil fields, and depleted gas fields, as a
means of examining these formations more closely and the progress, the pilot projects are
sorted by their formation type. Basalt is still being evaluated as a storage vehicle and therefore
as a project of the same scale does not exist, it is not included here. The projects descriptions
are given so as to understand why these projects were pursued and it should be noted that
none of this projects are really completely integrated in that they are none of them was
designed to be a standalone capture, transport, and storage project.
Deep Saline Reservoirs: Statoil in North Sea and Snøhvit in Barents Sea
StatoilHydro, the lead Norwegian oil producer, is a pioneer in the CCS field and established the
first CCS project without commercial motivation (EOR) in 1996. Apparently, Sleipner is named
after a mythical eight‐legged horse that was the fleetest animal on Earth and the idea is now
that it will lead the world in the development of CCS technology (Bazilchuk, 2007). The Sleipner
project in the North Sea was undertaken because the Norwegian Government passed a tax on
each metric ton of CO2 emissions resulting from offshore gas field production. The high level of
CO2 at the Sleipner Gas Field (12 percent) with the CH4 made the idea of capture and storage
interesting because there is a limit of 2 percent CO2 for commercial grade natural gas and so the
CO2 is removed anyway. The initial estimate was that it would cost slightly more than the tax to
store the captured CO2 in a saline reservoir within the Utsira Formation, so the project began
17

for the pure gain of the potential scientific benefit. However, once operations were underway
the CO2 storage costs ended up being less than the tax and so the project in fact saved money
compared with venting the CO2 and paying the tax, although the costs of the project’s
construction were significant at 350 million Euros (Lagneau, First Advisory Meeting, 2009).
Because the project is the first to explore the storage of CO2 in a saline reservoir formation,
there is a great deal of interest as to how the gas will behave. Since the storage operations
began in 1996, roughly one Gt CO2 has been sequestered annually for the past 13 years. The
saline reservoirs in the Utsira Formation used for the storage, are 200 to 250 meters thick and
lie 250 km from the Norwegian coast and nearly 800 to 1,000 meters below the seabed (IEA
GHG). The plume of CO2 within the brine reservoirs at Sleipner is being monitored with the
support of the IEA and many other members of the scientific community. The area of the CO2
plume today is roughly 5 km in diameter (Audigane, 2009). The gas is slowly dissolving into the
salt water and as this brine becomes saturated with CO2 , it will become heavier and sink to the
bottom of the aquifer over about seven or more thousand years, making leakage even less
likely. The gas also mineralizes to some extent, but this is at a much slower rate than it is
dissolved into the brine (Audigane, 2009). The Sleipner saline reservoir sequestration scheme,
illustrated in Figure 10, is looked to by the CCS community as a model, and is the basis for the
Socolow “wedges scheme” target that calls for the creation of a global capacity of “3,500
Sleipners” or the ability to sequester 3500 Mt (3.5 Gt) per year of CO2 . It has been estimated
that the Utsira formation could eventually store one to ten Gt of CO2 and is looked at as a
potential site for storage of the emissions from the new Norwegian Kårstø gas‐fired power
plant, north of Stavanger. According to the Norwegian Government, Kårstø will be outfitted with
a carbon capture facility after its production stabilizes, but this remains to be seen.
It is important to take into account that Sleipner is a very ideal case in terms of injectivity, being
that the Utsira formation is
essentially loose sand. The
geologic scenario found in
the Utsira formation, in
terms
of
porosity,
permeability, and other
factors, and is not by any
means what is being found
elsewhere or what should be
expected
in
other
formations. The Sleipner case
is good to be used as an
example, as is done by many
research institutes such as
BRGM (the French Geological
Survey) who have modeled
the Sleipner case to predict a
7,000 year period for
absorption of the injected
CO2 into the brine or fixing of
the carbon via mineralization
Figure 10 - Statoil Saline Storage Projects
Sources: Statoil, Canadian Geographic, Personal Analysis
(Audigane, 2009). However,
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it should be used as one example among many and the reality is that there are really not enough
examples at this point. Until the time when CCGS is more common place, no general rule should
be followed and as Sarah Forbes of WRI recommends, each case should be examined within the
context.
Snøhvit, another more recent Norwegian project, is taking place further north and this project is
engaged in a different approach from what is performed at Sleipner. The Snøhvit case is also
illustrated in Figure 10 because instead of an onsite gas separation unit, as was constructed
offshore at the Sleipner‐T CO2 processing and injection station, the gas is shipped to a liquid
natural gas processing facility called Melkøya, just outside Hammerfest. Because the CO2
liquefies at a much higher temperature/lower pressure than CH4, the separation process is
probably facilitated by the LNG processing plant, but an amine chemical process is still required
as is performed at Sleipner‐T (Fonck, 2009). The separated CO2 is then piped 145 km back out to
the Snøhvit rig, in the longest existing offshore CO2 pipeline. Once it reaches the Snøhvit rig, the
CO2 is stored below the gas field in a saline reservoir 2,600 meters below the sea floor. This
reservoir is located within the Tubåen Sandstone Formation (Statoil, 2008). Injection of CO2
began in 2008 and is estimated to reach 0.7 Mt per year at full capacity making it one of the five
largest existing CCGS projects to date.
Oil Field: Weyburn‐Midale EOR Project, US‐Canada
Weyburn Oil Field in Saskatchewan Province, Canada was estimated to have 1.4 billion barrels of
oil when it was first tapped in 1955. Oil production there peaked at 47,200 barrels per day in
1966 and then declined to only 9,400 barrels per day by 1986 (SEED, 2009). The injection of CO2
began in 2000 to increase recovery (EOR) in tandem with water injection in a nine well
production structure, with the central well serving as the injection point and the eight perimeter
wells producing as is shown in Figure 11. A gasification plant in Buelah, North Dakota is currently
contracted by EnCana, the company operating the Weyburn field, to ship its captured, 95
percent pure, CO2 via a 330 km pipeline for the gas to be sequestered in the field. Since the CO2
EOR began, at least 10,000 barrels of additional oil have been gained in daily production (this
was the amount documented by 2005), which is an increase of about 60 percent from the point
before injection began in 2000 (Lawrence, 2008). If the estimations are correct, it is expected
the EOR will extend the Weyburn field’s life by 25 years and amount to about 120 million barrels
in total, which is just under 10 percent of the estimated total reserve.
According to Paul Breeze, the injection rates started at 5,000t/day but are expected to fall to
3,000t/day by the end. Over this time about 23 Mt of CO2 will be injected into the field and
sequestered there (Breeze, 2006). EnCana quotes a higher figure of 30 Mt or 0.03 Gt for the
Weyburn field. This amounts to over 1 Mt of CO2 sequestered annually, but the exact amount
changes depending on the source. The operation has been augmented by a second EOR‐based
storage project in the adjacent Midale Oil Field, operated by Apache, and recent reports say that
together the new combined total amount of CO2 stored annually by the Weyburn‐ Midale
Project over 3 Mt, which translates to 8,800 tons of CO2 injected daily by their reports. The
Geological Survey of Canada quoted higher numbers for the overall injection amount in 2007 of
9,800 tons per day or 3.58 Mt annually, but it is important to consider the amount of new CO2
purchased each day to know how much is being recycled. The state that the amount of CO2
recycled is 21 percent for Weyburn (White, 2007). However, given that the purchase rate for
CO2 is 6,600 tons per day or 2.4 Mt, this is the amount of CO2 that is actually being stored. This
issue of CO2 recycled versus purchased is discussed further under the US case study for the
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Rangeley EOR project. This injection amount of 2.4 Mt nevertheless still places the project as the
largest existing storage operation to date (IEA GHG, 2009). Several sources have raised the
possibility that the CO2 is in fact being absorbed by the sedimentary rock and while further

Figure 11 - Weyburn EOR Project
Sources: Canadian Geographic, Personal Analysis

investigation is necessary, this could mean that the CO2 would remain trapped indefinitely. A
similar project to the Weyburn‐Midale effort is the Rangeley EOR project in Colorado which uses
CO2 taken from an Exxon operated gas sweetening plant at Shute Creek, Wyoming. However,
the Weyburn project is especially important because, even though it is focused on EOR, it is the
only large scale project that takes the emissions from an industrial operation, as opposed to
natural gas processing, and stores them underground. This makes the commercial scale
Weyburn‐Midale project the closest thing to an example of an operating, fully integrated CCGS
project.
Gas Field: In Salah, Central Sahara Region, Algeria
The success of the Sleipner project subsequently led Statoil to apply their emissions mitigation
approach, in cooperation with BP, to the In Salah gas field in Algeria. In Salah is one of the
largest dry gas joint‐venture projects in Algeria and produces 9 billion m3 of natural gas
annually. The venture involves the development of seven proven gas fields in the southern
Sahara, 1,200 km south of Algiers. The project’s major partners are Statoil and BP (each with a
32 percent share) and Sonatrach (the major Algeria oil company with a controlling 35 percent
share). The natural gas produced at In Salah contains roughly 5 to 10 percent CO2 and for the
CCGS project and as such the project is similar to Sleipner and Snøhvit in that it is designed to
separate CO2 from the production of natural gas. However, in this case it is an onshore
operation and the CO2 is reinjected into the same formation where the gas originated, only it is
not at the same location. An estimated 1.2 Mt of CO2 from four gas production wells will be
stored each year via three injection wells located roughly 60 to 100 km away in a depleted gas
field near Kretchba as illustrated in Figure 12 (Wright, 2007). The depth of the target formation
at the Krechba Field is roughly 1,800 meters and injections began in mid 2004. However, unlike
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Sleipner the project utilizes horizontal injection wells. This is because the injectivity is not as
high in the Kretchba Field as it is within the Utsira Formation for Sleipner. The horizontal wells
allow for multiple injection points throughout the formation so as to increase the otherwise
more limited rate of injection (Forbes, Correspondence, 2009).
Together the partners estimate that 17 Mt (0.017 Gt) of CO2 will be stored over the life of the
project. The total cost of the CCGS development work was 100 million USD, with an additional
30 million USD allocated for CO2 monitoring (Forbes, Correspondence, 2009). The idea is to
demonstrate CCGS as a proven method of GHG reduction and as a result achieve approval of the
technology for CDM and JI accreditation (Wright, 2007). As such In Salah is the first project of its
scale to investigate onshore storage of CO2 in a depleted petroleum reservoir without any

Figure 12 - In Salah CCGS Project
Sources: BP, Sonatrach, Personal Analysis

economic benefit of enhanced recovery (EGR/EOR). The project’s goal of getting the technology
approved under the current international regulation is vital, in terms of achieving the global
scale‐up that is needed, because then CCGS can more easily be found eligible for carbon credits
in any emerging global climate treaty designed to replace Kyoto.
In addition to the early projects that are documented above, there are major efforts underway
at the international scale. There are a sizable collection of projects that are planned or coming
online now across the globe, which are concentrated in North America, Europe, and Australia,
but are also visible in China, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The map that follows in Figure 13
illustrates where these projects are operating or are planned to be according to Worley Parsons
who completed a project identifying and interviewing the project teams for the current CCS
activities for the Global CCS Institute (GCCSI). This is a more complete combination than the
maps developed by the Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage, MIT, the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ),
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the World Coal Institute, Bellona, and Canadian Geographic, but these maps also provide an
interesting perspective on the global developments of CCS and detail the contain good
information about the smaller CCS projects that exist today, are planned, or have failed for
various reasons.

Figure 13 - Planned and Operational Large-Scale (>1 MtCO2/year) CCS Projects
Source Worley Parsons/GCCSI as presented by the IEA

Further exploration into the reasons for some past projects having failed or gone offline is an
important task in terms of understanding whether the causes were political, technical, financial,
legal, or a mix of some or all of these factors. Being able to account for these “failures” is
important to advancing the CCGS field to the global scale that is expected and more work should
be done to catalogue these unsuccessful projects. There are also numerous smaller pilot CCGS
projects, CO2 injection for EOR, and CO2 injection tests that have been completed at this point,
and these can offer some insight as to what expect with CCGS and also provide insight for the
final stages of injection and the sealing of storage reservoirs for future commercial projects.

Comparing CCGS with other Similar Technologies
If one considers the energy technologies available individually and compares them, there are a
variety of solutions available that could in theory be used as a replacement for a roll‐out of
CCGS. However, as 88 percent of the current global energy production is made up of carbon‐
based sources and six percent of what remains comes from nuclear, a complete change is close
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to impossible in the time frame being discussed within the climate context. The Boston
Consulting Group sums up the situation today:
Most mitigation actions undertaken so far have focused on improving energy efficiency or
deploying renewable or alternative forms of energy. Although both energy efficiency and
renewable and nuclear energy must be pursued, conventional wisdom and the opinion of
experts indicate that these efforts will not be sufficient to contain increasing global carbon
emissions (Baeza, 2008).
Although the IEA estimate predicts that this would result in a 70 percent increase in costs, the
basic wedges theory in fact does not preclude a solution assembled from a combination of
wedges that do not include CCS at all. Given the position of coal and other carbon intensive fuels
in the global energy mix it will be difficult to avoid addressing those emissions, not to mention
the emissions implied in waste management as well as in steel, iron, cement, chemical
production processes. Additionally, when comparing energy supplies, it is very important to
understand what it is being compared and the compatibilities of the alternative technologies to
CCGS in terms of their truly serving as an apt replacement solution. For instance, wind, solar and
other new renewable technologies are important solutions in the global picture. However, these
energies are intermittent and cannot be used to deliver base load power without significant
advances in energy storage technologies. The following sections outline briefly both direct
alternatives to CCGS, as well as solutions that would work in tandem with a CCGS outfitted
global economy.
CO2 absorption by the ocean has always taken place via several natural chemical processes
involving partial pressures of gases present in the atmosphere for as long as there have been
bodies of water on Earth. There is an increasing rate of this natural storage of CO2 , as a
dissolved gas, within the ocean is due to an increase in global atmospheric CO2 concentrations.
One result of this is an observed incremental increase of the ocean’s acidity. CO2 creates
carbonic acid when dissolved in water and the current documented changes in the ocean’s pH
are already having significant impacts on
coral and other sensitive marine life. This is
largely because it makes them expend more
energy to build their shells and carbonate
structures. If the atmospheric levels of CO2
were to change and go back down, a release
from the dissolved CO2 contained in the
oceans as a result of a reverse equilibrium
process could substantially prolong their
stabilization at pre‐industrial levels.
However, this is not at all the same process
that would be taking place with “carbon
capture and ocean storage” (CCOS). The
concept of CCOS is fairly simple. Deep in the
ocean there are similar levels of pressure as
are found in deep geological formations.
However, the temperature is close to 30
degrees Celsius, which is much lower than
those found in cases of underground

Figure 14 - Ocean Storage of CO2
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storage. When the CO2 is pumped from a pipe into the ocean at a sufficient depth, the
supercritical gas is heavier than water. As a result, the gas sinks and forms a pool on the bottom
as seen in Figure 14. How a system based on CCOS would work is that the CO2 would be taken
to a very deep part of the ocean, such as a trench, by a tanker loaded with the gas in a
supercritical state, and then pumped down into a storage pool at the bottom of that trench. The
only means of the gas returning to the surface is via the thermohaline circulation of the oceans,
which turns over every 1500 years. Nevertheless, this current could serve to carry small
amounts of the CO2 to the surface but this would take place over very long periods of time.
Ocean storage is extremely difficult to pursue for a number of reasons. First, there is very little
public support for ocean storage because it is admitted that it will have an impact at least on the
immediate marine life, and possibly a wider effect. Second, it is forbidden to dump waste into
the ocean by at least two international treaties: OSPAR, and the London Convention (Lagneau,
First Advisory Meeting, 2009). However, these treaties are already being slightly modified for
offshore CO2 storage and it is therefore not inconceivable that they be altered for ocean storage
if the first factor of marine life is disregarded (Kerr T. a., 2009). An announced project in Hawaii
that would have injected 10 to 100 kg of CO2 into the ocean was killed by substantial lobby
efforts against it (Lagneau, First Advisory Meeting, 2009). The method was finally tested of the
coast of California by the Monterey Bay Aquarium research division, but the experiment was
kept for the most part out of the media and was only publicized afterwards.
Enhanced coal bed methane recovery (ECBMR) is an interesting concept that involves a process
similar to enhanced oil recovery, in that CO2 is pumped via an injection well into a deep
geological layer to recover fuel. As is explained in Figure 15, the structure of coal is a lot of long
tangled fibers resulting in a surface area of 200 square meters per gram. As the coal ages and
reacts with its surroundings, methane is released. Some of this is trapped on the surface of
these fibers due to an affinity of the CH4 molecules to the coal molecules. However, when CO2 is
pumped into a coal bed, the CO2 has a higher affinity than the CH4 and as a result the methane
gets replaced and is released from the coal and can be collected (Lagneau, Second Advisory
Meeting ‐ Report Review, 2009).
With the recovery process for CH4, there are several issues to be considered. Coal is not highly
porous and as a result the process
of injecting CO2 into a deep coal
seam will need to be energy
intensive. A second issue is that
even if the energy intensity is
reduced, there are major concerns
as to whether ECBMR can serve as a
GHG mitigation tool because the
capture of any less than 95 percent
of the CH4 will defeat the purpose
of the CO2 storage. This is because
CH4 is also a GHG and stores 20
times the heat of CO2 in the
atmosphere
(Lagneau,
First
Figure 15 - Methane Replacement by CO2 in Coal
Advisory Meeting, 2009). At the
Source: Lagneau, Vincent
moment the technology is the least
developed of all of the geologically based storage solutions and as a result there does not have
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extensive research data on using coal beds as CO2 storage vessels at this time. There are
nevertheless several ECBMR projects moving forward in the US, Australia, China, Europe, and
there is significant interest in South Africa. For the movement, the technology does not appear
to offer a significant storage solution and will probably remain as a methane production method
rather than a GHG mitigation technique.
An interesting proposal, known as in‐situ mineralization or CO2 fixation, uses chemical
reactions to bind the CO2 with another substance. There are numerous experiments currently
underway designed to design a reaction that would combine CO2 with some natural or man‐
made substances, under the right temperatures and pressures, so as to trap the CO2 within a
compound. However, this requires a great deal of energy and given current scientific
understanding of this process much more R&D is needed before this will be available at a
reasonable scale. However, this would potentially work in an area where free renewable energy
is abundant, e.g. with a high solar, wind, or geothermal rating but that is has a low enough
energy demand to allow for excess renewable energy be utilized for things besides electricity
production. Iceland is interested in the technology because they have abundant geothermal
energy and relatively low energy demands.
One way to get around this is to conduct “ex‐situ mineralization” by injecting the CO2 into
basaltic formation. The Hellisheidi Project in Iceland is conducting an experiment on a hybrid
storage/mineralization process that injects CO2 into a basaltic formation at a depth of 400
meters. Here mineralization takes place naturally underground, i.e. without the high energy
cost. In the Hellisheidi case, as with several other experiments around the world, the hope is the
basalt will exhibit sufficient injectability so that the storage of large amounts of CO2 will be
possible. The most interesting aspect of this unproved hybridized CCGS‐mineralization process is
that it could allow for immediate storage of the CO2 , while causing a permanent bonding of the
gas with the formation in the medium‐term as opposed to waiting thousands of years for
dissolution of the gas with the brine found in these formations (Lagneau, First Advisory Meeting,
2009). If this hybridized mineralization/storage technology proves to be promising, India could
be an interesting beneficiary for ex‐situ mineralization because it could use its massive lava
flows, called “the Trappes”, to store its emissions.

Technologies and Developments that Compliment CCGS‐fitted Energy Infrastructures
It must be noted that as CCGS is not an energy technology, it should not be compared with other
energy technologies as such. CCGS is an emissions reduction technology and therefore has many
applications outside the energy sector. However, the cases where energy installations are fitted
with CCGS are often held up in comparison to other options, e.g. renewable or nuclear or the
same installations without CCGS. In these cases it is vital to understand that CCGS fitted energy
production facilities will be part of a portfolio of solutions as mentioned by the wedges
argument and the IEA Bluemap Scenario. Nevertheless the other technology options will be
discussed here to emphasize the importance that all the technologies be used in tandem as
complimentary solutions rather than stand‐alone options.
Nuclear for the moment is not a politically feasible option for the US or most of Europe due to
the issue of proliferation to hostile nations, the build‐up of radioactive wastes for which there
currently exists no clear storage solution, and safety concerns based on the major accidents at
the nuclear plants of Chernobyl in Russia and Three Mile Island in the US (as well as a long
history of smaller accidents related to the use and transport of nuclear material) (Greenpeace,
1996). However, elsewhere in the world, where the technology has less stigma built up around
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it, there are still possibilities of using the nuclear‐produced power as a GHG mitigation energy
option. Furthermore, it is important to note that there exists only 12 years of fissile material if
the world overcomes the political hurdles, embraces a nuclear solution, and uses deploys
nuclear using the technology at a global scale as it exists today. It would be necessary in such a
scaling up of the technology to deploy nuclear reactors based on, as a minimum, “fourth
generation” technology. Unfortunately, the only existing projects to test this technology, such as
the Super Phoenix project in France, are still in development or have been canceled/“moth‐
balled” due to political concerns and high costs. With the use of fourth/fifth generation
technology, there is feasibly enough fissile material to last the world for thousands of years.
However, the technology would require much more investment for development to advance
beyond where it currently stands. Compared to CCGS this would require much more research
time and far more substantial global investment.
Most renewable energy sources, such as the sun, the wind, or the ocean are intermittent in
terms of the energy that can be harvested from them. The constraint is simply that improved
energy storage technology must be developed so as to allow the carbon‐free energy to be
obtained whenever and where‐ever and then be shipped to where it is needed. Hydrogen is
looked at as perhaps being capable of serving this storage purpose by some researchers, but
there is almost no existing infrastructure for hydrogen transport, which would be much more
complex and costly than CO2 transport as required by CCGS. Furthermore, the cheapest means
of producing the gas today is via fossil fuels. Interestingly, if the price on fossil fuels reflected
their actual costs, including carbon waste/bi‐product management (CCGS), this would in turn
create a competitive demand for hydrogen (a carbon free energy source when burned for fuel –
regardless of its source) and thereby reduce CO2 generation. On these terms CCGS would allow
for the beginning of a hydrogen based economy that could eventually be supplemented by, and
in time completely supplied by, renewable energy sources. If wind does in fact prove to be less
expensive than coal power fitted with CCGS, as will be shown in Figure 16, the technology could
certainly compete for a larger share of the electricity mix. However, due to the issues with
intermittency and storage, for now the baseload power supply will have to come from
something more like a standard power plant, which can be coal, biomass, natural gas, fuel oil, or
nuclear. Biomass does ultimately produce CO2 and is less efficient than current coal and natural
gas plants, but with an increase in gasification technologies biomass could be fitted to CCGS as
well and provide a more sustainable solution than the limited fossil resources. Since nuclear
proves a difficult political hurdle, the most probable cases for baseload power provision are
coal, biomass, and natural gas. These energy sources will only be able to truly serve the
mitigation goals set for dealing with the climate situation, if they are first coupled with CCGS.
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Cost (USD per kWh)

Paul Breeze of Business Insights has made a comparison of nuclear, hydroelectric, and onshore
wind power production costs to determine where the cheapest solution lies. He found that
CCGS coupled with EOR
0.08
is the cheapest, but
0.07
without
EOR
the
following comparison in
0.06
Figure 16 gives the
0.05
Structural Costs
results of his analysis. His
0.04
Fuel Risk
results demonstrate that
0.03
Cost of Energy
given the uncertainty of
natural gas prices, the
0.02
other three options cost
0.01
slightly less than a new
0
generation
pulverized
New PC
NGCC
Nuclear Onshore
Hydro
coal (PC) plant or natural
(CCS)
(CCS)
Wind
gas combined cycle
Figure 16 – CCS-fitted Power Plant Costs Compared to other Technologies
(NGCC) plant retro‐fitted
Source: Business Insights
with CCS, even with the
structural costs of wind. However, it is noteworthy that hydropower is at about 60 percent of its
capacity in the US and therefore cannot be depended on to provide the base load electricity that
is needed.
Efficiency is the best option because it serves as either an immediate reduction in cost or, if
significant investment is involved, the pay‐back period is typically reasonably short, making the
costs of efficiency negative. However, efficiency is more a principle than a strategy. There are
significant inefficiencies that exist in the energy system today, including technology limitations,
aging infrastructure, behavioral issues (i.e. leaving equipment running when not in use or using
it at a higher rate than needed), etc. These inefficiencies range from temporary summer
vacation housing that has become permanent but is never properly insulated, to shopping malls
that due to “aesthetic” designs are extremely energy intensive. As for the power sector, the fact
that half of the current coal fired power plant fleet in a wealthy nation like the US is on average
more than 30 years old, does not bode well for the state of the rest of the world’s energy
infrastructure and the resulting efficiency levels. If efficiency is not pursued by members of the
energy system, it means the energy is too cheap to be properly valued. For the new generation
of CCGS plants, efficiency will be compulsory in terms of the of plants’ ability to achieve the
significant improvements necessary so as to minimize the inherent energy losses due to the
capture, compression, and injection processes needed to manage their CO2 emissions.
Embracing a new energy system is difficult technically, politically, legally, and socially, and will
require significant investment from all sectors of society to become a reality. The goal should be
to constantly improve the system and achieve new levels of efficiency, power output,
revolutionary energy sources, cheaper means of delivery, and better means of production.
Essential to this process again is to have each form of energy production reflect its actual costs,
including nuclear, with regard to waste management and disposal. However, this is currently not
the goal of the members of the global energy system. Thomas Friedman points to a line from
The Prince by Machiavelli to explain this task: “it ought to be remembered that there is nothing
more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than
to take the lead in introducing a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies all
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those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may
do well under the new.” Friedman points out that during the Dot Com bubble of rapid
development during the 1990s, the new information technology sector was receiving 80 billion
USD per year in venture capital investments by the year 2000 in the US. Clean energy in the US
on the other hand received 5 billion USD in 2007 (Friedman, 2008).
The problem is also that, at least in the US, there is little money returned from revenues by the
energy sector into R&D. Thomas Friedman cites 8 to 10 percent as the typical range for R&D
spending for a competitive industry, citing as an example the healthcare industry, which spends
8 percent of its revenues on R&D. However, Jeffery Immelt, the CEO for GE, revealed to
Friedman in an interview that the entire energy industry spends about 2 percent in this area.
That would make sense if there were low profits in that sector but for several years in a row
now Exxon‐Mobile has set records for highest profits in human history, with the other
petroleum giants not far behind. Imagine if Exxon and its competitors matched the medical
industry’s R&D investment.
For electric utilities the investment is even smaller, with only 0.15 percent of their revenues
going to R&D. This is less than the amount spent by the American pet food industry (Friedman,
2008). It is clear from this trend that there is little incentive to compete or innovate in the
energy industry. This will need to change if the types of numbers quoted as being required to a
change to CCGS, which range in the hundreds of billions of USD.

Energy Production Portfolios
The Carbon Mitigation Initiative (CMI) at Princeton University’s Environmental Institute (PEI)
was started by Robert Socolow and Stephen Pacala to develop a particle strategy to tackle the
GHG issue and mitigate climate change. These two researchers created the concept of
“stabilization wedges ‐ 25 billion ton “wedges” that need to be cut out of predicted future
carbon emissions in the next 50 years to avoid a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide over
pre‐industrial levels (Hotinski, 2007).” In this way, each wedge can be seen as a quantified goal
to achieve the overall carbon abatement strategy that takes away from the doubled amount of
emissions expected from business as usual (BAU). They have identified fifteen possible wedges
that can be used, but only seven are required to achieve their mitigation goal of stabilizing CO2
emissions at current levels. Three of the wedges have to do with CCS and all will involve geologic
storage of the CO2 .
The World Resource Institute (WRI), a nongovernmental environmental research center, is
working with the Goldman Sachs Center for Environmental Markets to take the wedge concept
to the “next‐stage” by evaluating the series of wedges and the financial, legal and
environmental implications of each wedge as a policy choice. They attribute their work to
Socolow and Pacala and the “solution‐oriented framework [of] the wedges approach [that] has
captured the imagination of those eager to tackle climate change (Wellington, 2007).” In their
report WRI and Goldman distinguish that there are also negative wedges such as coal to liquids
and oil shales that if pursued will increase emissions at a greater rate than the business as usual
scenario and will therefore increase the costs of successful mitigation.
Overall, the wedges approach outlines much more tangible solutions to define the commitment
required for scaling up CCS technology on a global scale, and requires the equivalent of 3,500 Mt
per year CO2 sequestration projects over that period. One Mt is currently the rough size of most
of the five largest operating CCS demonstration projects, with the one exception being the
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Weyburn‐Midale project to be discussed later. A better means for understand what this 3,500
Mt represents is to think in terms of coal power plants. A rough estimate it is that in the US a
typical coal power plant has a capacity of 1,000 Megawatts (MW) and this size plant produces 5
Mt of CO2 each year (Lagneau, Second Advisory Meeting ‐ Report Review, 2009). This means
that the equivalent of seven hundred 1,000 GW coal plants would need to be fitted with CCS
technology in order to achieve the goal for one CCS wedge. By a quick estimate given price
average for new pulverize coal power plants in the US of 3,000,000 USD per MW taken from
WRI and using MIT’s estimate that CCS increases costs by about 50 percent: if these 700 plants
were to be built new, the total investment would be 3.15 trillion USD globally for deploying one
CCS wedge, and that is only one seventh of what is needed to make up the full reduction goal.
A more recent take on the wedge theory can be seen in the latest report from the IEA, who have

Figure 17 - BLUE MAP GHG Mitigation Scenario
Source: IEA

written several “roadmaps” that give the steps needed for all technologies identified by their
BLUE Map modeling program as key for reaching the 50 percent by 2050 goal. The IEA outlines
the basis for the BLUE Map model in Figure 17 as follows:
The IEA Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) BLUE Map scenario describes how energy
technologies may be transformed by 2050 to achieve the global goal of reducing annual CO2
emissions to half that of 2005 levels. The model is a bottom‐up MARKAL model that uses cost
[optimization] to identify least cost mixes of energy technologies and fuels to meet energy
demand, given constraints such as the availability of natural resources. The ETP model is a global
fifteen‐region model that permits the analysis of fuel and technology choices throughout the
energy system. The model’s detailed representation of technology options includes about 1,000
individual technologies. The model has been developed over a number of years and has been
used in many analyses of the global energy sector. In addition, the ETP model was
supplemented with detailed demand‐side models for all major end‐uses in the industry,
buildings and transport sectors (Kerr T. a., 2009).
The IEA CCS Roadmap specifically outlines what needs to take place to see CCS come to scale
globally. This is a much more detailed model then the theoretical model by PEI and uses a cost
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benefit analysis to determine which wedges are needed and the size of each. This places CCS as
necessary for addressing nearly one fifth of the expected emissions increase for a BAU scenario
from 2005. The price tag for their CCS scale‐up scenario is predicated to be about 2.5 to 3 trillion
USD between now and 2050 for the construction of the 3,400 projects they estimate as needed
to meet the 50 percent mitigation target. This is slightly less than the estimate from the PEI
wedge cost of 3.15 trillion USD to cover CCS used for one seventh of the needed GHG mitigation
activities, which makes sense as not all projects will need to be constructed new. The more
precise CCS “wedge” from the IEA makes up roughly six percent of the total BLUE Map Scenario
investment requirement, meaning that the total cost to achieve that goal is roughly 40‐50
trillion USD in that 40 year period, or 1 to 1.25 trillion USD per year. It is important to note that
without CCS, the IEA predicts a 70 percent increase in those emission reduction costs.
Therefore, without CCS the costs would increase by 70 percent making the global investment
closer to 70 or 85 trillion USD.
Bear in mind that these numbers are all based on the limited data that is available, due to the
fact that only five commercial scale projects that are CCS currently exist at any sort of significant
scale. However, one thing that should be made clear by these calculations is that if climate
change is to be addressed and mitigated, a serious financial commitment must be made at the
international level to place CCS and other GHG mitigation technologies as a priority.
Furthermore, this highlights that firms with know‐how about CCS related technologies and
expertise will be in a position to take advantage of this massive outlay of capital. To give an idea
of what kind of priory this would need to be, North America for instance, which would be
responsible for 29 percent of the global CCS deployment according to the IEA CCS Roadmap,
would need to spend roughly 350 billion USD per year to achieve the goal (assuming CCS is
used). This is roughly 3.5 times what the US spends to operate in Iraq each year. To surmise, the
goal of mitigating climate change could require funding on a tier perhaps equal to (or even
greater than) what the current US budget allocates to its military. This is not meant to scare the
reader or bring politics into this report, but merely to place these financial estimates of what is
needed globally into terms that one can more easily gauge using know references.

30

Market Analysis
Although right now CCGS is seen as a very promising solution for addressing GHG emissions,
there are significant costs entailed in building the infrastructure associated with a coupling of
CCGS to fossil fuel energy production. The issue when considering whether or not it is feasible to
bring CCGS to scale is the real cost of employing it as a solution to climate change, as compared
with the predicted price of carbon, the cost of inaction, and the cost of other GHG mitigation
technologies. Financial estimations of what costs should be expected, i.e. capture, transport,
injection, storage, and monitoring, have been completed by groups interested in the CCGS
solution and Table 8 outlines their finding in terms of a price to abate one ton of CO2 and then
the resulting cost of scaling the global energy sector to meet the goal of mitigating 25 Gt of CO2
for one of the seven necessary climate wedges.
Information Source
Business Insights (2006)
WRI/Goldman (2008)
McKinsey (2009)
BCG (2008)

Average
Initial CO2
Cost

Stabilized CO2
in USD (High)

Stabilized
CO2 in USD
(Low)

Total Investment for a
Wedge (25 B tons)
in B USD (High)

Total Investment for a
Wedge (25 B tons)
in B USD (Low)

65

56

29

1,400

725

‐

60

40

1,500

1,000

105

67

42

1,675

1,050

63

42

42

1,050

1,050

Jefferies (2009)

55
145
32
3,625
Table 5 - CCGS Costs (1.4 USD = 1 EUR)
Sources: WRI/Goldman Sachs, BCG, Jefferies, McKinsey, Business Insights, IEA, Personal Analysis
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Although Table 8 above simplifies the results of these institutions, it is difficult to compare the
different reports because each took a different approach to the task of evaluating the cost of
CCGS deployment. The following sections highlight the important aspects of financing CCGS as
presented by the institutions compared in Table 8.

The World Resource Institute (WRI) and Goldman Sachs (Venezia, 2008)
What is made clear in WRI’s report “Capturing King Coal” is that “the transition to a lower‐
carbon energy economy is a long‐term one (Venezia, 2008).” The team assessment by WRI and
Goldman Sachs estimates that a period of 25 to 50 years is needed during which major capital
outlays will be required to achieve a CCGS infrastructure that will have any impact on climate
change. To the extent possible these outlays in capital investments need to be protected from
cyclical political change and backed by government support in terms of incentives, research,
development, and the deployment of demonstration projects, in order to attract serious
investment in this field. What this implies is a broad reaching climate policy for the US and the
EU and eventually at the global scale. US and EU policies are believed to be prerequisites to any
overarching international treaty governing GHG emissions and they are the only means for
bringing other major emitters such as China to the table.
In terms of this leading to CCGS development, a policy in the US and the EU will need to position
CCGS as the “least‐cost compliance strategy.” Otherwise emitters will simply pay the carbon
fees and pursue the hope of possible cheaper alternatives and GHG abatement strategies. The
WRI report outlines two methods for positioning CCGS in a favorable position for adoption on
the global scale: pull and push policy and funding strategies that work in tandem to achieve the
prerequisite market settings for a roll‐out of CCGS. “A government ‘pull’ strategy would center
on price incentives through cap and trade or taxation, whereas, a ‘push’ strategy would center
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on research, development, and demonstration (RD&D); technology performance standards
(such as efficiency standards); and subsidies (Venezia, 2008).”
A pull strategy would entail for the US adopting a carbon emissions trading scheme similar to
the one in place in Europe already called the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS).
The idea is that CO2 emission point sources are allocated or secure via auction a certain number
of CO2 emission credits. These companies then either buy additional credits to cover their
excess emissions from other companies that find a way to reduce their actual emissions, or
likewise they sell their excess credits or “bank” them for a future period where the allocations
may be stricter (17).
This is where the prices per ton of CO2 in Table 8 come into play in that they are estimates as to
what prices would bring CCGS into play as an economical emissions mitigation tool. The idea is
summed up as follows, “If the net present value of a conventional coal plant, including the cost
of cash outlays for cap‐and‐trade compliance over the life of the plant is greater than the net
present value of a plant including CCS, there is no financial incentive for CCS deployment.” One
roadblock to scaling CCGS is the concern that significant liability issues could arise with
transporting and the long‐term storage of significant quantities of CO2 . Governments will need
to be able to take responsibility for this liability to cover costs of any potential emergency,
especially for a closed site where the operating company is no longer in existence, so as to
ensure investors that this risk would not fall completely on them.
Conversely, a push strategy would entail government RD&D, performance mandates, loan
guarantees, and subsidies for private firms engaging in demonstration projects. Increasing
performance standards can drive efficiency and emissions improvements throughout the
existing industry and drive innovation in future projects, which may embrace CCGS as the
method of meeting the standard. As for RD&D, the IEA estimates that in order to understand
the technology at the scale the is required and achieve prices close to the lower estimates in
Table 8, at least 10 major scale demonstration projects are necessary. Currently there are no
major projects that incorporate capture and storage for a commercial scale power plant. It is
only at the point where this future project is completed that the necessary infrastructure will
begin to receive adequate investment. FutureGen in the US was just such a project and was
slotted to receive 1 billion USD in government funding. However, the project was “moth‐balled”
in 2008, just after the final site was selected in Illinois, due to political issues and cost estimates
increasing to 1.8 billion (20).
Government performance standards drive efficiency and emissions improvements throughout
the existing industry and drive innovation in future projects that may embrace CCGS as the
method of meeting the standard. However, from the private investment sector, the Carbon
Principles published by Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley banks now outline these
institutions’ new “environmental guidelines” that will be applied to investments due to the
pending climate legislation. This is because this policy shift implies risk for carbon intensive
projects and the guidelines encourage project developers to incorporate more efficiency and
renewable energy considerations (29). At the very least, this push from the private sector means
that Wall Street has begun to accept a future where carbon has a price tag and it gives a benefit
to CCGS project developers.
Ultimately, WRI concludes that “a shift to a low‐carbon energy future in the U.S. underpinned by
an economically viable national CCS system is possible, but that such a fundamental shift will
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likely only occur once definitive policies and incentives are put in place that reward investment
in and capital formation around improved carbon performance (33).” The most important
implications of the report on geological storage are those of who will take on the liability and
what sort of “not under my backyard” issues might arise.

McKinsey and Company (McKinsey, 2008)
The McKinsey report focuses on new build coal power in Europe as the basis for its evaluation of
CCGS. Retrofitting of plants is looked at as fairly inefficient since on a 20 year old plant, the life
of the capture facility would be about 20 years (the same as the remaining life of the plant)
making the initial CAPEX inefficient especially since the CCS costs compared to a new plant are
30 percent higher. The report highlights how public understanding is low and aims at bringing a
clearer picture to the estimations of cost and what scaling up CCGS would entail. They estimate
that 20 percent of Europe’s abatement potential lies in CCGS application. Their ideal scenario of
0.4 Gt of CO2 reductions per year via CCGS is based on 80‐120 commercial projects coming
online by 2030 (7). Storage is a major factor of uncertainty in the report and although the efforts
of the GeoCapacity project are recognized, their conclusion is that lore extensive work is
required.
One key figure described by the report and shown in Figure 18, was an idea of an economic gap
in terms of anticipated costs of the initial and pilot scale projects, and the expected price of
carbon that would allow these projects to recoup some of their costs. They estimate this gap at
0.5‐1.1 billion Euros per project in terms of net present value, which would need to be covered
by government subsidies or other funding (8).
In terms of cost, the McKinsey report sheds some light as to where costs are felt in a CCGS plant
compared to a non‐CCS plant in terms of the efficiency penalty and what that means in terms of
additional total coal consumed to generate the same amount of output electricity and the
associated increase in CO2 emissions over all. Even though most of these (90%) emissions are
captured, the overall increase
is important to note in terms
of the scale of storage that
will be required and the
increase in coal consumption.
Furthermore,
they
breakdown the estimated
cost of 35 to 50 Euros per ton
of CO2
into the various
associated components of
capture,
transport,
and
storage. They give an
Figure 18 - CCS Funding Gap
anticipated storage cost of 4
Source: McKinsey
to 12 Euros, or roughly 5.5 to
17 USD per ton CO2 given the anticipated constraints of storage techniques, depths, and
equipment. What is also interesting is that the costs of storage do not much change with the
scale of deployment. With storage the major issue is uncertainty in terms of where the storage
will take place, onshore having a significantly lower cost than offshore storage and saline
reservoirs entailing 10‐15 percent higher costs due to the extra geological mapping and
exploration (27).
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In terms of financing projects, the major cost sensitivity identified by McKinsey is the weighted
average cost of capital (WACC) used by an investor could significantly affect the price per ton. In
addition steel and engineering costs can be expected to increase (26). When looking to reduce
costs, EOR and EGR are considered briefly by the report and the US estimated value of 25 to 35
USD per ton for EOR is looked at to be fairly irrelevant for Europe due to the limited amount of
sites that could benefit from such activity (28). Nevertheless storage costs are looked at as a key
factor for optimization so as to reduce the costs of CCS, along with capture CAPEX costs.
One of the most interesting aspects of the report is the discussion of a roll‐out of CCGS in
Europe. They envision that one storage area are identified, clusters of emissions sources could

Figure 19 - Illustrative CCGS Clustering Scheme
Source: McKinsey

be identified and channel via a pipeline network to a central storage site so as to cut the costs of
transport and injection. Due to the high level of uncertainly regarding storage in saline
reservoirs, for which the capacity estimate ranges from 30 to 500 gigatons CO2 , they are unsure
about whether a storage scheme will focus on the established oil and gas reservoirs of the North
Sea or if the saline reservoirs that exist across Europe can be counted on. The offshore scenario
is estimated to double storage costs from 9 Euros to 18 per ton CO2 . The scheme in Figure 19
was given in the report purely as an illustration of what such a capture and storage clustering
scheme might resemble in Europe and nothing finite in terms of a plan and is in fact unrealisitic
based on the current policy constraints of countries such as Germany with regards to transport.
Nevertheless it gives a decent picture of the sort of road map that will be required for Europe to
embrace CCGS as a solution.
In terms of what an actual roll‐out of the technology, McKinsey estimates a 6‐10 year lag time
for projects in Europe to get started. They cite Prospex and Platts Powervision’s estimate that
five new coal plants are planned per year from 2015 to 2030. The McKinsey team suggests that
if along with these new builds, relatively new plants are retrofit for CCGS at an additional cost of
around 10 percent compare to new plants, a goal of 0.2 to 0.4 Gt of CO2 sequestered per year is
feasible. This would entail for the 0.2 scenario that the first commercial projects would be
operating in 2023, which would signal a commercial roll‐out phase of five 1000 MW new CCGS
coal plants per year or three of their example plants (900 MW) per year equally 70 percent of
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the CO2 abatement potential with retrofits and industrial projects each achieving 15 percent of
the remaining CO2 reductions (41). To reach the 0.4 Gt per year CO2 abatement goal by 2030,
two possibilities exist: one is to start the roll‐out sooner in 2018 implying a more rapid
development of commercial sized demonstration projects, the second is a nearly doubled rate
of deployment after 2023 with the equivalent of ten or eleven 1000 MW plants being brought
online each year and implying a great number of retrofits and industrial projects to make up the
difference. In the end this would translate into 80 to 120 projects during the roll‐out.
The report finishes by mentioning the major concerns already mentioned by WRI such as
storage liability and legality with purity of CO2 highlighted as a potential factor. Monitoring
costs, responsibilities, and timeframes also remain unclear.

Jefferies and Company (Alexander, 2009)
The Jefferies analysis of the emerging CCS market is much more limited as it is part of an
overview of a large selection of alternative energy technologies. Nevertheless it gives a
sufficient picture of the US CCGS situation. The report again highlights that the technology is
held hostage by the lack of any real global price on carbon. They place the start of a roll‐out at
2025 with the possibility of legality issues delaying deployment further. They identify Fluor,
Shaw Group, and the Washington Group subsidiary of URS Corporation as the E & C companies
that would benefit probably as a result of their experience with hydrocarbon drilling projects. In
terms of alternative uses for the CO2 , as opposed to storage or EOR, they have identified a 13.1
ton per year of liquid CO2 business that is experiencing a 2 to 2.5 percent growth rate due to the
increase of environmental standards requiring the use of less caustic chemicals.
As for storage, the report does mention the US DOE prediction that CCS will account for 40
percent of the US emission reductions by 2050 or 15 percent of all industrial emissions (182).
The report is more enthusiastic with the results of the NatCarb storage capacity survey than
McKinsey with the GeoCapacity project, noting that the survey results imply 300‐950 years of
storage. They mention that a depth of at least 760 meters is required to maintain the
supercritical state of CO2 that facilitates the largest and longest storage potentials but it is
unclear whether the estimate of 300‐950 years of storage based on the NatCarb assessment
takes that into account. Extrapolating from IEA estimates and their own data, Jefferies predicts
an ambitious 10,000 MW of CCGS demonstrative projects in the US by 2016.
The total price tag that the report assigns to a scale up of CCGS in the US is as follows:
sequestering “50% of the stationary emissions from the U.S., assuming no need to build long‐
distance pipelines or resort to ocean storage, with an average cost of $55/t, would cost around
$100bn a year, or 0.8% of GDP (186).” However, it is notable that their estimation for storage
and monitoring costs fall in a range bellow one Euro per ton, which is extremely low compared
to other cases.

Boston Consulting Group (BCG) (Baeza, 2008)
BCG highlights the promise of the European Union to partially fund 10‐20 projects investigating
CCGS. Japan aims at 0.2 Gt of reductions via CCS. The cost for storage is estimated at 4 to 5
Euros per ton. Large Investments in CCS cannot be exposed to a volatile carbon market. Not to
be expected commercially give current development path until 2020‐2030. The evolution of CCS
is likely to be similar to that of natural gas distribution. First there will be standalone projects,
with carbon dioxide capture, transport, and storage tied to a single‐point source of emissions
such as a power plant. Over time, more and more emission sources will connect through “trunk
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lines,” and a grid infrastructure will develop. As with natural gas pipelines, regulation will be
necessary to ensure open access to transport; in contrast, storage capacity is plentiful and likely
to remain unregulated.
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Case I: The United States of America
The United States is the largest developed market in need of a new energy strategy. The country
has remained outside the core international debate concerning climate change abatement
strategies and energy alternatives since the US Senate voted nearly unanimously against
ratifying Al Gore’s signature on the Kyoto Treaty. The Bush Administration drew focus away
from the ongoing climate debate, now centered in Europe, and Kyoto for eight years by
diverting attention and resources to US military operations and to parallel alliances formed
around the climate issue, such as the Asia Pacific Partnership on Development (APPD). In
addition to the US, the APPD is comprised of China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, and
as such its members are responsible for 50 percent of the global GHG emissions (Rettman,
2005). However, the focus of this partnership was more of collaboration on technology
development rather than an emissions limitation agreement like a direct carbon tax or a cap‐
and‐trade scheme similar to what exists for SOx emissions and is already in place in the EU for
carbon.
Individual states within the US are drawing separate conclusions from the federal government
and as a result there are more localized efforts taking place across the country that aim to
address the climate dilemma. There are currently three partnerships between groups of states
in the US designed to implement regional cap‐and‐trade schemes: the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI), the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), and the Midwestern Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Accord (MGGRA). The RGGI, which includes ten US states, has already begun
emissions trading allowances for its first three year compliance period as of January 1, 2009 and
maintains the goal of reducing emissions by 10 percent from 2009 levels by 2018 (RGGI, 2007).
The other two partnerships, WCI with six US states and three Canadian Provinces and MGGRA
with six states and one Canadian province, will commence a cap‐and‐trade policy on January 1,
2012, with the WCI committed to reducing emissions 15 percent from 2005 levels and the
MGGRA committed to 18 to 20 percent emissions reduction below 2005 (MGGRA Advisory
Group, 2009) (WCI, 2009). There are numerous observers of these various regional efforts,
which have not joined due to political and economic concerns, ranging from non‐member US
states and Canadian provinces but also several northern Mexican territories. A climate registry
agreement has also been created to standardize emissions reporting by individual states as can
be seen in Figure 20.
With the change of administration in the White House, there have been several developments
that suggest a potential movement towards US adoption of a national GHG reduction policy or
acceptance of a global climate agreement. The Obama Administration has reserved a significant
portion of the 2009 Stimulus Funding Package for alternative energy research and projects
deployment. In addition to recognizing the RGGI states for their efforts, the EPA has moved to
establish a nationwide climate agreement to validate the existing efforts by the US Climate
Registry state members and “on January 1, 2010, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency will,
for the first time, require large emitters of heat‐trapping emissions to begin collecting
greenhouse gas (GHG) data under a new reporting system. This new program will cover
approximately 85 percent of the nation’s GHG emissions and apply to roughly 10,000 facilities
(MGGRA, 2009).” There is also a growing development in the US Congress regarding a national
climate policy. A bill called the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 but known
better as the Waxman‐Markey Climate Bill has passed the House of Representatives and
includes a cap‐and‐trade scheme that would aim to reduce emissions by 17 percent below 2005
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Figure 20 - North American Regional Emissions Agreements
Sources: RGGI, WCI, MGGRA, and the Cliamte Registry

levels by 2020 (Open Congress). If the bill’s counterpart passes successfully through the Senate,
the bill would likely be signed into law by Obama but the Senate passage is a major hurdle. As of
May 2010 the Senate version of the bill S. 1733 sponsored by John Kerry has still not passed
through all of the six Senate committees responsible for it (Broder, Democrats Push Climate Bill
through Panel without G.O.P. Debate, 2009). However, a new bill involving a dual “tax and
trade” scheme, which changes depending on the type of emission point source, is being put
forward by a bipartisan group and has oil company support. The most important conclusion to
take from this is that the debate over whether the US will regulate emissions will need to be
largely settled before any real hopes for a CCS rollout can be realized.
As the Copenhagen Climate Conference ended with no decisions as to whether there will be a
global climate treaty, there are still hopes that the US will finally set a price on its CO2 by either
implementing a federal climate agreement or by participating in an international agreement
might. However, as can be seen with the current situation in the US Congress and the separate
state efforts, there is little consensus as to how the US should address the climate issue. To
better understand the politics behind the current roadblocks to either a national US GHG
limitation policy and/or a signature on the existing/future climate agreements, it is important to
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consider the US energy or more accurately GHG emissions profile. This profile is one based on
three major factors: the US is a major petroleum producer and is a major player in the global oil
and gas market, the US is the top coal producer and produces roughly half of its electricity from
coal, and lastly the US has largely mothballed its nuclear program with no new plants receiving
approval since 1978 (Broder, House Republicans Draft Energy Bill With Heavy Focus on Nuclear
Power, 2009).

The US Energy Profile
The US became the original major oil exporter as a result of its discoveries in Texas and then in
California at the turn of the 20th Century. Today the US remains among the top three producers
along with Saudi Arabia and Russia but unlike the other top two producers, the US is not among
the significant exporters of oil and gas as it is the top consumer of petroleum worldwide by a
factor of three (Information Please Database, 2007). As a result of its national stocks of oil and
gas, the US has maintained a strong economic dependence on oil, despite the oil shocks of the
1970s and 1980s. The US has pursued a strategy of international engagement rather than
energy independence as a response to supply issues and as a result has maintained a strong
presence in the Middle East and in South American oil producing states. However, with the
recent increases in global demand due to rapidly increasing consumption by developing nations
and issues with supply infrastructure, the limits of petroleum are beginning to be seen. The
extreme fluctuations in gas prices seen in recent years illustrate the problems with complete
dependence on this limited resource.
As only two percent of the US electricity supply comes from oil and most of the uses of
petroleum involve non‐fixed emissions, the country’s relationship with oil does not have a direct
impact on the development of CCS except in the form of emission control for refineries and
extraction operations. However, there are indirect negative and positive effects from the US
petroleum sector on its development of CCS. On the one hand, the stance of big oil on climate
change has confused the debate, which has now evolved from whether climate change exists to
what extent an emissions reduction commitment will limit economic activity. However, with the
decreasing productions of many US oil reserves, there has been strong development in the field
of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques and these include CO2 based EOR. The US EOR
activities will be developed further in a later section but it is important to realize that this has
made the US a major player in the development of CCS globally and is driving many of its current
DOE funded CCS related projects.
The most important factor in terms of passing a climate bill in the US or signing a global treaty is
coal. Jeff Goodell, the author of Big Coal: the Dirty Secret behind America's Energy Future, has
described the US as the “Saudi Arabia of Coal” because the country maintains the world’s largest
coal reserves: 27 percent of the global total. Not only does the US have the most coal in the
world but it also is predicted to have one of the longest lasting reserves given its current
production rates. Figure 21 puts this into perspective in terms of how other countries compare
to the US in this regard. What is notable is that while China ranks third in terms of reserves, their
production outstrips their overall reserves and leaves them with less than fifty years of domestic
supply. The EU ranks low in both overall reserves and remaining regional supply for coal. As a
result of this factor, it will be difficult to argue against the US pursuing coal based energy
production and therefore its hesitance to sign any commitments that might limit its ability to
capitalize on this resource are understandable. The EU is in a much more comfortable position
to pursue emission reduction treaties as they have relatively few fossil based energy resources.
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China is in the most difficult position as its current development relies nearly completely on coal
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for energy while it has one of the lowest domestic coal reserve life expectancies.
As a result of the relatively abundant fossil resources in the US, the country’s energy sector has
been able to provide energy cheaply to the population fairly consistently for the last century.
This also has meant a low rate of efficiency in the energy sector because it is perceived by most
utilities that it is cheaper in the short‐term to simply provide cheap energy using existing means
than to incur short‐term increases in costs so as increase efficiency and lower, more stable long‐
term prices. This has resulted in the trend, discussed by Thomas Friedman, with electric utilities
reinvesting only 0.15 percent of their revenues in R&D. The diagram in Figure 22 gives the most
recent breakdown for energy production by fuel type and consumption by sector in the US and
was developed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from the DOE energy statistics.
The calculations assume an 80 percent efficiency rate for average end‐use energy consumption
in the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors and 25 percent in the transportation
sector. One issue of note should be the US produces more than twice the energy it consumes,
with 58 percent of the energy being lost to inefficiencies. Although some of these inefficiencies
are arguable unavoidable given technology constraints, valorizing less than half of the energy
produced is excessive. Most of that is lost in electricity generation and this means that the
energy can be provided so cheaply that there is little incentive to improve the generation
process and increase efficiency. As nearly half of the electricity is produced by coal, a logical
place to enforce efficiency standards or tax production so as to increase the value of the
electricity that is produced or most specifically lost. Placing a price on carbon emissions would
send a clear signal that operating at less than 50 percent efficiency is unacceptable. This would
also prove true for the transportation sector that achieves even lower efficiency and would
increase the demand for electric cars or plug‐in hybrid vehicles (partially powered by batteries,
partially by a combustion engine), which in turn would increase the demand for electricity.
Figuring out a way to maximize resource consumption for energy purposes will be key.
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The nuclear industry has been held hostage by several political issues for the past few decades.
First, since the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear incidents, many people remain
concerned about the technology’s safety. The Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) Watts Bar 1,

Figure 22 - US Energy Consumption (101.51 Quads or 29.7 Million GWh)
Sources: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the US DOE

which came on‐line in February 7, 1996 in Tennessee, was the last U.S. commercial nuclear
power plant to go on‐line. Second, there is the issue of global nuclear proliferation for the
purpose of developing weapons. This is the major concern with countries like Iran and North
Korea. Lastly, the industry was allowed to progress without presenting a proper solution for the
waste it produced. Today as various governments search for a better solution, a large amount of
radioactive material is stored onsite at nuclear plants and poses a local hazard. This has led to
the rise of an anti‐nuclear movement led by national and international non‐governmental
organizations such as Greenpeace and “Green” political parties, especially in Europe, which
adamantly oppose the continued development of nuclear technologies or the construction of
new plants.
In terms of the limitations of the technology itself, the main limiting factor is the availability of
fissile material to power the reaction. At current consumption rates and using current nuclear
electricity generation technologies, it is estimated that the existing supplies of fissile material
will last roughly the same amount of time as the remaining petroleum reserves, which is to say
roughly 30 to 60 years. If a significant expansion of nuclear energy capacity takes place globally
by continuing to applying current or “third generation” technologies, the lifetime of global fissile
supplies drops to approximately twelve years. What is needed is a rapid development of “fourth
generation” nuclear technology that broadens the range of fissile material that can be used and
increases the supply life to an estimated 1000 years or more. However, as a result of the current
negative views on the technology, which are kept active by the global anti‐nuclear movement,
most of the projects to further develop the technology have encountered various issues or have
been stopped mid‐development. In the US the fourth generation technology was being
developed as of 1984 via the construction of an “integral fast reactor” demonstration at US
national labs in Idaho and Illinois but the funding was cut in 1994 by Congress due to concerns
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about safety and proliferation. Another result of the anti‐nuclear movement and the freeze on
nuclear project approvals in the US since the 1970s, there is a steady decrease of nuclear
engineers qualified to design, build, and operate new projects.
Notably, it is extremely difficult to site most new energy production projects in the US today, no
matter what type of power will be produced there. This is partly a result of the climate debate
and the risk of pending greenhouse gas emission caps, but is also due to a significant increase in
construction prices and a large contingency of local resistance to most large industrial projects,
which is referred to as a “not‐in‐my‐backyard” or NIMBY mentality. People are concerned now
about all aspects of these projects and these concerns are based on issues such as
environmental impact, water consumption rates, local land devaluation, and landscape
disfiguration. As a result, no one wants anything built in their backyard, whether it is a new coal
plant, a pilot nuclear facility, or a wind turbine. A price increase on energy vis‐à‐vis carbon will
place a greater pressure on citizens to consider the benefits to new infrastructure along with the
currently dominating detracting points. The need for new options is now beginning to mount
and as of the end of 2008 there were seventeen applications under review by the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for new nuclear power projects (US EIA, 2009).

Drivers for CCGC Development in the US
There are several reasons for CCS’s development in the US currently. These primarily revolve
around the abundant fossil resources located within the state’s borders. This is because the
state not only stands to benefit from not only being able to continue to use these resources
despite any future commitment to a climate treaty, but also in the recovery of energy from
those resources as extraction becomes increasing difficult as the reserves are depleted. It is for
this reason in fact that the technology that first injected CO2 underground is enhanced oil
recovery and not carbon storage for emissions reduction.
The early EOR operations in the US are not as well documented publicly, but there are extensive
projects using CO2 sources to increase production according to Oil and Gas Journal. This began
in the 1970s with some projects in Texas around the Permian Basin oil reserves, which were
found to be very responsive to the injection of CO2 in the “tertiary” production period. The first
production period is unaided and this is followed by a second production period, typically using
water to flood the bits of oil remaining in the pore space. The tertiary production can be
performed using a variety of methods that include several different gases and chemical agents.
CO2 has been found to be effective under certain conditions and with certain types of oil as was
mentioned in the Weyburn example. With CO2 EOR, the enhancement is normally done using a
combination of CO2 and water floods, known as a “water alternating gas” (WAG) flood. EOR can
be done with a immiscible CO2 at shallow depths, where the CO2 remains in a gaseous state
and simply increases the pressure in the formation which increases the flow of oil (and water)
exiting via the production well. A second method that takes place in deeper formations is a
miscible CO2 flood, which is where the high pressure and temperatures cause the CO2 to
become supercritical and in that state the gas mixes with the trapper oil and increases the
viscosity and this increases the rate of flow in the reservoir.
As these enhanced recovery aiding properties of CO2 were discovered and experimented with in
Permian Basin (and then elsewhere) one of the issues for the project operators became the CO2
supply. Several firms such as Denbury Resources and Kinder Morgan moved into the CO2 supply
business by tapping into naturally existing CO2 reserves in the country and building special CO2
supply pipelines to deliver this natural CO2 to EOR locations. As the industry developed, new
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sources for the CO2 were investigated such as industrial plants with high concentrations of CO2
in their flue gases. This corresponded also with the growing concern about climate change
resulting from CO2 emissions but the two issues of climate change were not directly related.
The primary reason for this is that given the limited number of CO2 supply sources and
providers, the gas was expensive and as a result the goal was to recapture as much as possible
of the gas from the production well so as to re‐inject it. Only a fraction of the gas was trapped
residually in the formation and this would result in the need to purchase additional CO2 but not
in the same quantity as the total amount being injected. The map in Figure 23 gives an idea of
the project activity in terms of what sources are used (natural or anthropogenic) and where the
pipelines are. The map is non‐exhaustive but has been slightly updated from the Oil and Gas
Journal version and a more complete map of the US situation will be presented in the active
projects overview. A more extensive list of Global CO2‐EOR projects can be found in the
appendix.

Figure 23 - US CO2 Sites/Pipelines and EOR
Sources: Oil and Gas Journal and Personal Analysis

As EOR was the first cause for the injection and monitoring of CO2 into porous geological
formation, it is the main precursor to the CCGS. However, EOR and EGR technology should not
be looked at as synonymous with CCGS for two reasons. First, any project that recovers CO2
already naturally trapped underground and then re‐injects it to recover carbon intensive energy
resources cannot be seen as a GHG mitigation technology and as such this type of EOR is not
CCGS. Second, although CO2 EOR technology that uses CO2 from industrial sources performs all
of the steps needed for CCGS, i.e. capture, transport, injection, and monitoring, prior to 2000
EOR was not focused on storage and in fact operators aimed to store as little or the gas as
possible so as to minimize CO2 costs. Some post‐2000 EOR projects such as Weyburn‐Midale
also aim to store significant amounts of CO2 , however, the amount they are injecting (in the
Weyburn case roughly 3 Mt per year) needs to be divided by a factor of three or even four to
calculate the amount of CO2 that remains trapped in the formation. Due to the market
sensitivity of these projects, the actual amounts of CO2 purchased new each year to supplement
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the gas that is recycled for re‐injection is not typically available in the public forum.
Nevertheless, the merits of CO2 EOR should not be forgotten as the technology has given many
active players in the emerging CCS market valuable experience, which can be applied to the
successful roll‐out of the CCGS projects. Furthermore, it is the cause for the most extensive
existing CO2 pipeline network in the world pictured in Figure 23.
Since the US has decided to recognize climate change mitigation as a global concern under the
Bush Administration and even as a political priority by the Obama team, the DOE has focused
significant research and financing towards developing the technology. This support began with
the regional partnerships to explore storage options and the FutureGen project to develop a
zero emission coal‐based IGCC power plant, but has now expanded to a variety of government
supported projects across the country under the Recovery Act of 2009.
However, companies in the US have not taken the same perspective as their competitors in
Europe. The US focus has largely been on EOR and not on developing saline reservoir knowledge
and storage expertise. For the capture and transport aspects of the CCS market, the technology
providers and service contractors are competitive and on par with their global counterparts.
However, the major US‐based storage players are nearly all connected to the oil and gas
industry and as such they are more interested in the CO2 as a commercial opportunity than as a
GHG mitigation technology. This is best seen best in the France‐based oil exploration and
production (E&P) contractor, Schlumberger, being the only storage expert involved in every
single DOE partnership project ‐ in most cases as a project leader. The US equivalents of
Schlumberger are working to catch up with the investment and marketing the French oil service
giant has already put behind its Carbon Services division. The section to follow gives an idea of
who the various US CCS players are today.
There remain several concerns that stand in the face of a full‐fledged CCS roll‐out in the US,
despite the extensive list of projects announcements that precede this section. This section will
touch briefly on these concerns but they are all aspects that will need to be dealt with if the
CCGS technology is to take hold among the portfolio of options.
One aspect of the US projects that have been announced is the large number of projects relating
to EOR. This is largely due to the assessment seen in the market analysis section that CCGS only
proves economical with EOR in the US. Conversely, it is difficult to get financing for a carbon‐
intensive project without CCGS built into the design due to the Carbon Principles mentioned as
taking hold in financial institutions on Wall Street and elsewhere that decline financing to
projects with a high emissions risk factor. This is resulting on a catch‐twenty for energy project
developers who do not know what to do, which has resulted in the Climate Action Partnership
of industries who strive to achieve a fair cap‐and‐trade policy in the states. The DOE is working
hard to facilitate the Obama Administration’s commitment to alternative energy development
and clean coal technologies (CCS) by funding numerous projects across the country. However, a
real adoption of carbon pricing schemes is needed before the technology truly begins to reach
any significant scale. The various initiatives like the RGGI and the Climate Registry are preparing
the country for the expected transition but the hope is this will come sooner rather than later.
Another major issue concerning CCGS project development is the perception of the technology
by the American public. The primary issue is that most people have not heard of CCS at all. If
they have heard of it, they often cannot link it to CO2 , do not understand what CO2 i.e. they do
not know it is in carbonated soda, or do not understand how it works. The ones who are made
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more familiar with the technology often see it as synonymous with clean coal and therefore as
an excuse to continue mining and see renewable energies as a preferred alternative. Many do
not like the idea of storing CO2 under their homes in what they image to be a big cave or
balloon type formation and do not understand it would be done in the pore spaces of rocks.
Others simply don’t support the use of CCS because they do not believe in climate change.
The best example of this in the US is the DOE Phase III project meant to take place near
Greenville, Ohio. The townspeople were rallied behind an anti‐CCS group called “Citizens
Against CO2 Sequestration” who argued that 1) climate change was not something they saw as
an issue for the town, 2) the new ethanol plant where the CO2 was coming from was not adding
much to the community in terms of economic gain, and 3) the storage would be dangerous. The
project used a variety of techniques to explain the project and the CCS concept to the town but
in the end the project was canceled.
For this type of issue to be dealt with prior to additional project facing opposition several
subjects need to be discussed in the public forum. First, climate change needs to be explained
with specific local relevance. Second, CCS needs to be placed in a portfolio solution to explain
that it is not merely a choice between one power type and another but that many different
types must be employed together to meet demand at a cost that is reasonable to ratepayers.
Third, carbon capture needs to be talked about and explained so that people know more about
the technology in terms of what it is and what it is not. This is not to say that the technology
should be marketed but that it should be explained on its own merit in terms of being an
economic bridge‐technology to a low‐carbon world that does not stop the mining of coal or the
use of fossil fuels but does help place a price on CO2 , which in turn will make renewables more
competitive and start to take over larger sectors of the power supply. Lastly, locals need to be
engaged in the project to the greatest extent possible, perhaps not as project decision makers
but at least as significant stakeholders with the ability to voice concerns and affect some
changes if needed.
As the US operates in a federal system, there are three tiers of laws that can affect CCGS
expansion within the country. Laws at the local, state, and national level need to be examined so
that CCGS is allowed to move forward in a safe and properly regulated way. For example, this
means looking at the pipeline permitting process, property ownership statues, interstate waste
regulations, etc. Jurisdictions need to be set in terms of who takes responsibility for the CO2
throughout the CCS operations chains, as well as long‐term liability statutes such as already exist
in Australia.
On the policy agenda regarding CCS lay several main priorities. The most important of these is
one that places a price on carbon, either via a national law or compliance under and
international treaty but the best case would be a combination of the two. These issues can be
seen as coming to a head over the conflict between whether the EPA or Congress will regulate
CO2 , which is a situation that only serves to highlight the need for the US government to decide
where it stands on climate change. However, for CCGS technology to be properly accredited as a
climate change mitigation solution several practices must be changed. Efficiency standards need
to be adopted for power production to address the issues discussed at the beginning of this case
study. CO2 EOR needs to be limited to anthropogenic sources either via direct prohibition of
using natural sources or the more feasible solution of not granting carbon credits to operators
using natural CO2 or treating natural sources as emission point sources and taxing them
accordingly.
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The Players: The US as CCS Deployment Stage
With the amount of money being poured into CCGS projects from the US government, many
international firms have been attracted to the US to test their expertise. Nevertheless, there
remain a significant number of American firms, research institutes, agencies, universities, and
various other organizations involved and this section gives a basic description of who these
players are and their rolls in the development of CCGS activities in the US.
There are numerous national agencies and research institutions run by the government or by
public and private universities involved in the development of CCGS technology in the US. The
following examples are the most important but there are many more. The main funder for CCS
projects and R&D work is the US Department of Energy (DOE). Under the Bush Administration
they developed the FutureGen project and the regional partnerships to be detailed in the
following section. Under the Obama Administration the support of the DOE extended to
additional projects to develop CCS under the stimulus funds of the Recovery Act passed in 2009.
The National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) is the 15th research lab for the DOE and
was commissioned as such in 1999 to develop solutions for fossil fuel based energy production
while pursuing increased energy independence.
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for environmental policy
development and enforcement. Currently their main efforts relating to CCS are in the creation of
a mandatory CO2 emissions accounting scheme that would directly support the potential
creation of a GHG emissions limitation policy in the US or at the international level. There is also
potential for CO2 to be classified as an air pollutant under the Clean Air Act, which would place
the limitation of the gas into the domain of the EPA but this is still being decided by Congress
and the Supreme Court. The EPA is also involved in several of the NETL/DOE regional
partnerships for CCS development.
These government laboratories are located across the US and are involved with research and
development of many topics relating to energy, including CCS and nuclear technologies. A
variety of National Labs are involved with the projects and partnerships relating to CCS in their
regions. Battelle is an international organization that started in the US to develop steel
technologies but now is involved with R&D laboratories across the US, in the UK, and elsewhere.
They are also contracted by the US Government to manage several of the national labs such as
the Lawrence Livermore and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (LLNL and PNNL) that
are both involved with CCS development. It is important to note that not only the Battelle run
labs are involved nevertheless Battelle has taken a clear lead in this field.
So as to better divide the task of surveying the country and determining storage capabilities, the
DOE has sponsored seven “regional partnerships” to conduct storage tests across the US. These
partnerships will be detailed further under the DOE projects section but in general they are
consortiums made up of US national labs, state geological surveys, the regions industries,
national and international corporate interests, regionally active NGOs, and the local universities.
They are supported by the DOE and its National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL). The
seven partnerships are listed here will be described in greater detail under the Phase II project
descriptions.
The Big Sky Carbon Sequestration Partnership (Big Sky) is responsible for Idaho and parts of
Montana, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. The West Coast Regional Carbon
Sequestration Partnership (WESTCARB) maintains as members both US states and Canadian
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provinces: California, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii, and British
Columbia. The Midwest Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership (MRCSP) includes Ohio,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and Michigan and parts of Kentucky, Indiana, and West
Virginia. The Midwest Geologic Sequestration Consortium (MGSP) is a smaller but very well
organized group hailing from Illinois and parts of Kentucky and Indiana. The largest partnership
that is again between the US and Canada is the Plains CO2 Reduction Partnership (PCO2 R or
PCOR) that includes Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Wisconsin with
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba in Canada, and parts of Montana, South Dakota, and
Wyoming. In the south there is the Southeast Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership
(SECARB): Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia and parts of Kentucky, Texas, and West Virginia. Then to the
west is the Southwest Regional Partnership for Carbon Sequestration (SWP): Colorado, Kansas
New Mexico, and Utah with parts of Arizona, Texas, and Wyoming.
Before the regional groups formed around the CCS issue, the FutureGen Alliance was brought
together to design the country’s first zero emissions coal fired power plant. Today FutureGen is
an international consortium of coal and utilities companies designed to support the construction
of a near zero‐emission coal‐fired power plant. The location of the plant is set to be Mattoon,
Illinois and the goal is to demonstrate both the technical and economic feasibility of building a
commercial‐scale, CCGS‐based IGCC power plant. However, there were so issues with the
approval of the plant that will be detailed in the project description to follow. The current
members are made up of coal producers and energy utilities. In terms of US coal companies
there is the US‐based Peabody Energy, which is the world's largest private‐sector coal company,
CONSOL Energy Inc, which is the largest producer of high‐Btu coal in the US, and Alpha Natural
Resources, a top US metallurgical and thermal coal supplier. In addition there is Anglo American
Services, a UK‐based global mining and coal supplier, BHP Billiton Energy Coal, a global coal
company from Australia, Rio Tinto Energy America Services, the US subsidiary of UK coal
company, and the Australian Xstrata Coal that serves as the world’s largest exporter of thermal
coal. In terms of utilities there is a US subsidiary of E.ON, the German investor‐owned energy
provider, and the China Huaneng Group that is the largest energy producer in China.
As this report’s primary focus is on storage, the following section on storage engineering firms
aims to give a fairly detailed description of the more significant US actors, their areas of
expertise, and their level of involvement in CCS. Many other actors are involved but their
activities are not as easily substantiated.
Advanced Resources International (ARI) was an early entrant into the CCS arena, beginning
with global sequestration capacity assessments in oil and gas reservoirs and coal seams for the
IEA GHG Program in the mid‐1990’s. Since then, ARI has become a leading provider of technical
and consulting services regarding geologic carbon storage for both R&D and commercial
projects. They are involved in the WESTCARB, SWP, and SECARB regional partnerships and
provide consulting services to several major contractors like Schlumberger and Halliburton and
the major oil companies involved with CCS.
Baker Hughes is best known for its rig‐counts service but besides that it is a major contender in
the oil services market. As such Baker Hughes sees a need to move into the CCS services market
to provide injection well and monitoring related services to remain competitive. However,
despite the company’s involvement in the MGSC, SECARB, and PCO2 R partnerships, they are not
as established in this area with respect to CO2 specifically. For instance, compared to
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Schlumberger they are behind in terms of both their smaller size and lack of CCS R&D related
activities. The company has merged with another E&P contractor, BJ Services, so as to compete
with the two largest firms in the sector, Halliburton (to be detailed to follow) and Schlumberger
(to be detailed in the French case study).
Core Laboratories describes itself as a leading provider of proprietary and patented reservoir
description, production enhancement, and reservoir management services. Based originally
Texas, the company specializes in analyzing core samples from drilling operations to determine
reservoir characteristics. They are involved in the SECARB. Another Houston‐based service
company, ION Geophysical performs on‐ and offshore reservoir imaging using a variety of
seismic tools and other technologies. They are present in WESTCARB and will no doubt use their
monitoring expertise towards geotechnical assessments of potential CCGS storage site locations
and monitoring.
The drilling professionals at the Gas Technology Institute (GTI)’s drilling test facility near Tulsa,
help customers find ways to reduce exploration and production costs. They offer a wide range of
services, from the evaluation of advanced drilling to formation evaluation and completion
technologies associated with the drilling of natural gas and oil wells. As such they are positioned
to assist in CCS storage project design and consulting as well as monitoring services. They are a
partner in the SWP.
The US oil services giant Halliburton is involved in SECARB but the group is also visible the realm
of CCS on a global scale. There precise involvement is not completely clear but the project
involvement is less than that of Schlumberger based on Halliburton’s own relation of their CCS
project history. They are more active in the US than elsewhere in the world with CCS and it can
probably be assumed that most of this expertise lies in their drilling and reservoir management
contracts that must have led them to engage in some of the EOR projects but it appears that
they are not involved in many projects relating only to storage. The group recently purchased
Pinnacle Technologies and this company is listed as a partner in the SECARB and SWP and this
may be the basis for Halliburton’s claim to involvement in SECARB. Halliburton is not a trusted
brand in the US at least due to many allegations surrounding its former CEO and the former US
Vice President Dick Cheney, the Iraq War, and Halliburton receiving numerous government
contracts there. This could also explain involvement in the sensitive CCS topic is more under the
Pinnacle brand. Nevertheless the company has big ambitions in the CCS arena.
Sandia Technologies is involved in SECARB and is reported to be involved with a lot of the
geotechnical field required in those projects. There origins lie in geological waste disposal, which
has given them some significant advantages in terms of experience, know‐how, and actual tools
in the CCGS field. Besides being competent in geologic/reservoir evaluation services, they also
offer specifically services relating to CCGS. They are also involved in the FRIO project and their
own DOE supported CCGS project that will both be detailed to follow and was an early feasibility
test of storage in the US.
The alternative energy solutions company, Sage Resources, is interested in CCGS due to its
existing activity with geothermal energy projects, which can involve similar geological
assessment, drilling, and re‐injection needs. They are involved in the Big Sky partnership as a
result. TGS, another Houston company, offers geological data services to many of the major E&P
companies and is involved in the PCO2 R partnership.
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Weatherford Advanced Geotechnology is a software service division of the oil services
company Weatherford International. It is involved with the PCO2 R partnership in the US, which
make sense because the group’s most stated involvement in CCS is in Canada despite its origins
being Texas. As such the group appears to be less involved in the US CCS market than its
competitors in well services like Halliburton, Schlumberger, and Baker Hughes. However, in
Canada the group is a member of the Canadian CCS Alliance and there it states more clearly its
ability as E&P service provider.
Blue Source is not a storage company per se but is still a significant player in the emerging CCS
market in the US and they are involved in CCS in three different areas: the financing of CO2
pipelines, project development, and voluntary carbon credits (specifically TERs). They are
partners in WESTCARB, SWP, MGSC, and PCO2 R but are also involved in a wide range of GHG
abatement projects. Their focus in terms of transport is taking CO2 from industrial sources to
potential storage sites. To coordinate this activity they are also involved in the project
development side of CCS and the TERs come into play for financing these early projects.
As the key aspect of the developing CCGS infrastructure chain, transport technology providers
and operators are important players in this market. There are some companies included in this
section that are also storage operators in that they use the CO2 for EOR applications and as such
have the ability to expand their expertise into CO2 EOR for storage and pure storage projects.
Denbury Resources’ involvement in the CO2 transport sector arose from the initial CO2 EOR
projects in Texas and then elsewhere in the US. The company is originally a field acquisition and
production company but as a result of its oil, gas, and CO2 pipeline construction projects it is
now well positioned as a CO2 transport operator and also an end‐user of the CO2 for EOR
projects. One thing that is interesting about their business model is that they began with natural
CO2 for their EOR. Now, as they add anthropogenic sources to their supply, the natural CO2
domes they acquired originally could serve as both supply to supliment their anthropogenic
supplies and as storage if the supply of anthropogenic CO2 becomes greater than their existing
demand from EOR.
The Denbury group recently acquired Encore who was also involved in CO2 EOR but in the
northwestern parts of the US, which increases Denbury’s range of influence. Encore has a few
operations that are employing or at least considering CO2 for EOR in Montana. Denbury is
involved in SECARB but Encore gives the group access to the PCO2 R. They also have several
projects that they are completing with industrial partners as a result of US stimulus funding from
the DOE and all this will be documented in the project section. Its biggest project relating to
transport currently is the construction of the “Green Pipeline” that will bring CO2 from near
New Orleans in Louisiana for EOR near Galveston Bay in Texas by mid‐2010 and beyond that
point later that year. This project has a good potential for expansion via trunk‐lines to the areas
other CCGS activity, which is extensive. They are currently negotiating with some CO2 sources in
Illinois in order to link them to there EOR activities near the gulf.
Kinder Morgan is similar to Denbury Resources in that they began as a supplier of natural CO2
for EOR operations in Texas and as such these two are the main competitors in the US CO2
supply and transport market. Kinder Morgan also produces oil in Texas but its main activities are
as one of the largest natural gas transporters and storage operators, the largest independent
terminal operator, the largest transporter and marketer of CO2 , and the largest handler of
petroleum coke in the US. The company is a member of WESTCARB, SWP, and SECARB. Its main
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CO2 pipeline operations are mostly developed around natural CO2 sources, which can prove
problematic if CCGS is to be looked to as a GHG mitigation technology. The expansion of
Denbury into more anthropogenic CO2 sources could prove as a real advantage in this
competition. Also, although Kinder Morger is involved in DOE partnerships, they have not
pursued their own projects as Denbury has done.
Rooney Engineering is a general engineering firm specializing in pipelines. They are mostly
involved in the construction of complete transportation systems, including not only the pipes
but also compression stations and metering and are familiar with right‐of‐way acquisitions, and
as such will be well positioned to participate in the CCS transport market. They are a partner in
WESTCARB. Spectra Energy specializes in all natural gas related infrastructure, which is very
closely related to that required for CO2 . As such they are involved in the MGSC and PCO2 R
groups. Similarly, the Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Company performs both natural gas
transportation, and underground storage services in the Northwestern US around the Williston
Basin, which lies between North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming and also extends into Canada.
It is not clear if the company was involved in the pipeline construction from the Dakota
Gasification Plant in Beulah to the Weyburn‐Midale EOR operations in Canada, but as these
operations are also in the Williston basin this involvement would be logical.
There are several consulting operations that have adopted CCGS into their portfolio of activities
and they engage in various aspects of advising companies how to adopt the technology or for
government regulators to help design CCGS policy. As of now there do not appear to be any
sizable pure and specifically CCGS‐based consultant groups based in the US. Melzer Consulting
maintains a focus on EOR operations arising from the Texas experience but is not engaging on
purely storage related activities. ICF has taken on a more regulatory role by working with the
EPA to develop carbon policies and storage regulations. The following paragraph gives many of
the more active purely consulting‐based firms involved in the US, however it is important to
understand that many project developers and contractors, such as Blue Source or Halliburton,
have in‐house consultants or consultant partners that they use for projects such as these.
The Applied Sciences Lab (SECARB) engages in environmental systems evaluation and planning
and do some software development. Bevilacqua‐Knight (WESTCARB) are engineering and
project communications consultants. CRL Energy conduct energy and environmental research
and consulting with a capture focus. GEO Consultants specialize in environmental services.
Nexant (PCO2 R & WESTCARB) provide technology management and development consulting.
Renewable Fuel Technologies (WESTCARB) do have a renewables focus but also consult on CCS.
SFA Pacific (WESTCARB) advises on power generation and environmental control and Summit
Energy (Big Sky) provides natural gas and related risk consulting.
One key aspect for CCGS project success is introducing the storage and transport aspects of the
project to the local community in a way that does not create anti‐CCS bias due to fears relating
to a lack of understanding regarding the concepts involved. Many social scientists from
universities and private firms are involved in studying the perceptions of CCS, the knowledge of
the technology (or lack thereof), the effect of pseudo‐opinions that are formed by those with no
prior‐knowledge of the technology so as to evaluate it in surveys, etc. Several cases exist
globally where CCS projects have failed or have been severely hindered due to public resistance
and as a result many project developers have begun to hire public acceptance consultants to
assist with educating the local population on the CCGS topic and engaging them in the decision‐
making process. The following firms are the main examples from the consultant groups doing
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this type of work for the regional partnerships. AJW of MRCSP has become recognized as an
expert in CCS related public relations and outreach, with their partner Sarah Wade working
closely with the DOE and NETL to provide the latest public engagement tools and tips to CCS
project developers and regulators alike. EnTech Strategies (SWP & Big Sky) also engages in
technology acceptance consulting and RMS Strategies (SECARB) provides marketing and public
opinion strategy services.
There are many players in the capture technology, equipment, and chemicals sector as well as in
the transport and commercial gas supply market. Because the list is already so populated in the
US this report will not attempt to list the major players as the focus here is again storage. Many
NGOs are involved in various aspects of CCGS development, policy, and research. As such they
are difficult to classify, this section presents some of the more interesting cases in terms of
environmental policy development relating to energy and climate change. The Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) has developed a recommended portfolio of energy production
technologies as a recommendation to energy policy developers at the state and national level.
They are also engaged in several capture studies taking place across the US and Canada and
support broadly the application of capture and CCS technologies to power infrastructure. The
World Resource Institute (WRI) is visible in nearly every international effort regarding CCGS
policy recommendations and its CCS expert Sarah Forbes as well as former WRI researchers like
John Venezia are well respected voices in the CCS world and appear as advisors and co‐authors
on most global CCS related papers. WRI is seen as an unbiased research institute and as a
member of the Climate Action Partnership (CAP), which is comprised of industrial and
environmental interests and can be viewed as a bridge between environmental advocacy groups
such as Greenpeace and NRDC and big industry.
Environmental Defense and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) began as
opponents to CCS like Greenpeace, advocating a completely renewable‐based solution.
However, they have now accepted the technology at least as part of a complete solution for the
climate change issue. The NRDC and Environmental Defense have also joined along with WRI the
CAP in the US, in the hopes on reaching a compromise on the cap‐and‐trade policy issue by
working together with industrials. The NRDC, like WRI, has also engaged in China and this may
be one of the key reasons why NRDC has become interested in CCS as part of a global strategy
as opposed to simply being a US policy issue. Nevertheless they have become active in
influencing US CCS policy and as a result have supported research on topics like EOR and CCS
project quality standards. The Pew Climate Center also in engaged in developing CCS project
standards.
Most of the projects in the US concerning CCS are focused on capture from energy projects for
underground storage. There are some that are interested in industrial applications for the gas
that would replace the need for storage and others who are pursing industrial applications for
the technology. The following examples are taken from the regional partnerships.
A new company called Abengoa Bioenergy is interested in using micro algae to capture the CO2 .
The algae then can be used for a variety of applications including being dried and burnt for
biomass energy and also as fish food for large aquaculture operations. CEMEX is perhaps the
only cement company worldwide engaged in a project to adapt CCGS to the cement production
context. In France, Lafarge is also interested in this but has apparently not as of yet engaged in
developing its own specific project and is more focused on biomass. As the sole developer in this
area, CEMEX stands in a good position to market this technology globally once they have
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developed a pilot as will be discussed in the project section. Continental Carbonic Products is
interested in another method to dealing with carbon: finding other industrial applications for
the gas. Dry ice is frozen CO2 and as such continental carbonic products has joined the MGSC in
the hope of using captured CO2 as a source for its products and services. This could have
interesting financial implications in terms of carbon credits if a price is assigned to CO2 within
the US.
As the US has been involved in oil production from the beginning of the petroleum age, the oil
companies in the US are numerous and cover a very broad range in terms of the size and scope
of the companies and their activities. Many of these companies are purely interested in the
development of CCS for enhancing their production and possible gaining additional benefits
from tax credits, carbon credits, and investment from parties concerned about the climate
change issue. However, several of the larger companies have begun to at least speak to the
topic of becoming energy companies in the larger sense of the word and as such are working to
develop their expertise for application in storage for the sake of GHG emissions reduction
without any additional benefit. This is less common with the big US players compared to BP
(with their new slogan: Beyond Petroleum), Shell, and Total. Smaller E&P companies like
Denbury Resources, Advanced Resources, and Rosetta Resources are more visibly involved with
non‐EOR related CCGS technology development.
As the US presents such a large market and deployment stage for CCS, with a variety of
government programs and incentives for the technology, many foreign actors are involved as
well within the country. Some of the major influences are from France, e.g. Schlumberger,
Alstom, Air Liquide, and Oxand (a smaller firm typically involved with Schlumberger), but these
companies will be discussed in the French case study. What is most notable is that Schlumberger
is the only commercial actor to be involved in all of the regional partnerships and most of the
other CCGS projects in the US. There are also a variety of Canadian actors as a result of the
extensive oil and gas E&P activities in the US’s northern neighbor. However, they are mostly
involved in bilateral partnerships like WESTCARB and PCO2 R who are developing projects in the
US and Canada.

The Projects: Current CCGS Activity within the United States
Despite perhaps appearances that the US has the least amount of commitment compared to
other developed nations in terms of developing solutions to climate change, it has by far the
largest amount of capital invested on its soil for developing CCGS. This is mostly reflected in the
recent Economic Recovery Act stimulus package that sets aside a good deal of funding for
alternative energy projects. The reason for this is however not due as much to the concern
about rising temperature but more so to the desire to increase domestic oil production using
CO2 . This is best seen in the early project development where EOR projects have been more
successful and the major saline storage projects have had more trouble.
As was discussed under the EOR section the initial CCS‐related projects in the US centered on
the CO2 ‐based EOR work in West Texas, with the concept gradually being applied by oilfield
operators in other states. Two of the major EOR project operations are now cited by the IEA as
among the only truly commercial scale projects in existence today as was revealed in the
introduction. However, the Gulf Coast Carbon Center has been established to facilitate regional
education and technical information transfer on the potential for scale‐up to use develop EOR in
the region as an early, economically viable method of greenhouse gas emissions reduction for
this industrial corridor.
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The actual amount of CO2 being stored each year must be estimated based on CO2 recycling
rates combined with information on the total injection and annual CO2 purchases. A rule‐of‐
thumb could be established to estimate new CO2 injection, for instance by using the 21 percent
recycling rate estimated for the Weyburn‐Midale project, this could be applied universally to
guess the size of the “storage” aspect of an EOR project. However, a general rate is difficult to
establish and should be calculated on a case‐by‐case basis for actual mitigation and carbon
crediting purposes.
The Weyburn‐Midale project detailed earlier was an example of CCGS but it is important to
remember that the storage project is Canadian with the North Dakota Gasification plant only
being concerned with capture. For a US example, Chevron is operating an EOR project at
Rangeley in Colorado, which is listed by the IEA as one of the five commercial‐scale CCS projects
existing today. The field was first discovered in 1901 and then commercially developed in 1943
with the depths ranging from 150 and 520 meters (Energy and Minerals Field Institute, 2005).
CO2 EOR began in 1986 and with the added boost from CO2 an additional 114 million barrels
are expected to be produced.
The CO2 is piped from the Exxon LaBarge gas sweetening plant in Wyoming via first the Exxon
pipeline for 77 kilometers (48 miles) and then a Chevron operated pipeline for 207 kilometers
(129 miles) and the capital investment for this pipeline was 158 million USD. The CO2
compression facility was one of the largest parts of this initial investment and continues to be a
significant operating cost.
The injection rates for CO2 are typically given for the US in million standard cubic feet per day
(MMSCF/D or MMCFD) In terms of the amount of CO2 captured as opposed to recycled, the CO2
purchase rates for Rangeley began at 1.8 Mt in 1986, peaked in 1990 at just less than 3 Mt, and
now have decreased to 1.2 Mt (50 MMCFD) as of 2007 (Energy and Minerals Field Institute,
2005). The water, CO2 , and other gases used at Rangeley are apparently reinjected after
processing but it is not clear if this implies 100 percent reinjection for the CO2 , which could have
implication for GHG mitigation accreditation.
Returning to the FutureGen topic, this time as a project rather than the organization, in terms of
the technology the IGCC coal gasification process for FutureGen involves a controlled mixture of
coal, oxygen, and steam in series of reactors. Then, similar to an oxy‐fired plant, an air
separation unit supplies the gasifier with a stream of oxygen without nitrogen. In high
temperature and pressure gasifier, a reaction converts the coal and oxygen into a syngas (H2 and
CO). The syngas is passed through a second “water‐gas‐shift” reactor to convert the remaining
CO into more H2 and fairly pure CO2 . There are a variety of applications for the H2 but the
important aspect of this plant is that the CO2 stream is relatively pure and ready for geological
storage. Another benefit is that many of the byproducts of the process would have commercial
value for regional industries. The efficiency of the plant is derived from the combined use of gas
and steam turbines to produce electricity. First the hydrogen‐rich syngas is fed into a gas turbine
to generate electricity. Next, the waste heat from the gas turbine is used to power a steam
turbine (FutureGen, 2008).
Originally, in 2003 the FutureGen project was announced by the Bush Administration as a front
running US effort to develop clean energy technology. The project was meant to be a group of
industrial partners from the US coal and utilities companies with some international
involvement from relevant developing countries, like China, who depend on coal as an energy
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source and would benefit from the demonstration project. The first four years were dedicated
to planning the plant and selecting a site for the project and the preliminary cost estimate for
the project was set at 1 billion USD, with the DOE contributing roughly three fourths of the
funding. The Washington Group, which was then purchased by URS Corporation, was selected to
lead the project’s design and construction.
In the final site selection, the possibilities were narrowed down to two sites in Texas and two in
Illinois. Shortly after the Mattoon was chosen at the end of 2007, the DOE withdrew its funding
promise for the project. Among the concerns were a more recent estimate of the project’s cost
predicted an increase to roughly 1.8 billion. The US Energy Secretary at the time of the
cancelation in early 2008 argued that the money could be better spent between several CCS
pilot projects rather than just on one large project. Several members of the US Congress from
Illinois accused the Energy Secretary of following directions to kill the project after it was not
awarded to the president’s home state of Texas.
The FutureGen alliance lost some members but has continued to maintain the prospect of
moving forward in Mattoon. Obama’s support for clean coal was elicited after the election and
in the summer of 2009 the project was again taken up by the DOE under the Recovery Act
funding and is in a restructuring period until early 2010, so as to complete the site specific
design/subsurface work and expand the partnership.
The Department of Energy's total anticipated financial contribution for the project is $1.073
billion, $1 billion of which comes from Recovery Act funds for carbon capture and storage
research. The FutureGen Alliance's total anticipated financial contribution is $400 million to
$600 million, based on a goal of 20 member companies each contributing a total of $20 million
to $30 million over a four to six year period. The Alliance, with support from DOE, will pursue
options to raise additional non‐federal funds needed to build and operate the facility, including
options for capturing the value of the facility that will remain after conclusion of the research
project, potentially through an auction of the residual interests in the late fall.
This field test of CO2 sequestration into the Frio Formation in Texas was the first example of a
saline reservoir test in the US. It is a part of the three state of the international GEO‐SEQ project,
which is designed to improve injectivity and capacity predictions for saline and depleted gas
formations. There are three CCGS cases that fall under the GEO‐SEQ project: Frio, the Otaway
Basin Project in Australia, and In Salah in Algeria. According to GEO‐SEQ:
In [fiscal year 2008], the third year of a five‐year cycle, we will continue to advance
understanding of CO2 migration in brine formations and depleted gas reservoirs, and investigate
geomechanical effects of industrial‐scale CO2 injection. Although the three projects are carried
out in distinct geological environments, the scope of GEO‐SEQ is integrative with strong cross‐
task communication and application of common tools and approaches in related projects. The
overall objective of the GEO‐SEQ project is to gain knowledge of geologic CO2 storage processes
and mechanisms and how to monitor and simulate them while making results available through
publications and conference participation. Advances derived from GEO‐SEQ efforts also support
the DOE Regional Partnership Projects through the involvement of the investigators in various
Partnership projects, and will likely be used in commercial‐scale CO2 operations in the future
(IEA GHG).
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As the first task in GEO‐SEQ, Frio is designed to explore as well a major storage location for the
very carbon emissions intensive region around Texas, due to the significant oil and gas
production and processing there. The project phase I was reservoir characterization followed by
100 days of CO2 injection. Phase II, currently underway, involves monitoring compared to a pre‐
injection baseline established at the end of 2002. The goals are to prove the security and safety
of saline formations for CCGS, track the CO2 plume that results in such a formation, compare
real results with conceptual models, and develop the experience needed for future saline
projects.
The project is funded by the DOE and the NETL and there are several key players involved as
partners in the Frio injection test including Sandia Technologies, Schlumberger, and three of the
national labs. BP, the Texas American Resources Company, and Transpecto also were involved
with the test. Frio is a Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) Endorsed Project. CSLF is
an international climate change initiative that is focused on development and improvement of
cost‐effective technologies for the CCS and for this purpose it has endorsed 10 international
projects it believes support its overall goal.
Today the DOE and the NETL work most closely with the Regional Carbon Sequestration
Partnerships (RCSPs), hereafter referred to as the Regional Partnerships, but the DOE is involved
with nearly every CCS project being undertaken in the US with efforts such as Frio and
FutureGen where the DOE has taken a funding role but also with the Recovery Act of 2009.
There was significant funding allocation for CCS projects in this Act and the DOE has selected
additional projects in addition to its own Regional Partnership Phase III projects to receive
stimulus support.
DOE/NETL carbon source and storage possibilities atlas “Carbon Sequestration Atlas of the
United States and Canada” that was mentioned earlier in the report to give the storage capacity
for the US and Canada was the core aim of the Phase I of the regional partnerships project. This
phase included the gathering of available geological data so as to begin to better estimate the
storage capacity US and Canada. Phase II of the partnerships was designed to continue to the
course up the pyramid given from CO2 CRC at the beginning of the report to the regional, basin‐
wide, and even site specific level by engaging in smaller injection tests across the country. The
overall goal has been to test the various capacities for the different formation types, including
coal beds, and also for terrestrial sequestration projects in forests or wetlands. However, in
terms of actual CO2 injection these tests have given a more reservoir specific and site specific
knowledge, which was severely lacking for saline reservoirs and was not certain even for the oil
and gas formations for CO2 specifically. The DOE list for the Phase II tests is given in Figure 24
and the projects are divided into geological and terrestrial tests and then further by the specific
storage mechanism, i.e. formation or biomass type.
The major goal of the Phase III tests is to verify the storage potential with injection rates and
amounts resembling the amounts anticipated by a commercial operation (DOE, November). The
following paragraphs attempt to outline where these projects stand.
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Figure 24 - NETL RCSP Phase II Projects
Source; DOE

SWP: The focus of this partnership’s phase III project the goal is testing some Jurassic sandstone
formations throughout the region from Wyoming to Northern New Mexico. These formations
are about 60 meters thick and the project will inject two Mt of CO2 over four years to test the
large shale deposits that will act as cap‐rocks using a variety of monitoring techniques.
SECARB: This test has two locations within the Tuscaloosa Massive Sandstone that are 320 km
apart to test the effect of the formations heterogeneity on the injectivity. The first location will
be to inject 1.5 Mt into the saline portion of a formation lower down or “down‐dip” from an oil
field already employing CO2 EOR to trace the CO2 ’s movement in the saline reservoir. This
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injection has begun already. A second location will inject CO2 from an existing coal plant fitted
with post‐combustion capture. This CO2 will be injected for six years directly below the plant.
PCO2 R: The largest of the seven partnerships is working in the US and Canada and as a result it
will complete large‐scale tests in both countries. The Canadian project involves the “largest gas
production plant in North America” and 1.8 Mt of its CO2 and hydrogen sulfide (H2S) will be
injected in Northwest British Columbia into a saline sandstone formation within the Alberta
Basin. The US test will be within the Williston Basin into an oil‐bearing reservoir in a carbonate
formation at a depth of 3048 meters for EOR. The partnership will specifically be working with
Basin Electric and their post‐combustion capture facility and Encore, now owned by Denbury,
who is currently producing oil at the field of concern where one Mt of CO2 will be injected
annually.
MGSC: Archer Daniels Midland Corporation and Schlumberger will be injecting one Mt of CO2
from a biofuel fermentation plant into the Mount Simon formation to test its capacity to serve
as the major storage formation for the region. The Mount Simon formation is ideal in that it is
450 meters thick and highly permeable and porous, but little information is known about the
formation as a whole. The primary injection well is already drilled and the injection will be 1800
meters below the surface at the base of the formation and is planned for early 2010. The DOE
has also committed 1,480,656 USD of Recovery Act funding to this project.
MRCSP: This phase III project has not pinned down where the injection location will be due to
public resistance to the first selected site near Greenville, Ohio. The original idea was to inject
one Mt of CO2 annually from an ethanol plant, which produces a fairly pure stream of CO2
naturally without extensive capture equipment. This would also have been within the Mount
Simon Sandstone formation. The issues with this project will be discussed further in the public
acceptance and engagement section.
WESTCARB: This project will test the San Joaquin basin in central California by injecting 1 Mt
over four years. The source will be a Clean Energy Systems 170 MW oxy‐fired IGCC plant that
will be using coal and biomass in Kern, County. The injection location will be on site with the CO2
stored directly below the plant in one of several feasible formations.
Big Sky: This project will test the Nugget Sandstone formation with the injection of 2 Mt to CO2
at a depth of 3352 meters. The location will be at Riley Ridge near Exxon’s LaBarge platform and
the Cimarex Energy Company’s planned helium and natural gas processing plant is expected to
be the source for the CO2 . The sandstones in the region are hoped to eventually be able to hold
more than a century’s worth of the regions point source emissions.
As already mentioned, the Economic Recovery Act of 2009 has promised a significant amount of
funding for alternative energy projects and research. Among these technologies, a large
percentage of the money will go directly to CCS related projects, including FutureGen. The
following projects are the projects selected to receive these funds that have as of yet not been
mentioned in this case study in another context (DOE, 2009).
Air Products and Denbury Resources have agreed to work together to capture more than 1 Mt
of CO2 from two steam methane reformers Port Arthur, Texas and transport it via Denbury’s
planned Green Pipeline system for EOR applications, e.g. in the Oyster Bayou and Hastings
oilfields in Texas. The DOE has promised just less than million USD of funding for this project.
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Fluor will be employing its “Econamine Plus” post‐combustion capture solution specially tailored
to accommodate the emissions from a plant burning a Boise White Paper industry bi‐product
called black liquor fuels that are made during pulp production. This Battelle Memorial Institute
project will explore injection into deep flood basalt formations in Washington State, probably
close to the paper plant’s location. The DOE will contribute 0.5 million USD to this project.
A Bay Area, California‐based project headed by C6 Resources, which is an eco‐minded spin‐off
from Shell, will be injecting a total of one Mt of CO2 from several facilities in the area into a
3220 meter deep saline formation with the help of two national laboratories and 3 million USD
of DOE funding.
CEMEX is partnering with the oil and gas E&P contractor RTI International to demonstrate a dry
sorbent CO2 capture technology at one of its cement plants in the United States. The CEMEX
plant will work to design and construct a dry sorbent CO2 capture and compression system,
pipeline (if necessary), and injection station apparently near to the plant. This is hoped to be a
demonstration CCGS project at a scale of one Mt of CO2 stored annually and if successful will
allow CEMEX to market its technique to cement industry players globally. The project will
receive 1.1 million USD in funding from the DOE.
ConocoPhillips aims to capture the CO2 from a 683 MW IGCC plant firing petroleum coke in
Sweeny, Texas for this CCGS commercial‐scale project. Only 85 percent of the CO2 produced will
be captured but this will amount to over 5 Mt of CO2 stored, probably for EOR in an oil or gas
field nearby. The project was awarded a little more than 3 million USD by the DOE.
Leucadia Energy and Denbury Resources have received a DOE pledge of support for two projects
they will pursue jointly. The first project, which was awarded 540,000 USD from the
government, will be to capture the CO2 from a co‐generation plant that will make methanol
from petroleum coke to be located near Lake Charles, Louisiana. The project will send the 4 Mt
of CO2 for EOR by building a 19 kilometer (12 mile) trunk‐line to connect it to Dunbury’s
proposed Green Pipeline. The second project, with 840,000 USD from the DOE, will involve a
Leucadia affiliate, Mississippi Gassification, petcoke‐based synthetic natural gas plant in Moss
Point, Mississippi. Similar to the first project this plant will capture 4 Mt and probably also truck
in to the Green Pipeline.
Praxair with BP and Denbury Resources plan to capture one Mt of CO2 per year from a
hydrogen‐production facility at an oil refinery in Louisiana planned along the path of the Green
Pipeline. The DOE will support this project with 1.7 million USD.
Shell’s Chemical Capital Company will work to coordinate the capture of one Mt of CO2 from
facilities located along the Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. It could be
that these are all chemical production facilities and as such do not require significant capture
related modifications because they already produce relatively pure streams of CO2 and are thus
“low hanging fruit” economically for the CCGS roll‐out. The project will receive 3 million USD
from the DOE. It is not yet clear if it is up to Shell to store the CO2 themselves or, as the project
is located close to the proposed route of Denbury’s Green Pipeline, to dispense of the CO2 that
way.
A University of Utah team will work with several proposed CO2 EOR locations in Kansas. To test
the CCGS concept, more than one Mt of CO2 will be captured annually from a variety of
industrial sources. The project aims to then compress and transported the gas via two new
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intra‐state pipelines to bring it to the EOR locations. Below each EOR location also lies a deep
saline reservoir that spans most of Kansas and will be used to store the CO2 produced in
addition to the EOR production needs. The DOE’s share of funding for this effort is 2.7 million
USD.
Wolverine Power Supply Cooperative will be building a 600‐megawatt circulating fluidized bed
power plant near Rogers City, Michigan and this project will investigate the use of advanced
amines and other capture chemicals from DOW and Hitachi to capture 0.3 Mt of CO2 per year.
The storage for this project is apparently not yet determined but it is notable that there are
already some CO2 based EOR activities in the state. The DOE will contribute 2.7 million USD to
the project.
In addition to the projects discussed, there are several other CCS projects across the US that are
either funded via some other government mechanism not discussed here or are privately
funded. These projects have been discovered using the CCS project maps supplied by MIT, the
World Coal Institute, and the Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage and additional research. In the
appendix is a list of the global comercial projects as given by the GCCSI but a comprehensive
map in Figure 25 give all of the sizable project activity in the US.
Ultimately, for the US several things should be made clear by this case study. First, the country’s
energy system is severely limited by a variety of technical, financial, and political factors. The US
infrastructure is aging and needs to be revamped, which means a significant concentration of
national efforts on projects to improve many systems and foremost among these systems is the
energy system. However, other updates will increase the overall efficiency and decrease energy
demand.
Second, climate change needs to be recognized at the national, state, and local level across the
country and the implication this has on the energy options available to the country needs to be
made clear to decision‐makers. It is important that a choice be made to move forward with a
solution and economics point to CCGS as able to deliver a significant piece of that solution. But it
must be realized that CCGS is only the beginning and that a long‐term strategy be developed to
increase the energy independence and security in the US. The recent BP oil spill accident in the
Gulf of Mexico places a great deal of pressure to move away from offshore drilling and could
lead to increased interest in onshore EOR using CO2 .
Third, within the alternative energies market the US is placing its firms at a disadvantage by not
adopting higher efficiency standards and carbon pricing mechanisms. Whether or not climate
change needs to be addressed becomes irrelevant if the energy security of the country is
considered. Furthermore, although coal is apparently abundant, it would be unwise for the
country to focus its entire R&D effort on inefficiently burning a dirty resource that is scarce and
will be taxed elsewhere on the planet if it hopes to remain competitive internationally. Coal is
believed to be a constant and reliable source for energy but some studies indicate supply issues
arising in the next couple decades and some new natural “shale gas” discoveries could lead to a
favoring of natural gas projects over coal and diminish the need for CCS given relatively low
carbon constraints.
The general lack of foresight with respect to climate constraints in the US can already be seen as
taking effect with the loss of alternative energy companies to more politically supportive
counties like Germany and cheaper production countries like China. In terms of CCGS specifically
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it is a French company, Schlumberger, which is managing most of the US storage projects. As
one of the major oil market players, a potentially fast democratic system, and one of the largest
national budgets, the US has great potential to be highly completive in the emerging CCGS
market but without strong policies supporting the potential national players this market will
pass into the hands of others eager to act today.

Figure 25 - US CCGS Related Projects
Sources: OGJ, MIT, Canadian Geographic, Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage, DOE
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Case II: The French Republic
France is an interesting case when considering its stance on climate change for several reasons.
First, as an influential member of the European Union, the country offers an opportunity to
observe the larger picture of EU policies regarding climate change and CCS. Second, France is
largely energy independent, in terms of its grid electricity production, due to its significantly
nuclear‐based power sector. The severe effects of the oil crises of the 1970s caused the country
to pursue a route towards energy independence early, which moved it away from fossil fuels for
electricity production and towards alternative energy solutions like nuclear, hydroelectric, and
geothermal. As a result, the fixed point source (non‐transport related) carbon dioxide (CO2 )
emissions of the country are drastically lower than most other developed countries.
Nevertheless, given the significant number of cars and trucks in its transportation sector and its
expertise in the petroleum industry France remains tied to carbon due to its high stake in the
international oil trade. Total, France’s main oil provider, is listed as one of the six global
“supermajors”, which is a title designated for the world’s largest petroleum companies. The
other big oil industry names in France are Schlumberger and Technip, which are worldwide
service providers for the industry. Second, in addition to the oil players, Air Liquide is a global
commercial gas supplier with an interest in carbon dioxide management. Lastly, given the
number of turbines and power equipment supplied by France’s Alstom, who serves as a global
technology provider, the company claims that, “One in four of the world’s light bulbs is powered
by Alstom technologies (Alstom, 2009).” These two divergent profiles, one with comparatively
low CO2 emissions and the other with a high stake in carbon production, make the prospect of a
strong carbon capture and geological storage (CCGS) market sector emerging within France
uncertain without further investigation.
One pattern that can be observed globally is that many existing companies within oil and gas
sector are currently positioning themselves to provide the servicing and expertise to deploy the
various technologies associated with CCGS. The aforementioned French companies are all, to
some extent, vying for a piece of the emerging CCGS market. On the other hand, the clientele
and project locations for this market appear for the moment to be developing largely outside of
France, due to the low carbon profile of the country. As such, due to the economic interest in
the sector from the French industrials, the current situation in France is one of embracing the
technology on the small scale, giving the country a technical advantage in CCGS, so that CCGS
can be applied by French experts on a larger scale elsewhere on the globe. This report will
outline what the positions are of potential CCGS experts within France, the French pilot projects
that are coming online or are planned, the involvement of French industry giants in these
projects, and the applicability of these projects both within the country and at a global scale.

The Background: France’s CO2 Profile and the Reason for CCGS Development in France
France currently maintains a very low profile in terms of its CO2 produced per capita. Compared
with the top per capita CO2 emitters, Australia and the US, France produces less than one third
of the emissions of these coal dependant countries. To place this in perspective, Australia
produces 20.5 tons of carbon dioxide per capita and the US follows closely with an annual
average of 19.7. These two are closely followed by Canada, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia
whose per capita emissions continue historic increase trends or are now beginning to stabilize
(Lauder, 2009). On the other hand, France’s per capita emissions have decreased since the
1970s and are stabilized around an average of 6 tons per capita during the 1990s. Although this
trend is more due to a decision to pursue energy independence rather than a dedication to
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reducing climate change; it nevertheless places France in a more comfortable position in terms
of meeting the demands of a global climate treaty such as the Kyoto Treaty and its potential
successor that is to be agreed upon at Copenhagen in the coming months. Nevertheless,
regardless of the results from the Copenhagen Conference, the European Commission (EC) has
set a target of a 20 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (30 percent if other
developed nations join in on meeting a similar reduction goal). “As part of its Climate Action
package adopted on January 23, 2008, the Commission mentions CO2 capture and storage (CCS)
as one of the most promising techniques available in terms of its potential contribution to their
targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction. It recently put forward a regulatory
framework for this technology and is encouraging the installation of demonstration pilot units to
improve knowledge (Veolia, 2009).”
The EC has now announced that it will select ten to twelve CCS projects planned within its
member states that will receive European funding (Munier, 2009). These projects are currently
encouraged to be larger than 0.5 Mt but there is a possibility that, due to the immaturity of the
technology in terms of existing integrated CCS projects, there will be no minimum. In France,
complimenting the interests of the EC, there are several policies going into effect to incentivize
the reduction of GHGs. The French President Nicholas Sarcozey has committed the country to
adopting a carbon tax beginning in 2010. The recent environmental law passed in August of
2009 states in section VI,
Tout projet de construction d'une centrale à charbon devra être conçu pour pouvoir
équiper celle‐ci, dans les meilleurs délais, d'un dispositif de captage et stockage du
dioxyde de carbone. Aucune mise en service de nouvelle centrale à charbon ne sera
autorisée si elle ne s'inscrit pas dans une logique complète de démonstration de captage,
transport et stockage du dioxyde de carbone (Prorogeant le mandat des membres du
Conseil économique, social et environnemental et de programmation relative à la mise
en œuvre du Grenelle de l'environnement, 2009),
which means that all new coal plants constructed within France must be coupled with CCS. In
addition to this, by 2015 3.6 GW of France’s existing coal plants are scheduled to be
decommissioned so as to respect new EU air quality standards. Lastly, the new “Grenelle
Environment Round Table” is backed by several state funded agencies like ADEME, which is also
encouraging CCS technology development by offering funding to five projects being planned
within France. However, given the country’s overall emission’s profile, it is not necessarily clear
at an initial glance why the country has adopted CCS as such a major priority.
As a result of France’s decision to move away from fossil fueled electricity production in the
1970s, the country is now the global leader in terms of the percentage of its national energy
supplied from nuclear power. This is visible in Figure 27, which illustrates the significant
reductions of solid fuels like coal from the French complete energy makeup. The most notable
increase lies with liquid fuels, which represents the burgeoning transport sector that is mostly
made up of cars and trucks and less so by rail transports as is seen in Figure 26. The significant
decrease in the use of solid fuels, namely coal results directly from the buildup of nuclear power
in France, which now ranks second behind the US for the total amount of electricity produced
from nuclear fuel. Nuclear power made up 41 percent of the country’s energy supply in 2004.
This leaves only 4 percent of the energy supply coming from coal, which in most cases is the
likely target for CCGS in other countries.
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for the application of the technology after coal is natural gas combustion. However, natural gas
is not very carbon intensive in terms of energy production, when compared with coal or fuel oil‐
based boilers. Furthermore the security of the natural gas supply is not completely clear and a
major build‐up of capital intensive natural gas CCGS‐coupled power plants tied to a resource
that might not last for the life of that infrastructure would be unwise.
Observing energy via consumption by sector, rather than by fuel type, gives another perspective
and reveals an additional target that could benefit from CCGS. Although the five percent of the
energy sector that is made up by coal perhaps seems unappealing initially as a target, if one
examines industry as a
whole by combining the
eight
percent
of
greenhouse gas emissions
that result from industrial
processes with the thirteen
percent from energies used
(and therefore normally
produced locally) by the
industries, the resulting
nearly one quarter (23
percent)
of
France’s
Figure 28 - France's GHG Production by Sector
emissions. As seen in
Source: UNFCCC, Personal Analysis
Figure 28, this number
becomes an attractive target for GHG reduction strategies. Mineral products, metal production,
and the chemical industry make up over 60 percent of the industrial process emissions and most
of the coal consumption would be contained within this sector (Le Treut H. e., 2007). Because
the EU has selected many of these industries as major targets for the union’s emissions
reductions, there exists significant interest in technologies that could mitigate the potential
increase on emissions or a price increase on carbon in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)
or from the pending French carbon tax. This makes companies like the cement giant Lafarge, the
steel major Arcelor‐Mittal, and the waste and water services provider Veolia, along with the
energy providers GDF‐Suez and EDF, who are the more typical clients for CCGS, all very eager to
see the technology develop.

The Players: CCGS Service Providers and Global CO2 Producers
In addition to these pressing national concerns about emission reduction strategies within the
state, the aforementioned French‐based global corporations are a group of companies based in
France who are interested in CCGS as potential service providers. Beyond the mere provision of
capture, transport, and storage services for the CO2 , there are others who hope to develop and
sell low‐CO2 industrial methods. Groups and consortiums are forming across the lines of the
government, education, research, and private sectors so as to maximize the expertise of each
and facilitate the necessary steps to bring CCGS online. As a result several CCGS projects are in
the initial and planning stages and a variety of efforts are now underway currently to map the
geological potential of the country for CCGS deployment.
France has a large potential to be successful in terms of realizing an edge on the CCGS service
and technologies market. Most of this is seen within the energy sector, but there are other
groups interested in providing aspects of the technology to the major industrial GHG emitters.
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These interests are pulling in the support of universities, government agencies, and non‐
governmental research groups, so as to share the expenses and workload among those with the
highest level of expertise in each area. The following section gives an overview of these various
organizations and corporations, their core activities, and their connection or potential expertise
within the emerging CCGS market.
Oil and gas companies and their associated exploration and production (E&P) and engineering
and construction (E&C) contractors have the most experience with the technologies required for
capturing, transporting, storing, and monitoring CO2 . They are familiar with the construction of
infrastructure such as on‐ and off‐shore pipelines, offshore rigs, injection and extraction wells,
and above‐ and below‐ground storage facilities needed for CCGS but that also allow the
extraction of oil and gas for domestic and commercial use. They also gain expertise from their
familiarity with the geological formations relevant to CCGS, because these are the same as the
ones that are typically targeted either for oil and gas extraction or for the storage of gas
reserves after it is extracted and purified. This gives them a significant amount of knowledge and
experience dealing with underground engineering. The builders of power‐plants and other
industrial installations also have the technical knowledge for capture and often work with the oil
and gas companies for that reason helping them purify their natural gas production by removing
contaminants like CO2 . As a result, all of these companies have a significant lead on the
members of other industrial sectors who are hoping to enter the CCS market and is the reason
why they are the ones who are most involved with the current and planned CCGS
demonstrations. The following companies are the most significant players in the energy sector
regarding CCS.
Alstom, as was mentioned, is the global leader of integrated power plant production, in terms of
the equipment and technology required to build them. They are also a global leader in many
other sectors, including nuclear power plants, hydro power, high‐speed trains, and urban
transport, with global orders totaling 24.6 billion Euros (Alstom, 2009). Their position in the
power plant market has compelled them to pursue development in terms of carbon capture
technologies, often by creating alliances with the other key players who compliment their
technology with the necessary gases or chemicals used to capture the CO2 . Alstom lists its
expertise in this area with two of the three types of capture: post‐combustion and oxy‐
combustion. The third technology of pre‐combustion capture is not currently covered by Alstom
technologies but it is only applicable to new plants, whereas the other two can be built new or
retrofit to existing installations (Sonnois, 2009).
Alstom’s post‐combustion technologies currently at the demonstration phase include chilled
ammonia scrubbing and advanced amines. Some of the amine based capture techniques, as was
described in the CCS overview, are projects that Alstom is developing jointly with partners such
as Dow Chemical Company. The second technology uses chilled ammonia in a similar process
that cools the flue gas, but treats it instead with ammonium carbonate in solution, which reacts
with CO2 to form ammonium bicarbonate. The compounds are again reheated to release
pressurized CO2 . An advantage to this technology appears to be that there is no degradation for
the globally available and therefore inexpensive reagent (ammonia) and no emission of trace
contaminates, leaving a highly pure stream of CO2 for storage. Alstom is currently in the early
stages of developing with ARMINES (the research wing of Mines ParisTech) an “anti‐
sublimation” capture technology, which will be discussed further in the following section
(Lagneau, First Advisory Meeting, 2009).
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As for the oxy‐fuel technologies, the concept is one of removing the agent (nitrogen) within air
that is the cause of a large percentage of the impurities within flue gas that make normal CO2
post‐combustion capture difficult. Here an air separation unit is employed to provide a pure
stream of oxygen to the boiler, for which Alstom partners with companies like Air Liquide. The
main advantages to this technology are that it covers all fuel types. Most of the components
already exist at commercial scale and so the technology needs merely to be adapted to the
power generation or industrial settings. As a result the technology, according to their own
reports, can be scaled‐up rapidly after demos are completed and it is currently the most
conducive technology for retrofitting existing power or industrial plants with carbon capture
(Sonnois, 2009).
Air Liquide’s specialty lies originally with the supply of various gases of commercial interest. As a
result, the company has entered into the oil and gas sector with respect to the gas based
enhanced oil recovery (EOR) activities in the US. To supply the CO2 for several US projects, Air
Liquide developed some CO2 transport experience as well. With the rise of oxy‐combustion
technology, the company has recognized and capitalized on the emerging need for oxygen
separation equipment. This has led to their involvement with Alstom in projects such as Total’s
integrated oxy‐fueled CCS Project at Lacq that is detailed in a following section. They are
currently engaging in solving the issue of increased argon and trace gases after nitrogen is
separated and removed from intake air for oxy‐fueled projects.
According to their profile, “To oil and gas companies worldwide, Schlumberger is the leading
oilfield services provider, trusted to deliver better results in any location to help customers
improve [exploration and production] performance.” They back this with their 80 year history of
subsurface evaluation and engineering experience and advertise that they have been involved
with CO2 injection since the mid 1990s (Schlumberger Carbon Services, 2009). Schlumberger’s
core professional activity is the provision of formation characterization and monitoring services,
but they also are very capable of managing all aspects of underground engineering and they
contract out the work they cannot do themselves. This has led them to exposure to nearly every
existing CCGS project to date, because most of the early projects are run by oil companies.
As a result of their initial exposure, Schlumberger today has the biggest name globally in terms
of providing CCGS solutions, participates to nearly every existing consortium concerned with
CCS, and speaks as experts on the topic at countless CCS conferences, forums, and workshops.
Schlumberger has embraced this role and now has developed an explicit Carbon Services
division with 100 million Euros worth of R&D investment, so as to provide CCGS solutions to all
interested parties and expands their customer base to more than the oil and gas sector
(Lagneau, Second Advisory Meeting ‐ Report Review, 2009). What this means is they hope to
manage the drilling and technical outfitting of carbon injection wells. They also engage in the
wide range of seismic and monitoring solutions that could be required for storage sites once
they are in operation. Their services could potentially expand into the operation of the physical
storage facilities once they are constructed and injection is underway, but this currently does
not appear to be their core focus. As a result of their marketing on the subject of CCS, their
involvement with so many of the current projects, not to mention their expensive network
within the oil and gas industries, Schlumberger will remain one of the key players in CCS as the
market continues to develop.
Total has an interesting position in the CCGS field in that the Oil and Gas giant has been involved
in CCGS projects since the beginning, as it was a partner with Statoil on the Sleipner project. The
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company also has the capital to engage in expensive demonstration projects without so much
assistance from other funding sources. Total also has a broad knowledge of the geological
characteristics of the reservoirs it has explored for its various oil and gas operations. As such the
company is moving forward on a project in the southwest of France, which will be detailed in
the following section. This project is one where it will act as director and utilize the experience it
has gained from Sleipner and other CCGS projects it has involved itself in. However, the
individual pieces of the project will be provided by the traditional array of oil and gas E&P
contractors. Total is also pursuing a major storage project for the Northwest of France, the
details of which are also to follow.
The reason for the oil giant’s involvement in the business is not clear in terms of what they hope
to achieve with the expertise they may gain. However, it does not seem logical that the
company will pursue CCS as an additional core activity, as it is currently already extensively
engaged in oil and gas extraction and this is already an immense business. There are two
possible reasons for their interest in CCGS development in France. First, Total is involved
significantly in oil and gas extraction activities in Canada where the more of the world’s oil‐sands
are located. However, recovering this oil is extremely carbon‐intensive and as Canada hopes to
comply with its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, continuing to extract oil resources there may
require a change in method so as to limit the resulting emissions. CCS offers a potential tool for
achieving this goal and also the CO2 is becoming valuable as a means of EOR in Canada. For this
reason, Total could wish to prove expertise in this area. Second, Total operates refineries and
other oil related facilities in the northwest of France. As these facilities are carbon‐intensive
they are at risk of being negatively affected by the pending carbon tax and by future climate
treaty statutes Total is interested in the possibility of storing their emissions via CCS. If the
company is going to engage in a significant storage project for its own needs, it could benefit
from increasing the scale of such a project so as to accommodate the emissions from other
industries located in proximity to Total’s own operations (Lagneau, Second Advisory Meeting ‐
Report Review, 2009).
Geostock is not on the same scale as the previously mentioned French oil and gas related
companies. Nevertheless, it does have a strong name in its field of expertise, which is
underground storage. Geostock is owned by Total (50%), BP (25%), and Entrepose Contracting
(25%) and is prolific in France, but also has extensive international project experience, with
several holdings in European companies, an office in the US, and major contracts active in
Singapore, Korea, and elsewhere in Asia. As such, at least in terms of France, Geostock has been
involved with many of the early storage capacity estimation and methodology development
projects. Geostock has now created, in a partnership with the French Geological Survey (BRGM)
and the French Petroleum Institute (IFP), a commercial firm specifically focused on the topic of
carbon transport and most especially storage.
Geogreen was created in August of 2007 and is currently headed by Gilles Munier (CEO),
formerly of Geostock, and Dr. Pierre Le Thiez, formerly of the IFP. The company’s connections
within its founding partners (IFP, Geostock, and BRGM) and its new collaboration with others
interested in the CCS market like Technip and TNO, a Dutch climate research group, have led to
a rapid scaling up the company’s activities in the CCGS world. According to Mr. Munier,
Geogreen is involved with roughly 20 projects worldwide and will be creating an office in the US
early in 2010 and hopefully will have a presence in China within about one year’s time. They are
also involved in the Middle East and in South America. The group appears to be operating in a
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niche market with designs of moving to a larger level of involvement at a time when CCS will be
deployed internationally at a commercial scale.
Technip’s expertise lies with its on‐ and offshore as well as subsea construction experience in
the oil and gas E&C sector. This entailed the construction of offshore platforms, facilities,
moorings, offshore pipelines, and other various infrastructures. The company also has some
experience in constructing some onshore plant installations and pipelines. The company is eager
to engage in CCGS service contracts and has signed an agreement with Geogreen, so as to
provide together the complete chain of carbon services as it has been a little more slow in
entering the CCS game than many of its competitors.
There exist others companies and groups that are or hope to be involved in the new CCGS
market and lie outside the oil and gas world. There are nevertheless some aspects of the
technology that are not covered by the oil and gas E&P and E&C groups, namely the industrial
application of low‐carbon production via improved efficiency and carbon capture and also the
more intellectual aspects of CCGS such as various sorts of risk assessment and legal issues. The
following companies listed here are given due to their stated involvement in CCGS related RD&D
work.
The state electricity company, Electricité de France (EDF), seems perhaps an odd candidate for
an interest in CCS due to the earlier sections of this case study, which revealed how little of
France’s electricity, with nearly 90 percent being produced by nuclear or renewable sources,
comes from carbon‐based energy resources. Much of what remains of France’s coal power
production will probably be shut down anyhow after 2015, being too old to retrofit with CCS.
However, an interesting aspect of many French state‐run companies is that as they have grown,
they have been permitted to expand by gaining holdings in other countries, much like a private
company would do. EDF maintains ownership of electricity infrastructure in several other
countries throughout Europe. One particular investment made by EDF in a variety of coal plants
during the deregulation of some Eastern European countries, which were formerly pieces of the
Soviet Union. Now with these countries joining the EU, they are subject to the EU ETS and will
have to comply with any other European statues regulating CO2 . As a result, developing some
experience or at least contributing toward the major research efforts surrounding CCS
technology could prove very strategic in terms of addressing the company’s coal plants outside
of France.
Veolia is originally one of two municipal services companies in France, the other being Suez that
has now merged with GDF. Today the company is, along with being a water supplier and a public
transport company, a major waste management firm, with 100,000 locations of activity across
the globe. Veolia’s waste operations are estimated to account for one one‐thousandth of the
total global CO2 emissions and as a result the company hopes to patent, utilize, and potentially
sell via its environmental services group, Veolia Environment, GHG reduction technologies
related to this industry (Quisel, 2009). The solutions it is developing for waste processing
facilities on the global market will be grant the unique ability for these facilities to couple energy
and waste recovery/recycling via concepts such as methane/landfill gas capture, combined heat
and power plants, industrial symbiosis, with CCGS. The idea is that if these waste operations can
be made carbon neutral (they produce no CO2 ) or even carbon negative (they have a net‐effect
of reducing the amount of carbon in the atmosphere) in terms of carbon credit accounting
purposes there could be significant financial incentives for other waste sites to employ the
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techniques Veolia is developing. At present however, the group contracts the carbon storage
engineering and facilities design work to others such as Geogreen.
The global steel producer was formed by a merger between the French steel group, Arcelor,
with the Mittal steel company Arcelor‐Mittal from India. The company is now one of Europe’s
top steel producers and as a result is directly impacted by the EU’s commitments to the Kyoto
Protocol. As such the group is keen to develop low carbon steel production techniques and is
pursuing this via the ULCOS consortium that is detailed in a following section.
GDF or Gaz de France was the gas equivalent of EDF before its recent merger with Suez.
Similarly to EDF, GDF has developed holdings in other countries and as a result has equivalent
sister companies in countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands. However, prior to the
merger the gas provider was involved in the K‐12B project discussed earlier, which aims at very
deep offshore EGR just off the coast of the Netherlands. It is also a partner for several of the
pilot projects planned in France.
Oxand does risk assessment work and therefore is interested in assessing the various types of
risk that will unavoidably be associated with CCGS projects. These risk include not only the
financial risk of projects dependant on a price on carbon and global climate treaties, but also the
geological risk, public acceptance, transport risk, etc. The company apparently involved with this
topic on a global scale and has worked with Schlumberger in CCS projects such as the In Salah
project in Algeria (Van Der Beken, 2007). Its competitors in the field are companies such as the
Norwegian Det Norske Veritas (DNV), who has gained more exposure as a CCS risk assessment
company due to its association with Statoil and the Norwegian Government.
Lafarge is a global cement supplier based in France and as cement is a major emitter of GHGs,
the company maintains an active interest in the CCS discussion in France (ADEME, 2009).
However, it would appear for the moment that the company has no direct projects related to
CCS that it is engaged in as opposed to its American equivalent of Lafarge: CEMEX (DOE, 2009).
There is a strong level of communication between the private sector and a long list of public and
private research institutions within France. The following list compiles a brief description of
some of the more important ones based on their current involvement in the topic. The Bureau
de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) is France’s governmental geological expert and
is similar to the United States Geological Survey (USGS). They maintain detailed records of the
geology throughout the state and therefore have been implemental to assessing the CO2
capacity within France.
The Institut Français du Pétrole (IFP) is like the American Petroleum Institute (API) except that it
is a public sector research group with an attached university whereas API is purely a trade
association that funds petroleum based research and initiatives. IFP is involved deeply in the
French CCS activity and is also pulling France into the CCS activities happening on the national
scale, quite often in cooperation with BRGM. They participate to several European CCS research
initiatives and also are involved in China and in the US with CCS developments there (like the
Regional Partnerships in the US and the Coach Project in China that will be discussed in the case
studies associated with those countries).
The École Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris is a member of the French Grande École
group and as such is top university in engineering, especially in areas related to the
management of resources. The school is involved with several projects on both the capture and
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the storage side and works closely with the major private sector companies in these areas such
as Alstom, EDF, Total, and GDF‐Suez.
The interest of so many French players in CCS has resulting in the creation of some groups
designed to share ideas and work together on the development of CCS technologies within the
country and in Europe. Club CO2 is a group put together with a focus on capture and storage by
ADEME, the French energy agency, which begins to approach the type of collaboration seen in
the US regional partnerships. It includes three types of entities within France and the categories
can be seen as CO2 producers, CO2 mitigation service providers, and research organizations
involved with the CO2 topic. The group is not meant as a federation and is more a forum where
the members can share information they feel will not jeopardize their position in the market.
ADEME uses the group as a means of distributing pertinent information regarding the CCS topic
to the members and holds fairly regular meetings with representatives from a wide variety of
groups to discuss relevant developments within the topic. The largest of these are the ADEME
CCS Symposiums designed to provide cutting edge lectures from the experts in the field to those
seriously interested in the CCS topic.
ULCOS (Ultra Low Carbon Steelmaking)is a European effort, headed by the European Technology
Platform on Steel (ESTEP) and major steel producers of France, Germany, and Luxembourg, for
the development of low CO2 steel technology, with the explicit goal of reducing the overall CO2
emissions of the steel industry by 50 percent in the long term (AFP, 2009). The effort, led by
Arcelor‐Mittal, has an announced short to medium term budget of one billion Euros and initially
involves a small pilot plant in Germany, with then a larger demonstration operation to be
implemented in France that will be detailed in the following section. The technology is hoped to
be ready for application at commercial steel sites starting in 2020.

The Projects: CCGS Activity within France
France has a high level of ambition when it comes to CCGS, but not without reason. As can be
seen in the last section, there is a strong support network of experts from all steps of the CCS
technology chain. Many of these experts are global corporations who have a high potential to
act as international CCGS service providers as the technology is accepted and implemented
across the globe. In order to reach this stage, or even to effectively use CCGS as a GHG
mitigation tool within France as part of the portfolio of solutions to meet the country’s Kyoto
commitments and the commitments that will follow under the future climate treaty, a rigorous
schedule needs to be followed by those participating in the research and development and
demonstration activities. Figure 29 outlines what this progression should look like.
The first projects in France worked to estimate the countries capacity ranging from the site to a
national scale. The goal was to estimate not only the total capacity of France but also to
understand in the French context how injection took place. The “PIégeage du CO2 dans les
réservoirs géologiques, en France” (CO2 Trapping in Geological Reservoirs, in France) or
PICOREF project is a two year project began in 2005 and had an allotted budget of 3.75 million
Euros. It was meant to determine application within France of the previous 4 year study (PICOR)
by the RTPG (Réseau des Technologies Pétrolières et Gazières ‐ a network of oil and gas
technology providers) that was designed to research the available knowledge and tools that
could be applied to storing CO2 (Lund, 2008).
GETSCO was a European effort designed to give an initial estimate of the European carbon
storage capacity in terms of saline aquifers, oil and gas reservoirs, and deep coal beds in a select
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group of European nations including France, Germany, Etc. This project is what was expanded
into the GeoCapacity project to estimate the storage for the entire EU. These projects hailed
cooperation by a wide range of groups across Europe.

Figure 29 - Timetable for CCGS Developments in France
Source: Usinenouvelle.com

A project more specific to France and therefore more precise called “Méthodologie de sélection
des sites de stockage du CO2 dans des réservoirs souterrains en France” or METSTOR was
completed by a partnership containing BRGM, CIRED, Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de
Paris, Gaz de France, Geostock, IFP, INERIS, and IPGP. This group worked to further identify
geological storage sites in France and provide a public interface at metstor.fr, a site where
interested parties can learn about the CCGS field, where the storage sites could be, what is
taken into account when storing the gas, etc. This work was mostly focused on two potential
storage formations within the Paris Basin: the Dogger and Trais (Lagneau, Second Advisory
Meeting ‐ Report Review, 2009). These were selected due to the broad range and depth of
knowledge surrounding these formations as a result of the extensive exploration of them for oil
and gas, as well as for geothermal resources. This project was completed in 2008 (Ha‐Duong,
2009).
Total’s project at Lacq was the first CCGS project to come online in France and is the first fully
integrated CCGS demonstration utilizing oxy‐combustion capture technology at a gas‐fired
power plant in the world. Lacq is Total’s first project where the company serves as the project
director, but the company has served as partner for many other projects such as Sleipner and
Snøhvit in Norway. “The project has three key objectives: to improve mastery of the oxyfuel
combustion process, particularly with a view to applications in the production of extra‐heavy
oils, to halve the cost of carbon capture compared to existing processes, to develop monitoring
methods and instruments to demonstrate on a larger scale the reliability and sustainability of
long‐term CO2 storage technology (Lund, 2008).” The plan for Total is to fit a gas boiler with
oxyfuel‐based CO2 capture technology at its location near the Lacq gas field in the Southwest of
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France near the Pyrenees. The 0.15 Mt of annual CO2 emissions from the gas plant will then be
shipped to the neighboring depleted Rousse gas field, which lies more than 4000 meters below
the surface (Total, 2008).
The creation of this oxy‐fired gas plant contributes to the EU goal of creating low CO2 fossil fuel‐
based power, known as the Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plant (ZEP) goal, as defined by the
European Technology Platform of which Total is a partner (Lund, 2008). The pipeline to be used
is about 27 kilometers long and is already built, being once a natural gas pipeline for the gas
production operations that Total operated in the Lacq area. The project counts a wide range of
partners, including Alstom who will design the oxy‐boiler for the gas plant retrofit and Air
Liquide, who is also involved in the oxy‐combustion technology application. Because IFP and
BRGM are also involved with the project, it seems logical to deduct that Geogreen is the
company that did the initial geological assessment and was probably chosen to operate the
storage for the project. The injection was scheduled to commence in late 2009, but due to some
problems with a down‐well monitoring device the injection has been temporarily delayed
(Agrinier, 2009).
With Lacq, France has now progressed to the pilot and demonstration phase of the CCGS
timescale, despite the current complications that have temporarily delayed the project (Agrinier,
2009). In Tandem, ADEME has made a call for five projects in France, which it will contribute
research funding of up to 60 percent of the project costs. Some sources believe this funding will
in fact be much lower and will not be given directly as cash but will be realized via tax incentives
or other fiscal mechanisms. In addition to Lacq and these five ADEME projects, there are a few
European supported efforts and potential projects announced, but not confirmed, on some
scale by other parties interested in CCS. The map in Figure 30 to follow gives a broad estimate of
where the various planned CCS related projects are located in France, with a brief summary of
each project following.
Veolia, with significant expertise in the area of waste management, is in charge of a waste
incinerator and landfill site at Claye‐Sulley that is noted as one of the largest in Europe. They
wish to explore two solution possibilities for their CO2 emissions at this site: the first being CO2
capture, transport, and industrial recovery; and second being CCGS. The first investigation
involves recycling the CO2 produced by the incinerator by capturing it and then piping it to a
local chemical production plant that needs a source of CO2 . The second project is to capture
biogas being produced at the landfill and valorize the energy in a combined heat and power
plant (CHP), while capturing and storing the resulting CO2 emissions (Harel, 2008). As a result of
the project’s implications for CCS in France, they approached ADEME for funding towards this
150 million Euro CCGS proposal, which when completed will engage in a full chain CCGS project
for their landfill facility at Claye‐Sulley (Agrinier, 2009). The resulting 200,000 tons of annual CO2
emissions will be captured and transported just a few kilometers away to be stored in a saline
formation at about 1,500 to 2,000 meters below the surface (Les Echos, 2009).
The project was planned for 2011 with the injection commencing in 2014, which would have
made it the third project involving CO2 injection in France, after Lacq and one other, and in fact
will be the largest at 0.2 Mt CO2 injected per year. However, this original schedule is no longer
sure. Nevertheless, Veolia is now engaged in investigating the proximity of its other operations
worldwide to identified geological formations with CO2 storage potential (Wecsteen, 2009).
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Alstom is building a plant in a partnership with the French State electricity provider EDF and
some other partners. The project is one of five projects that are receiving ADEME funding to
encourage CCGS in France but beyond that there is currently not publically available information
concerning the location of the project or the type of plant it will be applied to. The goal of the
project is to explore the use of a new family of advanced amines in a post‐combustion capture
facility.
Alstom is also putting funding, along with EDF, GDF, and ADEME into a research project called
“Pil Ansu” developed by an Ecole des Mines researcher on the topic of carbon capture. This
technology currently exists at the laboratory stage (at a scale of 1/100th of an industrial sized
application) and involves a of cooling flue gases at a pressure more or less equal to atmospheric
pressure at a temperature such that the carbon dioxide passes directly from the vapor state to
the solid state via an “anti‐sublimation” (Pil Ansu) process. This is a technology that Alstom
supports and hopes to add to the repertoire of capture methods it has on the market and as
such this project would be an application of this process to a roughly 30 MW power plant near
Le Havre.
The project by Arcelor‐Mittal is within the context of its ULCOS project. It will keep open the
steel operation in Florange, is in the Northeast of France near Germany, which was originally
scheduled for closure by 2010 or 11 as part of Arcelor’s “Apollo” plan (Arcelor Mittal, 2008).
Arcelor with ULCOS support is first planning to test this technology at a smaller scale at
Eisenhüttenstadt, Germany from 2010 to 2014. The company will keep the plant open at
Florange and begin a larger ULCOS demonstration project there, if the initial feasibility studies
prove positive, in 2011. This project will cost an estimated 400 million Euros over the four years
needed to complete the low carbon steel plant by 2015. This project has also been selected to
receive ADEME funding and hails Air Liquide as a partner, which suggests it will utilize oxy‐
combustion technology. Along with the steel technology engineering company Paul Wurth of
Luxembourg will be performing the steel‐related design work.
There are activities underway, run by Total under the project heading of “France Nord”, to
determine a feasible storage location for the industries of the Paris area and the cities of Le
Havre and Lille near the coast. These locations form a triangle that rests atop the Paris Basin,
where Total hopes to discover a suitable storage site for this large amount of emissions. This
project has the benefit of being a follow‐up project on the heels of PICOREF and METSTOR. It
also coincides with a project called “AQUA‐CO2 ”, which is headed up by IFP and several other
European partners to find a sizable CO2 storage location in each participating country (Lutzky,
2009). A second source cites a similar project that could be conducted offshore, close to the
Normandy Coast, with a similar goal of supplying storage space for the Paris and Le Havre
industrial CO2 sources (Les Echos, 2009). The connection to the Geostock studies and the IFP
work suggests that this project might involve Geogreen as the storage expert but according to
Geogreen, Total is in fact not yet working publically with any other companies on this project for
the moment (Munier, 2009). Nevertheless, the project should receive ADEME funding as one of
the five sponsored projects.
At the moment there exist two additional projects that are also rumored to take place in France
that could prove interesting for the advancement of the CCGS field. Vermillion energy of Canada
has operations at two locations within France. The first is in the South West on the Atlantic
Coast and involved taking its petroleum products and burning them in a combined heat and
power (CHP) installation build to power tomato greenhouses. The heat and power will be
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utilized for the greenhouses and the emissions of CO2 will be circulated through the
greenhouses in sync with a specially timed lighting scheme that will cause the tomatoes to have
an increased CO2 absorption rate. They basically plan to engage in bio‐sequestration via
tomatoes.

Figure 30 - CCS Pilots Planned in France

A second operation for Vermillion is in the Paris Basin, where they own one of the larger oil
concessions in the area. The group according to one source has spoken loosely about the
potential to capture CO2 and store it in some of their depleted reservoirs for either the aim of
pure storage or enhanced oil recovery (EOR). This information is only speculative at this point.
The Soufflet Group is engaged in the production of biofuels and especially biodiesel. As a
member of Club CO2 they had expressed an interest in pursuing CCS at one of their operations
near Paris at Nogent‐sur‐Seine but they have not released any more information (ADEME,
2009).
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The sum up of the French situation is divided into two different areas. On the one hand there
are national industries eager to do their parts to meet the requirements set by Kyoto or a future
climate treaty. These include EDF, Veolia, Groupe Soufflet, and others who are looking to invest
in pilot projects at their operations in France, or even outside of the country. The second group
is one of major service providers who are hoping to get all of the experience they can on the
topic of CCS so that they can move onto the global market or improve their existing position
within that market. There are even those like Schlumberger who appear to be more active
outside of France than within. Ultimately this technology if successful will prove very profitable
for France.
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Case III: the People’s Republic of China
The region that is today known as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has maintained a
significant population when compared with other areas across the world throughout history. An
undeveloped and loosely associated semi‐colony, split apart by imperial powers in the early part
of the 20th Century; China’s rapid transition to a massive independent economy at the start of
the 21st has significantly changed how that population is perceived. In terms of development and
global impact, it was not until the last few decades that that the PRC began to be considered
and treated as a global power.
China presents the most interesting case when considering climate change and the applicability
of CCGS technology. Although its decision to act or not could potentially have the most
significant impact globally, the country has taken a vague stance in terms of climate change
mitigation commitments. As a result, it is unclear to what extent the country will pursue CCGS.
This case study will explore what the implications are of China’s actions and inactions, what
opportunities can be found there for the development of CCGS technologies, and what the risks
and benefits are from China’s engagement in this sector.

The Background: China and Climate Change
According to Wired, “If China’s carbon usage keeps pace with its economic growth, the country’s
carbon dioxide emissions will reach 8 gigatons a year by 2030, which is equal to the entire
world’s CO2 production today.” China surpassed the US around 2006 or 2007, depending on
how one counts emissions, to become the world’s top emitter of GHGs. This ranking does not
indicate the amount of emissions related to products that are consumed in China, as many of
the products are then exported to countries with apparently low GHG counts. Nevertheless, it is
still important to realize that the largest source of the GHGs produced on earth today is China.
This has tended to draw greater attention to China’s actions, or its inaction, with respect to
international climate change mitigation efforts. Whereas before China was listed among the
developing countries who would not be directly bound by the emissions limitations set by a
global climate treaty, now there is mounting international pressure for China to join the
developed “Annex I” countries in devising and implementing a solution. The Annex I countries,
who had been designated by Kyoto as the actors most responsible for addressing GHG emission
mitigation, predict that any actions under a new treaty, as was hoped for from the Copenhagen
talks, will be for naught if China refuses to participate at a meaningful scale.
As the US and China are currently the most important states in terms of GHG emissions,
generating more than 40 percent of the global output, it is important to understand what they
are discussing in terms of reductions. Leading up to the Copenhagen Conference in December
2009, US President Barak Obama stated that he hoped to commit the US to reduce emissions by
17 percent of 2005 levels by 2020, which was in line with the commitments contained in the
most recent climate bill passed by the US House of Representatives. China, in response to the US
statement, committed to reducing emissions intensity by 40 to 45 percent in that same period
(Lash, November 26, 2009).
A notable counterargument is that compared to developed countries like the US, China has
produced significantly less emissions on a historical basis. To date China is responsible for 66
percent less emissions than the US has produced a historic basis, which is calculated in terms of
the total GHG emissions released by either nation throughout their development histories. If
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one uses the IEA and WRI recorded data for annual and historic CO2 emissions respectively, it is
possible to put these commitments into perspective, as is shown in Figure 31. Given the trends
for a business as usual (BAU) scenario, China will not overtake the US in terms of historic
emissions until 2034, even if the US caps its emissions according to its recent commitment.

Figure 31 - Trend Based Comparisons of US vs. China Emissions
(CO2 Equivalent) | Data Sources: WRI and IEA

The historical emissions argument proved beneficial for the PRC during the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations, which took place at the turn of the 21st Century and resulted in China’s being
listed among the developing nations who would not be limited by the treaty and who could
benefit from the “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM). This mechanism of the Kyoto Treaty
allows the Annex I countries, i.e. those listed as sufficiently developed to have their emissions
directly limited by the treaty, to invest in approved emissions mitigation projects in countries
not listed on Annex I. The logic here is that to ease their domestic emission reduction measures,
Annex I countries can offset their existing emissions by instead helping a developing country
reduce their emissions instead and so in the end ‐ at least in theory ‐ the overall achieved
reduction is the same. China still holds historic emissions as a key negotiating point and as a
means of placing the responsibility of reducing emissions on developed countries: namely the
US, but also EU member states.
As another counterargument to the increasing demands that it take a leadership role in
addressing increasing global emissions, China points to the fact that its CO2 profile per capita is
still very low compared to most developed countries. Compared to the top fifteen major
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emitters, which using 2006 data make up 75 percent of the total global GHG emissions, China
ranked number one for overall emissions but thirteenth for its per capita emissions. In 2008,
China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) estimated that the country’s per
capita emissions of CO2 would probably remain below US levels until at least 2025. “This will
mean less pressure from the international community for more drastic measures, and it allows
China to pursue a more flexible model for rapid economic development," said a senior official
with the NDRC. With a population more than four times as large as the US, the NDRC claims the
per capita figures are more meaningful and that after the necessary catch‐up period, “From
2030 to 2050, China will enter a period of extremely strict environmental controls [to tighten
environmental regulations and reduce emissions].” This argument would demand that China
only decrease its emissions by less than 5 percent so as to match the global average.
This type of argument is becoming increasing difficult to support given the rapidly increasing
share of emissions global emissions coming from China. In addition, while it is important to
recognize that global emissions are not equally distributed across the globe, the danger of
designating emissions responsibility on a per capita basis, while continuing to also divide them
by state borders, is that the result will be just as unbalanced and arbitrary as to simply do so
based on borders alone. To comply with such a “per capita emissions standard”, while the US
would still need to reduce its emissions by around 80 percent, India, who ranks fourth in terms
of total emissions, would need to increase its emissions by more than 200 percent to meet this
same global average‐based standard. The problem also lies in that a per capita basis makes
assigning the state responsibilities for meeting a global cap very difficult. It allows multi‐national
companies to simply move to “developing” states where the treaty is not as harsh. There they
can continue to produce unregulated cheap goods with high emissions without providing major
development benefits to the poor citizens of that country who are holding down the average.
Nevertheless, China’s position and the implications of per capita and historic emissions should
be addressed by a climate treaty: but in a way that is constructive and not in one that simply
allows China to continue to prosper and widen the trade deficit by depressing its currency and
allowing unrestrained development and goods production.
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commitment implies no change for its current development trends.
However, in the next rounds of negotiations, as it now ranks as a major economy and as the
largest emitter of CO2 , it will be increasingly difficult for China to maintain this position of
making no promises. If an agreement is finally reached between the developed countries on
GHG emissions limitations and China refuses to comply, such a move could prove damaging to
the state’s economy if the participating states use mechanisms to properly tax the carbon
implied by imports coming for countries that are not abiding by the treaty.

Chinese Domestic Issues and Drivers for CCGC Development in China
China is in a more difficult position than it may appear in terms of addressing the domestic side
of the climate issue. The socio‐economic reality behind the arguments China provides for
refusing to agree to a set limit on its emissions is that the state government believes it must
maintain a steadily growing GDP so as to provide jobs to the increasing number of people
entering the workforce each year. For this reason, the economy is the top priority for the
country and all commitments for emissions reductions are placed in terms of emissions
intensity. However, leaving that same workforce with unlivable environmental conditions is
equally destabilizing. The increasing access for common citizens to information from outside
China only serves to emphasize that higher standards should be expected.
As with most developing nations, China needs to deal with and provide for a burgeoning
population. The state has addressed the overpopulation issue to some extent with the “one‐
child” policy that is predicted to stabilize the population at 1.4 billion, as opposed to India where
this kind of population stabilization is not taking place. The issue now is to sustain this immense
population. Moreover, the critical problem today in China is the rate of urbanization, which
unlike its population growth is not stabilizing. In tandem to the urbanization trend is an
increasingly large Chinese middle class, which means there are more people demanding more
resources. This problem can be seen globally but is especially relevant for the Chinese case
according to Thomas Friedman. He describes the global problem as a conflict between two
trends: an increase in the number of “Americums” that exist on the planet, i.e. US‐sized groups
of middle class consumers who are using resources at a similar rate, versus a decrease in
resources meaning a decrease in the number of “Americums” the planet can sustain (Friedman
2008).
When traveling through the Chinese heartland, what one sees out the window – versus what is
accounted for on a map – is not the same reality. Armies of cranes appear in the middle of
nowhere, deployed there to literally construct a city there “over‐night”. The current annual rate
of urbanization in China is 2.7 percent, which is more than twice the US rate of 1.3 percent and
more than triple the 0.8 percent rate in France (US CIA, 2009). After analyzing the current trend,
McKinsey gave the following assessment:
China's urban population will expand from 572 million in 2005 to 926 million in 2025 and
hit the one billion mark by 2030. In 20 years, China's cities will have added 350 million
people—more than the entire population of the United States today. By 2025, China will
have 219 cities with more than one million inhabitants—compared with 35 in Europe
today—and 24 cities with more than five million people (McKinsey, 2008).
To power this burgeoning economic growth, the Chinese are depending on their most abundant
energy resource, coal, to produce the needed electricity and as a result are the largest
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consumers of coal in the world. China is also one of the largest importers of coal, as seen in
Table 9, with most of this coming from Australia. China’s concern driving this is that if the
Coal by Country:

Imports

Production

Exports

Consumption

Japan

4,669.882

0

59.257

4,627.030

Korea, South

1,998.969

52.948

0

2,215.316

Taiwan (PRC)

1,733.974

0

0

1,733.974

United Kingdom

1,296.428

446.627

15.589

1,689.652

India

1,255.961

8,203.105

33.571

9,425.496

Germany

1,168.727

2,181.497

8.492

3,335.581

United States

1,007.035

23,789.510

1,303.749

22,507.970

Mainland China (PRC)

793.958

52,803.472

1,702.600

52,031.825

Italy

672.491

1.852

6.349

668.063

Russia

593.405

6,143.047

2,181.760

4,554.692

Canada

588.541

1,524.293

687.181

1,431.272

Spain

580.149

288.444

31.561

777.613

France

568.920

0

23.156

592.082

462.136

0

133.218

314.487

Netherlands

Table 6 - Coal Market by Top Importers
Source: IEA

economy does not have the energy needed to prosper and grow, the resulting unemployment
will be destabilizing for the country. In addition to coal, the PRC is now, after the US, the world’s
second largest consumer of petroleum. The other electricity sectors in China are expanding as
well, including solar, wind, and nuclear. As a result of its nuclear ambitions, China has also
recently begun to buy up a large number of uranium reserves in Australia and elsewhere. The
Australian news group, The Age, documents this as follows:
China is shaping as a multibillion‐dollar new uranium export market as it looks to
Australia to supply the resources it needs to underpin a massive expansion in its nuclear
power industry. Chinese officials this week announced they would start building five
extra power plants this year on top of the 24 already under construction and 11 already
in operation. Chinese analysts say the country's dearth of uranium is "the tiger in the
road" to fulfilling its nuclear power ambitions and that Australia is the most obvious
solution (Garnaut, 2009).
In the short‐term, the Chinese economy is still largely tied to coal especially as an increasing
number of items demanded by its growing middle class require electricity. What this means is an
unprecedented rate of coal‐fired power plant construction in China, which the New York Times
estimates place near to one plant per month, adding that, “China now uses more coal than the
United States, Europe and Japan combined (Bradsher, May 10, 2009).” In fact, China’s
consumption is 25 percent larger than the mentioned regions.
Coal is not the only resource that is being used in large quantities to power Chinese growth.
Thomas Friedman recounts the Three Gorges Dam project in China that increased the scrap iron
demand so much that exports to China surged globally and resulted in some strange thefts of
such things such as manhole covers, with several cases resulting in injuries due to pedestrians
falling into the exposed manhole (2008). The number of resources needed to continue the rate
of China’s growth and the shortages/supply strain that will result can only increase given current
trends.
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Returning to coal, it is interesting to consider how much of the resource the country has in
terms of domestic reserves. Returning to the diagram in the US case study, where Figure 21
places China as holding the second largest coal reserves in the world after the US, it was
important to note how the PRC only has a predicted 55 years maximum for its coal reserves at
the current consumption rate (IEA, 2008). Even if the two major exporters of coal to China,
Australia and Indonesia, contributed all of their recoverable reserves as of 2005 and China
capped coal consumption at 2006 rates, the state’s coal supply should not be expect to last
more than 95 years. On the contrary, the projections from the IEA show China as doubling its
coal‐based electricity capacity by 2030 and the new push in 2010 by Volvo and Honda to sell
electric cars China will certainly not decrease this demand.
It should be noted that China has made significant strides in terms of improving its emissions
intensity and efficiency; however, there are many reasons why the state still hopes to be
allowed to function as a developing economy under a new climate treaty. Another driver for
China’s current stance on climate change is that the state could hope to use a “developing”
status to appear incapable of creating solutions on its own. Because China is still regarded as a
developing country in many respects by OECD countries, such a strategy might continue to
encourage developed economies to transfer technology to China with agreements like the CDM.
Additionally, by keeping its developing status, the international attention due to China’s being
known as the largest emitter can draw significant clean investment projects and aid to China
that might have gone to other countries otherwise.
Again, it is true that a strong economy is certainly an important factor for maintaining political
stability, but the state can see that forgoing a livable environment is just as destabilizing.
Regardless of its international posturing, there are social and environmental issues that also are
driving China to deploy some solutions domestically at a rate that is faster than foreign actors
are able to bring them. Air quality issues and fresh water availability, especially in major cities,
are serious concerns in China and the state is working hard to develop and implement solutions
for the pollution problem. China not online understands the position the environment holds
domestically, it also knows what neglecting it does for the global perception of the state and as
such the leaders want to demonstrate that the state is making strides to meet this challenge.
China is interested in exploring the CCGS route, but the commitment to gaining a strong position
in this market has not arrived at the same extent in China to which it has in the US or even
France and the EU. The state has begun to deploy some CCS related projects but some actions
are more superficial, such as the demo capture projects (to be detailed) in Beijing and Shanghai
led by the Huaneng Group for the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010
respectively. These are arguably more in response to the image issue, rather than a strong
desire to scale‐up CCS. However, China has adopted CCS into its current Five Year Plan and
several other policy agendas and there are several CCS projects underway across the country,
mostly involving the enhanced oil recovery.
The potential for CO2 ‐EOR to increase China’s domestic production are significant and the
desire to pursue CCS as a strategic move for the state is clearer with these efforts. Many
projects exist to begin exploring the benefits of CO2 aided oil production as will be detailed in
the following sections. Another driver is the international concern relating to China’s
deployment of coal gasification and coal to liquids (CTL) infrastructure, which are significantly
more carbon intensive than more traditional coal power production and threaten to significantly
increase the rate of increase in China’s emissions trajectory.
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With respect to the environmental implications from CCGS development, systems that capture
CO2 from flue gases necessarily imply a more efficient and cleaner operation for the industrial
process concerned and so this offers an incentive to develop CCS technology regardless of any
climate agreement. In this way the technology corresponds well to China’s “circular economy”
i.e. industrial ecology based policy to close the loop by increasing the overall efficiency of its
production systems. Increasing the efficiency of its plants while decreasing the overall
emissions, including not only CO2 but also sulfur, NOx, and mercury emissions that are causing
so many of the countries environmental problems, can only prove to be a win‐win situation for
China. First, the country would benefit economically from the needed technology transfer of
countries hoping to deploy their capture technologies as CCGS moves towards scale globally and
also from beginning to design its own solutions that it could then market to other countries
adopting the solution. Second, the environmental benefits of becoming a truly green and
efficient economy should stand on their own merit: a quick trip to China and then Western
Europe to compare the environmental quality differences and the effects this must have on
someone needing to live there should make this clear.

The Players
One interesting situation is that China is becoming increasingly dependent on imported
petroleum and as such the state is pursuing an extensive coal to liquids (CTL) development
program. These liquefaction plants produce petroleum‐like fuels and will supplement the
waning supply of national oil. These plants essentially capture the CO2 as part of the process in
that the resulting flue steam is very pure and as such they offer low‐cost opportunities for
capture. Likewise, CO2 ‐EOR in China is viewed as an early opportunity to demonstrate CCGS.
These types of projects have been identified as targets for foreign‐Chinese cooperation on CCGS
due to the economics possible in China and the ability of the government to move quickly with
few non‐addressable regulatory hurdles (Light, 2009). However, China also stands to benefit
from developing its experience with CCGS if it applies capture technologies to these CTL plants
and deploys CO2 ‐EOR. Once the experience has been gained from China‐based projects, Chinese
companies involved with these early projects would be highly completive in the CCGS market as
they will probably be able to underbid many of their competitors.
The situation of simply China waiting for technology to be given to the state by foreign actors via
a CDM‐style agreement does not paint an entirely accurate picture. Clean‐technology
development is strategic and difficult to do entirely in the lab and as such in order to develop its
own solutions China will have to act quickly to deploy pilot projects of its own. In fact, the
country is pursuing CCS independently in many cases without foreign company involvement.
Many foreign companies, like Schlumberger and Shell, have recognized this and are pushing to
be allowed to participate in these “Chinese‐only” projects, but their success remains to be seen
(Loizzo, 2009).
China began to explore EOR using untreated flue‐gases and then purer CO2 in the late 1990s. As
a result of the growing international pressure and interest in China addressing climate change,
the amount of project activity in this area is increasing rapidly, with a variety of national and
foreign actors becoming involved. This section will give an overview of the major Chinese actors
in this sector, the foreign actors and resulting international partnerships, and the project
activities across the state. PetroChina is the international wing of CNPC, one of four state
petroleum companies. The company is pursuing a variety of EOR projects in the northeastern
oilfields of China using CO2 . As a result of this activity, the company has been sought out by
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several of the international partnerships as an early stage potential user/storage operator for
currently capture‐focused CCGS projects. The Huaneng Group is the state’s largest utility
company and was founded in 1985. It created Huaneng International Power as a public entity
listed on the Hong Kong, Shanghai, and New York stock exchanges in 1998. The company is the
most active in developing clean‐coal technology in the country, with two demonstration
projects, and is the leading member of the GreenGen consortium to develop a CCGS‐equipped
IGCC plant. The Shenhua Group, formed in 1995, is the largest coal producer in China and is a
vertically integrated energy company in that it operates the coal supply chain from the mine, to
the transport, and all the way to the end sale to the purchaser. The company is looking to
expand internationally with investments in coal in Australia, Indonesia, and (Outer) Mongolia
(McGregor, 2007). They are developing a large coal‐to‐liquids sector across China and for these
projects it is looking for international partners for possibly capturing and storing the emissions.

The Projects
Due to the economic benefit possible by using CO2 for EOR, this type of project is the primary
cause for Chinese engagement in CO2 storage at the present time. The following projects outline
what activities are currently taking place or are planned in this area. According to a report from
the China University of Petroleum, CO2 injection technology has been applied as an EOR
technique only recently due to the lack of readily available CO2 . Today some discoveries of
natural CO2 sources have been made in recent years, found in the Jiangsu, Shengli and Jilin
oilfields. Most oilfields in east China are entering the “late‐life production” stage and as a result
they require EOR in order to maintain production rates making CO2 EOR increasingly attractive.
“CO2 injection technology has been studied in China since the late 1980’s, and pilot tests were
conducted in the eastern Sanan of Daqing oilfield, Jiangsu oilfield and Xinli 288 area of Jilin
oilfield[3‐5] and satisfactory results were obtained. Unfortunately, there has been little study of
injection CO2 for heavy oil reservoirs in China so far, especially for reservoirs at their late stage
of cyclic steam stimulation (Luo, 2005).” The Shengli Oil Field is the second largest in China and
is located in the Yellow River Delta and produces approximately 500,000 barrels of oil per day.
According to Canadian Geographic, pilot testing using CO2 EOR began in 1998, implemented
using both polymer flooding and steam and gas injection (Canadian Geographic, 2008). The
Liaohe Oil Field, an EOR pilot project to recovery heavy oil located in the Bohai Sea near
Liaoning, has undergone several phases of testing since 1998 (Canadian Geographic, 2008). The
project employs “combustion EOR” which injects steam and boiler flue gasses, containing 12 to
13 percent CO2 , into the reservoir to increase production (Luo, 2005). Liaohe is the third largest
oil field in China and comprises six percent of the national oil supply. The project is operated by
Liaohe Petroleum and Huafu High‐Tech with possible involvement from Panjin Liaohe Oilfield
Tianyi Petroleum Equipment Company and CNOOC/COSL.
China has taken two international events, the 2008 Olympics and the 2010 World Expo, and
recognized them as venues for showcasing their efforts on many aspects of clean technology,
including CCS. Huaneng began to engage in CO2 capture with Australia's Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) just before the 2008 Olympics that were
held in Beijing. They built a demonstration plant that captured and sold CO2 for commercial
purposes, namely for carbonated drinks. The demo employs a post‐combustion capture retrofit
at the Huaneng‐Beijing Gaobeidian 845 MW co‐generation power plant and it captures up to
3000 tons of CO2 per year. Expanding from the Beijing pilot plant, Huaneng has expanded to a
larger Shanghai demonstration project for the Expo. “The world's largest carbon capture project
launched by a coal‐fired power plant broke ground in July in Shanghai. After completion, which
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is scheduled before the end
of this year, the project will
capture as many as 100,000
tons of carbon dioxide
annually (Ying, 2009).” The
location for the project is on
the outskirts of the city at
the Shanghai Shidongkou
Second Power Plant, a
subsidiary of Huaneng. In
terms of the possible end‐
uses for the captured CO2 , in
the short‐term it is expect to
Figure 33 - Shenhua's Coal to Liquids (CTL) Plans
be disposed of locally via
(DCL: Direct, ICL: Indirect) | Source: West Virginia University
commercial gas sales to food
production and industrial companies, with a possibility open that the excess emissions could
eventually be piped for offshore EOR.
Although the international involvement in China is extensive, the state is engaged in several
CCGS related programs that do not involve a good deal of international involvement. The
following two projects give some examples of China’s independent actions, but there is a good
possibility that there are efforts taking place for developing this technology that are beyond the
seight of the global public. Shenhua Group, as already mentioned, is moving quickly to deploy a
significant number of CTL plants as are shown in Figure 33, which is only a small part of the
development in this sector in China. Coal to liquids is recognized as a major CO2 emissions point
source and the technology is listed by WRI as a negative wedge in terms of GHG mitigation,
meaning that it will potentially require an additional wedge worth of mitigation efforts if
deployed globally at a significant scale. Shenhua recognizes this issue to some extent and is
developing partnerships with many foreign companies like Shell, Sasol, and GE so as to develop
capture and storage options for its plants. However, the group has also acted on its own in
developing a demonstration project in Erdos, Inner Mongolia, which appears to use a Rectisol
coal conversion process adapted from American, German, and Japanese processes. Plants such
as this plant capture the CO2 as part of the process and emit practically pure stream of the gas.
The plant is already in operation but the storage demonstration is hoped to come on line before
2011, with 100,000 tons being stored in the Erdos Basin in saline reservoirs and possibly being
used for EOR. If the storage is successful at the pilot level, the project should expand to store 3.9
Mt per year.
The GreenGen group is a corporation formed from a national partnership, headed by the
Huaneng Group (with 51 percent ownership), the other four state power companies, and with
Shenhua and China Coal holding the remaining shares. Peabody Coal applied to join the
corporation and was only recently approved as the sole non‐Chinese partner. The goal of the
corporation is to build an IGCC plant at a demo scale of 250 MW by 2011 in Tianjin, with this
expanding to 650 MW using capture by 2013 and storing the emissions via EOR in the Dangang
or Shengli fields by 2015. Saline reservoir‐based storage will be investigated for the long‐term
(GreenGen Co., 2006).
Just as China has a vested interest in pursuing CCGS on its own, foreign interests have identified
the Chinese market as an ideal stage for initial CCGS projects due to the low costs of materials,
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labor, and a variety of other factors. There is also less of an issue with public acceptance of
projects. As a result there are two kinds of international cooperation efforts that are visible in
China. The first kind is represented by a variety of consortiums, which work to support the
deployment of CCS and can be seen as alliances between China and either singular states or
groups, e.g. the European Union. The second type is a more direct agreement between
companies in an effort to transfer technology to China in a mutually beneficial relationship.
The following groups have been identified from among many that can be found to exist today
and are estimated to be the most important broad arrangements between state‐level interests
in the field of CCGS in China (Zhang, 2009). COACH is an EU funded effort that is led by the IFP
and dominated by French and British corporate actors. It is comprised of a wide range of
Chinese and European institutions but the key players are oil and gas based: Schlumberger,
Alstom, Air Liquide, BP, Shell and Statoil with one smaller Argentinean chemicals company
involved called Atanor. The other organizations are mostly national geological or petroleum
survey groups from Europe and then Tsinghua University, a top engineering and management
school in Beijing, heads of the list of Chinese organizations (COACH, 2007). The main goal
appears to be to developing technology transfer by setting up a variety of memorandums of
understanding (MOUs) and this project was set to end December 2009.
Japan, as one of the early movers in CCGS project demonstration, has approached China to
perform CCS based EOR in the Northeast province of Heilongjiang near Daqing oil field as part of
a Japan‐China development cooperation agreement. The two countries signed an agreement in
May of 2008 that aims to store 3 to 4 Mt to CO2 from two post‐combustion capture based 600
MW power plants for EOR in a major oilfield nearby. The Japanese industrial partners are led by
Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), include: JGC Corporation (a supplier for
the In Salah project), Japan Coal Energy Center, Toyota Motors, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
(MHI) who are working with CNPC/PetroChina and the local Daqing Oil Field Company, the
Harbin Utilities Company, and the Huadian Corporation that is another of the top five state
electricity companies. It is estimated that this project will cost 300 million USD.
The Near Zero Emissions Coal for China (NZEC) project is originally a UK‐China partnership and
remains that way for the first phase of the project, which is designed to explore the possibilities
and options open for demonstrating CCGS in China and increasing the overall CCGS capacity. The
second and third phases of this project are to be taken on by the European Commission,
expanding the scope of this partnership to EU‐China collaboration. Phase II will work to develop
specifically identified capture and storage options in a lead‐up to Phase II that will be a
demonstration plant, probably near the Songliao or Subei basins for EOR and eventually saline‐
based storage. Songliao is already home to two EOR projects at the Jilin and Daqing oilfields but
the Yangzhou oilfield in Subei is also a possibility, which is why the project end location is not
decided yet. This final phase is hoped to begin in 2014.
In addition to the FutureGen project, which involves Chinese participation in the US, the US has
engaged in several US‐China partnership efforts to expand CCS in China. First of all, the US State
Department has supported WRI to create CCS guidelines similar to those completed for the US
and WRI has established an office in Beijing to go about this task and to become more involved
with CCS there in general. Secondly, a group of research partners including the U.S./China
Energy and Environmental Technology Center, Tsinghua University, the Institute of Rock and Soil
Mechanics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Leonardo Technologies, the Battelle managed
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and Montana State University, have worked to
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identify regional opportunities for CCGS in China. This larger effort is led by the Ministry of
Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China (MOST) and the US DOE.
In addition to the broad international collaborations, the second type of international
cooperation effort is comprised of several industry level agreements or MOUs between foreign
and Chinese actors. This type of agreement has also been shown to be a strong method for
ensuring protection of patented technologies by having the Chinese actors gain a vested interest
in protecting their exclusive right to the technology and defend this right on the state level.
As mentioned previously, many MOUs involve the Chinese coal giant Shenhua, who has signed
agreements with Shell, DOW, GE, and Sasol in regards to several of its CTL projects and many of
these companies are already speaking to the issue of CCS for the plant they are involved with
across the state (Sun, 2008). EESTech was formed in Deleware in the US in 2000 as a sustainable
and environmental technology patent acquisition company. As such it has acquired a technology
for carbon management and storage and is working to apply this technology in Asia. The
company has signed an agreement with Dagang Huashi Power Generation Company to build a
capture/compression addition onto a 330 MW Dagang plant in Tianjin and transport the
emissions for EOR in the Dagang oilfield and/or storage (Zhang, 2009).

Figure 34 - China’s CCGS Activities

Greatpoint Energy has rapidly expanded its base in the US with and now has moved to try and
develop a plant in Southeast China with Datang Power, another of the top five state producers.
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One of the main benefits of the “bluegas” hydro‐methanization technology is that the CO2 is left
pure at the end of the process and ready for storage so it makes sense that any operation
employing the technology will seek to store its emissions using CCGS. The demonstration plant
in China was expected to come online within the next three years; however, the plant would
have cost between $100 million and $200 million and this was found to be too exorbitant and
the project was scraped. It was going to be located at a coal‐fired power plant operated by
Datang Huanyin Electric Power and would have been designed to convert 1,500 tons of coal a
day into natural gas,
according to the CEO of
Greatpoint (La Monica,
2009).
This case study has
hopefully brought several
issues to light about
China’s position with
regards to climate change
and its stance on the
CCGS roll‐out as a result.
To sum up from the last
few sections, the map in
Figure 56 gives the
approximate location of
the CCGS projects in
China identified within
this report. As was stated
earlier, there are a
Figure 35 - Chinese Export Make-up Evolution
probably a good number
Source: IMF
of projects that the state
is pursuing out of the media’s focus to maintain a strategic position on this emerging market,
especially in the area of technology development if not true demonstration and deployment.
China has claimed that the finances do not exist for funding a major CCGS scale‐up on its own.
However, the state is in a position, if it decides to give priority to the technology, to become a
serious leader in the global CCGS market. The biggest potential for China’s industrials would be
in developing the technologies needed to build the CCS chain. One reason for this potential is
because the most significant expansion in the Chinese exports can be seen in capital goods, as a
change from a consumption goods based export market 15 years ago as seen in Figure 35, which
along with parts and components has grown to represent 50 percent of their export market
versus less than 20 percent in the early 1990s. However, as the Chinese market does not appear
to have a significant service sector, or at least not one as developed as those found in developed
countries the storage market potentially remains fairly unpopulated by Chinese firms. The
advantages lie in that the financial, legal, regulatory, and public acceptance issues will not be as
severe in China making a roll‐out of full scale CCGS there much more feasible on the storage side
of things. Nevertheless, there are other issues that exist in terms of the political system in terms
of cooperation between regional and local governments and the central government in Beijing
that could prove as stumbling blocks to the otherwise relatively unimpeded possibilities for
exploring and demonstrating storage possibilities at a commercial scale in China.
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What should be clear is that even though the Chinese are resisting a public international
commitment to reducing emissions and as such as promising only to achieve what is feasible
within the scope of what they intend on doing anyway development wise. However, as they are
aware of the implications of being cut out of the export market by a price on carbon that could
drastically affect the competitively of their products and also of their potentially strong position
as a capital goods supplier in the emerging CCGS roll‐out, they will not completely disregard the
climate change and CCGS issues. What seems more likely is that they will delay for as long as
possible any formal signature to an international commitment while they also pursue emissions
reductions employing many technologies, including many types of CCS, CCGS, and especially
carbon capture, use, and storage (CCUS), at their own pace. Based on this situation, it can be
argued that the pace China will engage in this task, as can be seen in just about anything China
engages in, will be significantly faster than would be achieved elsewhere and certainly faster
than the rest of the world thinks is possible.
If a policy is adopted that charges a tax on emissions embodied in goods, imports coming from
China will probably need to have their carbon accounted for and appropriately taxed. This could
be similar to the REACH Regulation on Chemicals that was recently adopted by the EU. As a
result of the regulation, foreign chemical producers in countries like the US and China that do
not have as strict regulations regarding chemicals must comply if they wish to sell on the
European market based on a “no‐data‐no‐market” principle. With regard to CO2 emissions, if
China does commit to the decreases decided upon at Copenhagen and the US and EU do,
China’s emissions associated with the production of exported goods could place these products
at a disadvantage compared to goods produced in EU and US that will potentially embody fewer
emissions in this case.
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Final Case Comparison and Conclusion
In light of the climate situation, the economic implications of decreasing carbon emissions, and
the overall status (technologically and economically) of the various solutions available today for
addressing that situation, CCGS should play a significant role as a means of achieving a long‐
term solution. However, the technology is not a solution in and of itself, and in most cases will
have a limited life expectancy – aproximately the same as the life of the first generation of
commerical plants. In refference to the estimation by the IEA, the construction of 3,400 CCGS
projects globally will be the end of development for CCGS except in unique cases of steel,
cement, petrochemical, and chemical production that may continue to require GHG emissions
control systems as necessary feedstocks for many products.
Adding a price to CO2 , with a direct carbon tax or an economy‐wide cap‐and‐trade system alike,
is essentially taxing GHG emissions. No matter how it is implemented, any argument that takes
into account the social implications of such a fee must do so on a social basis, not a state‐basis.
If the entire world wishes to join a climate treaty that essentially establishes an enforcement
power, higher than any state government, that can regulate GHGs; only at that point could the
global population be divided along the lines of rich/carbon‐intensive versus poor/low‐carbon
individuals. Under such a system, brackets could be drawn for individual carbon intensity
profiles to place the greatest responsibility on the upper brackets that would be designed to
contain the richest people with the highest emissions. However, as the current national
governments would never agree to such a loss of power, climate regulation policies must be
developed at the state level and as such state emissions must be considered in their totality and
not in terms of any per capita argument.
In line with this fundamental political reality, another interesting argument could be to examine
state emissions not by how much that sate produces, but instead by how much of emissions are
embodied in the products that are consumed within its borders. For instance, when one ton of
steel is produced and it generates one ton of CO2 as a result, it is the eventual buyer of that
steel that is responsible for those carbon emissions and not the steel plant in China. Calculating
China's emissions, “On a consumption rather than a production basis both lowers its
responsibility for carbon‐dioxide (CO2 ) emissions in 2006 from 5,500 to 3,840 Mt CO2 and
reduces the growth rate of emissions from an average of 12.5 [percent per year] to 8.7 [percent
per year] between 2001 and 2006 (Pan J., 2008).” This means that 30 percent of China’s CO2
emissions and 4 percent of the resulting growth rate for these emissions are embodied in its
exports.
To not consider emissions in this way creates significant problems that can be seen today
throughout the global economy and are referred to as carbon leakage. With no global treaty
regulating emissions, the strong desire in most developed countries to go green coupled with a
need to do so as economically as possible, together are driving a significant shift in production
to developing countries. The industries of developed countries already are forced to compete
with the low wages and artificially low currency of China. Increased pressure for companies to
produce their products more cleanly and with less GHG emissions serves to underscore the
existing difficulty they face by operating in a country with stricter environmental controls, higher
wage and working standards, and higher exchange rates. Although countries with large amounts
of carbon‐free energy production capacity (like France ‐ with its large nuclear fleet and just over
six tons of CO2 per capita) appear to lead in the green energy movement, it is the countries who
do not really embody such desires to go green (like China) or with small industrial sectors (like
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Switzerland ‐ with its dominant banking sector powered by hydroelectricity) who benefit the
most. While China gains from the industries that give up on achieving the higher standards in
their home country and move their production centers to within its borders, Switzerland has
little industry to lose and gains by financing the moves. France is actually at the greatest
disadvantage because it is constrained by a European emissions regulation and has a sizable
industrial sector while the US remains in limbo, caught between the European example of how
to run a green economy regardless of the cost and the Chinese example of how to maintain
consistent GDP growth regardless of the environmental consequences. The risk is that in the end
developing countries will be powered by green energy technology all made in China and while
the EU and the US suffer from unemployment and budget deficits and China suffers from severe
environmental degradation and social inequality, the whole world will have achieved nothing
with respect to lowering GHG emissions.
Assigning the onus of emissions to the countries where the products that embody those
emissions are consumed significantly alters the picture. According to a Stanford study, if one
looks at emissions on a consumption basis the numbers shift slightly. While the emissions for
the US is responsible increases by 13 percent and China’s decrease by roughly one third,
France’s emissions increase by nearly 50 percent and Switzerland’s emissions more than double.
Despite the potential attractiveness of this kind of accounting, it creates massive carbon
crediting problems in terms of assigning a price to carbon because it relies on life cycle analysis
to calculate not only what a product’s carbon is but also to determine from which country these
emissions were added to the products overall embodied carbon. Moreover, the fact still
potentially ends with a drastic shift away from buying the now expensive, carbon‐intensive,
products from China no matter whether a carbon tax is placed on products at the production
end or the consumption end. These various means of describing who is to blame for the climate
issue in the end need to decide if it is a global priority to cap emissions and stabilize the GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere. Once this can be agreed to, the responsibility of each nation
must comply with the overall cap agreed upon will no longer be a moral argument but one
based on economics and a commitment to global wellbeing.
It should be noted as well that CCGS is not only a climate change mitigation‐based solution and
that the technology serves as a market mechanism for moving towards a new energy system;
one no longer based on fossil fuels. As these resources are becoming increasingly scarce (in
terms of long‐term resource management) it is aparent that policies and financial incentives
need to be put in place that not only encourage the development and deployment of new
energy production methods but also the discouragement of inefficient and poluting
technologies that currently make up most of the 88 percent of the global energy production
relying on fossil fuels.
With respect to the cost of the technology itself, the technological costs are quickly moving
down the curve for capture technologies. At the same time however, the costs of transport and
storage are becoming less and less certain as projects encounter legal, regulatory, and public
acceptance issues. One issue that has become prominent is that it is not sufficient for projects to
simply be “capture ready”. A “capture ready” project with no feasible transport or storage
options is a waste of time and capital. Rather, projects that first assess a region/locality in need
of CCGS should, given the industrial/emissions make‐up of that area, pursue from the start a
geological assessment to determine storage options. Once this is completed, the region should
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be examined using an industrial ecology‐based approach to determine the most cost effective
means for treating and storing the CO2 .
In terms of the three countries examined in this report, the situation becomes more complex in
terms of when and why a CCGS roll‐out will be realized by each country. For the US, it is in the
best position with respect to getting a return on an investment in CCGS‐coupled energy
production because it has the largest coal reserves, both in terms of quantity and anticipated
longevity. The technology will therefore serve as a key aspect in the decision making process for
how the state will engage in a global climate treaty. Despite the lack of any federal level
limitations on emissions, the US has engaged rapidly in developing CCGS projects across the
country, assisted by the surge in federal funding facilitated by the economic recovery package
and the DOE. Most of these projects are related to enhanced oil recovery (EOR), but there are
still a significant amount of them that are pursuing storage purely for mitigation reasons.
For France CCGS has merits in certain cases, such as for the carbon intensive port of Le Havre
due to the large amount of fossil fuel use and processing based there. However, the country
does not have any apparent desire to re‐embrace carbon intensive energy technologies due to
the implications this would have for its energy independence. Therefore, the basis for significant
CCGS development work by multinational corporations headquartered in France, is with the
goal of applying the technology either to their operations abroad or to sell services relating to
the technology to projects elsewhere, especially in the US and in China but also potentially in
India and South America, which are also anticipated to become major targets for commercial
CCGS deployment.
China is the most complicated case in terms of CCGS in that the state is somewhere in between
a developing and developed nation at the moment. As such the Chinese government recognizes
the technology as a means to encourage support from developed nation in terms of technology
transfer and project development. However, the state also appears to recognize the strategic
implications of CCGS technology along with green technology in general globally and sees a need
to develop its own competence in this area so as to remain competitive in the rapidly
developing markets that service this expanding sector. Furthermore, with only a limited amount
of coal reserves given the expansion of China’s consumption of this resource, which is estimated
to leave the country with 50 years or less of its national supply, a solution is needed to facilitate
a change to a new energy source and as a result China has strong ambitions in the area of
nuclear and renewable technology development. In light of this limit on China’s coal, CCGS
should be seen much more as a bridge technology than a solution for energy, as opposed to in
the US where the coal reserves are more substantial.
Ultimately, after the legal and acceptance issues are addressed for the global rollout of CCGS,
the main concern will be resource and energy consumption by building the 3,400 projects
implied by the CCS wedge. Substantial work needs to be done in terms of the life cycle of CCGS
projects. Given past experience with technology scale‐ups and major projects, it should be
anticipated that resources like steel, cement, coal, technical supplies like wire and valves, and
manpower will be affected in terms of availability and price. However, this will not serve to
decrease CCGS technology’s competitively relative to other core base‐load energy supply
technologies as they will all imply roughly equal amounts of these key resources to build.
Returning to the IEA Blue Map scenario, an increase in prices for these resources would merely
decrease the amount of the global solutions based on new construction as opposed to
efficiency. Currently the IEA predicts that 46 percent of the solution lies in new construction
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with 19 percent of that coming from CCS. However, it resources become more expensive this
amount will decrease and efficiency gains will be discovered, not only due to the financial
incentives that are in place from a global climate agreement, but also from the high costs of
materials.
Therefore, the final assessment for CCGS is that it will need to be deployed. The scale of this
deployment cannot be known at this point but evidence suggests that it will be less than the IEA
estimate implies. This nevertheless implies a significant outlay of capital for the projects that will
be built, which will be numerous even if it is not exactly 3,400 as suggested by the IEA.
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Appendix I: Global EOR Projects from Oil and Gas Journal (2008)
Operator

Country

Start date

Profit

EOR Type

Previous Method

Formation
Limestone

Kinder Morgan

USA

January‐72

Yes

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Occidental

USA

April‐72

Yes

miscible

Primary, Gas Injection

Tripolite

Great Western Drilling

USA

January‐74

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Petrotrin

Trinidad

January‐74

‐

immiscible

Primary

Sandstone

Petrotrin

Trinidad

January‐74

Yes

immiscible

Primary

Sandstone

Petrotrin

Trinidad

June‐76

Yes

immiscible

Primary

Sandstone

Petrotrin

Trinidad

June‐76

Yes

immiscible

Primary

Sandstone

Stanberry Oil

USA

June‐80

Yes

miscible

Primary

Sandstone

ConocoPhillips

USA

February‐81

Yes

miscible

Primary

Dolomite

ConocoPhillips

USA

February‐81

Yes

miscible

Primary

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

January‐82

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Chaparral Energy

USA

September‐82

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Merit Energy

USA

September‐82

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Occidental

USA

April‐83

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Hess

USA

July‐83

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

ExxonMobil

USA

November‐83

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

January‐84

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Penn West Energy Trust

Canada

January‐84

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Petrotrin

Trinidad

January‐84

Yes

immiscible

Primary

Sandstone

Occidental

USA

November‐84

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

December‐84

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

December‐84

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Denbury Resources

USA

January‐85

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

ExxonMobil

USA

February‐85

Yes

miscible

Primary

Limestone

Apache

USA

May‐85

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Pure Resources

USA

May‐85

Yes

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Dolomite

XTO Energy Inc.

USA

July‐85

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

XTO Energy Inc.

USA

October‐85

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

XTO Energy Inc.

USA

December‐85

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Tripolite

Denbury Resources

USA

January‐86

‐

miscible

Primary

Sandstone

Occidental

USA

January‐86

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Petrotrin

Trinidad

January‐86

‐

immiscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Petrotrin

Trinidad

January‐86

Yes

immiscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

TPAO

Turkey

March‐86

Yes

immiscible

‐

Limestone

Fasken

USA

July‐86

‐

miscible

Primary

Dolomite

Chevron

USA

October‐86

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Merit Energy

USA

October‐86

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Occidental

USA

June‐88

Yes

miscible

Primary, Gas Injection

Tripolite

Merit Energy

USA

May‐89

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Merit Energy

USA

May‐89

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Apache

USA

June‐89

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Petrotrin

Trinidad

June‐90

‐

immiscible

Primary

Sandstone

Petrotrin

Trinidad

June‐90

No

immiscible

Primary

Sandstone

Petrobras

Brazil

January‐91

Yes

immiscible

Primary, Waterflood

Sandstone

Chevron

USA

January‐92

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

September‐93

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite
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Occidental

USA

October‐93

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Limestone

Chevron

USA

January‐94

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

April‐94

Yes

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Sandstone

Occidental

USA

August‐94

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

February‐95

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

June‐95

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Orla Petco

USA

July‐95

No

miscible

Primary

Sandstone

Pure Resources

USA

November‐95

Yes

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Dolomite

Whiting Petroleum

USA

November‐95

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Core Energy

USA

January‐96

‐

miscible

Primary

Limestone

Core Energy

USA

January‐96

‐

miscible

Primary

Limestone
Dolomite

Energen Resources

USA

May‐96

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Merit Energy

USA

June‐96

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Hess

USA

July‐96

‐

miscible

None

Dolomite

XTO Energy Inc.

USA

December‐96

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Core Energy

USA

January‐97

‐

miscible

Primary

Limestone

Core Energy

USA

January‐97

‐

miscible

Primary

Limestone

Merit Energy

USA

February‐97

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Fasken

USA

March‐97

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

April‐97

Yes

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Dolomite

Chevron

USA

July‐97

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

July‐97

Yes

miscible

Primary, Gas Injection

Tripolite

Occidental

USA

October‐97

No

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Hess

USA

November‐97

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

November‐97

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Tripolite

Pure Resources

USA

January‐98

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Limestone

Resolute Natural Resources

USA

October‐98

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Limestone

Chaparral Energy

USA

November‐98

Yes

immiscible

Primary

Sandstone

Petrobras

Brazil

January‐99

‐

miscible

Primary

Sandstone

Occidental

USA

February‐99

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Limestone

Occidental

USA

July‐99

Yes

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

August‐00

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

EnCana

Canada

September‐00

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Merit Energy

USA

September‐00

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Anadarko

USA

January‐01

Yes

miscible

Gas Injection, Waterflood

Sandstone

Occidental

USA

March‐01

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Chaparral Energy

USA

April‐01

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Occidental

USA

August‐01

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

October‐01

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Limestone

Denbury Resources

USA

December‐01

‐

miscible

Primary

Sandstone

Anadarko

USA

September‐03

Yes

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Sandstone

Denbury Resources

USA

November‐03

‐

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Sandstone

Denbury Resources

USA

December‐03

‐

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Sandstone

Murfin Drilling

USA

December‐03

No

miscible

Waterflood

Limestone

Core Energy

USA

January‐04

‐

miscible

Primary

Limestone

Core Energy

USA

January‐04

‐

miscible

Primary

Limestone

Kinder Morgan

USA

March‐04

Yes

immiscible

Gas Injection

Dolomite

Hess

USA

April‐04

‐

miscible

None

Dolomite
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Hess

USA

April‐04

‐

miscible

None

Dolomite

Anadarko Canada

Canada

September‐04

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

September‐04

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Devon Canada

Canada

October‐04

‐

miscible

‐

Limestone

Anadarko

USA

December‐04

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Core Energy

USA

January‐05

‐

miscible

Primary

Limestone

Denbury Resources

USA

January‐05

‐

miscible

Gas Injection, Waterflood

Sandstone

Denbury Resources

USA

March‐05

‐

miscible

Primary

Sandstone

Penn West Energy Trust

Canada

March‐05

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Occidental

USA

September‐05

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Anadarko

USA

October‐05

‐

immiscible

Primary, Waterflood

Sandstone

Apache Canada

Canada

October‐05

Yes

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Core Energy

USA

January‐06

‐

miscible

Primary

Limestone

Occidental

USA

January‐06

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite

Denbury

USA

March‐06

‐

immiscible

Primary

Sandstone

Denbury Resources

USA

March‐06

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Denbury Resources

USA

March‐06

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Denbury

USA

April‐06

‐

immiscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Denbury Resources

USA

April‐06

‐

miscible

Primary

Sandstone

Denbury Resources

USA

April‐06

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

George R. Brown

USA

May‐06

‐

miscible

‐

‐

Whiting Petroleum

USA

January‐07

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Pengrowth Corp.

Canada

February‐07

‐

miscible

Hydrocarbon

Limestone

Anadarko

USA

May‐07

‐

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Sandstone
Sandstone

Whiting Petroleum

USA

May‐07

Yes

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Denbury Resources

USA

September‐07

‐

miscible

Primary, Waterflood

Sandstone

Chaparral Energy

USA

December‐07

TETT

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Denbury Resources

USA

December‐07

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Sandstone

Hess

USA

December‐07

‐

miscible

None

Dolomite

Occidental

USA

January‐08

‐

miscible

Waterflood

Dolomite
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Appendix II: Global Projects from GCCSI List (Nov 2009)
Capture Type

Transport
Type

Storage
Type

USA

Estimated
Operation
Date
2012

Post‐combustion

TBD

Netherlands

2014

Pre‐combustion

Pipeline /
Ship

EOR
EGR or
depleted
oil/gas field

Project Name

Country

W.A. Parish
Rotterdam CGEN

Storage
Rates
(Mtpa)
1.0
2.5

AEP Northeastern CO2
Capture Project
Tenaska

USA

2011

Post‐combustion

Pipeline

EOR

1.5

USA

2014

Pipeline

EOR

4.3

Lianyungang

China

TBD

TBD

EOR

0.1‐1.0

Lockwood Gasification
Antelope Valley and
Williston Basin

USA

2009

Post‐combustion
Pre and
postcombustion
Pre‐combustion

Pipeline

EOR

7.2

USA

2012

Post‐combustion

Pipeline

EOR

1.0

Masdar

United Arab
Emirates

2013

Post‐combustion

EOR

4.3

HECA IGCC

USA

2015

Pre‐combustion

EOR

1.8

Quest CCS Project

Canada

TBD

Oil refining

EOR

1.2

Husky CO2 Injection

Canada

2012

Oil refining

EOR

TBD

Enhance Energy Pipeline
and EOR Project

Canada

TBD

Oil refining and
fertiliser
production

EOR

1.8
(initial)

Rangely EOR Project

USA

1986

NG processing

EOR

1.0

Val Verde CO2 Pipeline

USA

1998

NG processing

EOR

1.0

Weyburn Operations

Canada

2000

Pre‐combustion

EOR

2.4

Salt Creek EOR

USA

2006

NG processing

EOR

2.4

300 km
Pipeline
6.4 km
Pipeline
10‐60 km
Pipeline
Pipeline
240 km
Pipeline
(Alberta
Carbon
Trunk Line)
285 km
Pipeline
132km
Pipeline
330 km
Pipeline
201 km
Pipeline

GreenGen

China

2020

Pre‐combustion

TBD

Genesee CCS Project

Canada

2015

Pre‐combustion

Pipeline

EOR and/or
Saline
EOR and/or
Saline
Geological

TBD
1.2

Ledvice

Czech Republic

2015

Post‐combustion

Pipeline

Siekierki

Poland

2015

Post‐combustion

Geological

2.5

HYPOGEN

Norway

2014

Pre‐combustion

Geological

2.5

Kedzierzyn

Poland

2015

Pre‐combustion

Geological

2.4

FINNCAP ‐ Meri Pori

Finland

2015

Post‐combustion

Geological

2.4

SWP Entrada
SWP Deep Saline
Sequestration

USA

2009

NG processing

Pipeline
Pipeline,
ship or
combined
Pipeline
800‐2000 km
Ship
Pipeline

Geological

1.1

USA

TBD

NG Processing

Pipeline

Geological

1.0

Snøhvit CO2 Injection

Norway

2007

NG processing

Geological

0.7

In Salah

Algeria

2004

NG processing

Geological

1.2

Nuon Magnum

Netherlands

2015

Pre‐combustion

Pipeline

Kingsnorth

England

2014

Post‐combustion

270 km
Pipeline
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160 km
Pipeline
14 km
Pipeline

Depleated
Gas
Reservoir
Depleated
Gas
Reservoir

1.1

2.0

2.0

Dongguan

China

TBD

Pre‐combustion

TBD

Shell/Essent Project

Netherlands

2015

Pre‐combustion

Pipeline

Rotterdam Afvang en
Opslag Demo

Netherlands

2015

Post‐combustion

25 km
Pipeline

Coolimba

Australia

TBD

Post‐combustion

20‐80 km
Pipeline

Longannet

Scotland

2014

Post‐combustion

Pipeline or
ship

FuturGas

Australia

2017

Pre‐combustion

80‐200 km
Pipeline

Bintulu

Malaysia

2011

NG processing

TBD

Hatfield

England

2014

Pre‐combustion

80 km
Pipeline

Browse LNG

Australia

2015

NG Processing

Pipeline

Eston Grange

England

2015

Pre‐combustion

250 km
Pipeline

Karsto

Norway

2012

Post combustion

Pipeline

Janschwalde

Germany

2015

Oxyfiring and post‐
combustion

150 km
Pipeline

Compastilla Project

Spain

2015

Oxyfiring

Porto Tolle
BKK Gasskraftverk
Mongstad
Kalundborg

Italy

2015

Norway

Depleated
Oil
Reservoir
Depleated
Oil/Gas
Reservoir
Depleated
Oil/Gas
Reservoir
Depleated
Oil/Gas
Reservoir
Depleated
Oil/Gas
Reservoir
Saline or
Depleated
Oil/Gas
Reservoir
Saline or
Depleated
Oil/Gas
Reservoir
Saline or
Depleated
Oil/Gas
Reservoir
Saline or
Depleated
Oil/Gas
Reservoir
Saline or
Depleated
Oil/Gas
Reservoir
Saline
Saline

0.1‐1.0

2.0‐4.0

1.1

3.0

2.0

1.6

3.0

4.75

3.0

4.2
1.0
1.8
(Oxyfiring)
0.9 (PCC)

Saline

TBD

Post‐combustion

80‐90 km
Pipeline
Pipeline

Saline

1.0

TBD

Post‐combustion

Pipeline

Saline

1.0

Denmark

TBD

Post‐combustion

Saline

3.4

SEI ‐ Saline Joniche

Italy

TBD

Post‐combustion

Saline

8.0

PCOR Ft Nelson

Canada

2011

NG processing

Saline

1.6

ZeroGen

Australia

2015

Pre‐combustion

Saline

2.0

Belchatow
Aalborg
(Nordjyllandsvaerket)
Gorgon Project
RWE Goldenbergwerk
(Huerth)
FutureGen
Big Sky Development Test
(Moxa Arch)
Sleipner

Poland

2015

Post‐combustion

Saline

1.7

Denmark

2014

Post‐combustion

Saline

1.9

Australia

2015 (est.)

NG processing

TBD
Truck or
pipeline
78 km
Pipeline
100 km
Pipeline
Pipeline
30 km
Pipeline
Pipeline

Saline

3.4

Germany

2015

Pre‐combustion

Pipeline

Saline

2.8

USA

2018

Pipeline

Saline

1.0

USA

TBD

Pipeline

Saline

1.0

Norway

1996

Pre‐combustion
Oil refining or NG
processing
NG processing

Pipeline

Saline

1.0
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Southern California Edison
IGCC

USA

2017

Pre‐combustion

Pipeline

Taylorville IGCC

USA

2014

Pre‐combustion

TBD

Wandoan Power

Australia

2015

Pre‐combustion

Yulin Chemical Plant
Tilbury Clean Coal Power
Station

China

TBD

Pre‐combustion

England

TBD

Post‐combustion

103

Up to 200
km Pipeline
Pipeline
150 km
Pipeline

Saline or
EOR
Geological
and/or
beneficial
reuse
Geological
or EOR
TBD

5.0–10.0

TBD

4.0

3.0

TBD

2.5

